

















WHAT MAKES LIFE FEEL MEANINGFUL? 
Thesis submitted by Vlad Costin to the University of Sussex for qualification of 

























I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or 






























University of Sussex 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
What makes life feel meaningful? 
SUMMARY 
Through a series of four papers using experimental and correlational methods, this 
thesis investigates precursors to judging life as meaningful. This thesis extends and 
tests tripartite models that define meaning in life (MIL) as comprised of the three 
dimensions of purpose, coherence and significance, while integrating claims derived 
from the Meaning Maintenance Model and previous research on sources of MIL 
(e.g., relationships, personal control). In Paper 1, we showed that different kinds of 
coherence threat (self-uncertainty and general uncertainty) were perceived 
differently, with self-uncertainty being overall most successful at influencing felt 
uncertainty; however, neither of the two manipulations influenced MIL judgements. 
In Paper 2, against our predictions, we did not find evidence that the effects of 
belongingness and personal control additively increase sense of MIL. In Paper 3, 
across three studies, we tested whether fulfilment of the three dimensions of MIL 
(coherence, purpose, significance) predicts MIL judgments contemporaneously and 
over time. In Study 1, we improved previous measures to create distinct scales of the 
key constructs. In Studies 2 and 3, we showed that sense of significance was the 
most consistent predictor of MIL judgments across time, with the effects of purpose 
and coherence being moderated by religious belief (Study 3). Finally, in Paper 4, we 
used a multilevel approach to show that different meaning frameworks (i.e., 
propositions that one holds about oneself and the world; e.g., identities, values) are 
seen as more meaningful, the more they provide a sense of purpose, significance and 
coherence. This, in turn, predicted the perceived importance of meaning frameworks. 
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Finally, I discuss implications for the future of the construct of MIL in terms of 
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When I started my PhD project, I initially set out to study the psychological 
functions of historical narratives, and I proposed that, alongside other psychological 
needs, they would fulfil a need for meaning. However, reading through the many 
studies that use the word “meaning”, I became increasingly unsure about the 
theoretical boundaries of the construct. Given this definitional ambiguity, previous 
findings on meaning were difficult to interpret. As such, what I initially envisaged as 
a secondary aspect of my PhD research, quickly became its focus. The breadth and 
depth of questions related to meaning would have made unsatisfactory any cursory 
attempt at studying it. Furthermore, questions about meaning in life are at once 
fascinating and of ultimate personal importance for individuals (“a matter of life and 
death”, Yalom, 1980, p. 419) 
People have been preoccupied with how to live good lives long before 
psychology was a discipline of study. For a comparably long period of time, people 
have cautioned against defining a good life simply in terms of things that are 
immediate and pleasurable (Aristotle, c.350BCE/1962). Stories often portray their 
characters trying to make sense of who they are, trying to figure out why life is 
worth living, or what their ultimate purpose is. Herman Hesse (1922/2008) depicts 
Siddhartha, the eponymous protagonist of his novel, embarking on a lifelong quest to 
find what makes a meaningful life. Tolstoy’s (1886/2010) Ivan Ilych lives a non-
reflective, carefree life until awareness of his imminent death confronts him with the 
consequences of having lived an empty life. People also talk about engaging in 
meaningful life pursuits and finding fulfilment in their lives. 
Despite the widespread interest, it is unclear how people appraise their lives 
as being more or less meaningful. Does the presence (or absence) of certain 
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psychological states reliably predict whether people experience their lives as 
meaningful (or meaningless)? In this Introduction chapter, I will review existing 
definitions of meaning in life and selectively discuss the most compelling accounts 
of what can affect one’s perceptions of meaningfulness. I will highlight gaps in 
existing research throughout. Finally, I will describe the series of questions 
addressed throughout my PhD project and how they have attempted to integrate 
various lines of inquiry to form a more cohesive account of how people perceive 
meaning in life.  
Defining and Measuring Meaning in Life 
Before defining meaning in life (MIL), I draw attention to the difference 
between meaning in life and meaning of life (Crescioni & Baumeister, 2013; Debats, 
Drost, & Hansen, 1995). The latter involves ontological assumptions about human 
nature and existence, i.e., that there is an underlying meaning that applies to all life. 
Meaning of life is a topic that has been addressed within philosophy (e.g., trying to 
capture aspects of life that are objectively valuable and attractive; Kant, 1790/1987). 
MIL, instead, is personal: rather than referring to life in general (Is life meaningful?), 
MIL is about an individual’s life, in particular (Is my life meaningful?). 
MIL is an abstract well-being construct (e.g., eudaimonic well-being, Ryan & 
Deci, 2001) that is separate from related constructs such as life satisfaction (Steger & 
Kashdan, 2007) and happiness (Baumeister, Vohs, Aaker & Garbinsky, 2013), but 
with considerable overlap (e.g., Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006). Some 
philosophers have argued that MIL is also linked to some objective feature of the 
world. For instance, Wolf (2010) defines MIL as something that is “realized by 
loving objects that are worthy of love” (p. 13). Similarly, Mintoff (2008) suggests 
that MIL is related to having connections to things that are transcendent (i.e., that are 
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less likely to be undercut by doubts about their arbitrariness and insignificance). For 
instance, engaging in political activism might be inherently more meaningful than 
having a beer with friends. Thus defined, MIL is a phenomenon that could be 
identified by external observers: if individuals are observed engaging in more 
objectively attractive (or transcendent) activities, then their lives will also be rated as 
more meaningful.   
Nevertheless, it is unclear what constitutes a worthwhile endeavour. People 
might be prone to self-deception when assessing the objective value of their pursuits. 
For instance, a person could be convinced of the worth of their artistic creation, 
despite it having no discernible value (e.g., stylistically flawed, unappreciated or 
unknown by others; Koethe, 2010). This person would supposedly perceive their life 
as meaningful. It remains unclear whether such a life would be qualitatively different 
from that of a person who genuinely produces something of value. Furthermore, 
when talking about self-deception, the implication is that there is a true objective 
criterion of value, regardless of one’s appraisal. Wolf (2010) admits that her 
examples of worthwhile pursuits are based on US middle-class values. This suggests 
that any candidates for objective criteria would be heavily socially and culturally 
prescribed. In this case, the objective component of MIL would become a measure of 
how much activities that one enjoys are congruent with those sanctioned by the 
cultural context in which an individual finds oneself. These issues have prompted 
some to question whether a meaningful life is anything other than the individual 
perceiving their life as meaningful (e.g., Haidt, 2010).  
Most psychology research on MIL has avoided this philosophical debate by 
only capturing the subjective component of MIL through self-report measures. These 
measures have participants project their own notions of MIL when responding to 
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items such as “I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful” (Meaning in 
Life Questionnaire – Presence subscale, MLQ-P; Steger et al., 2006). The subjective 
appraisals of MIL, as captured by self-report measures, will be henceforth referred to 
as MIL judgments or sense of MIL (e.g., George & Park, 2016a). Regardless of 
whether MIL judgments can be equated to MIL, feeling that life is meaningful 
should be at least partially indicative of how meaningful life is (Heintzelman & 
King, 2015). Moreover, others have argued that MIL judgments are beneficial in 
their own right (Hicks & King, 2009a).  
Most studies that have looked at positive life outcomes within the meaning 
literature have used MIL judgments. As such, sense of MIL has been associated with 
higher life satisfaction and lower depression scores (Steger et al., 2006; Zika & 
Chamberlain, 1992). During adolescence, MIL judgments have been associated with 
lower binge drinking, drug use, and unsafe sex, as well as increased physical 
exercise and healthy eating (Brassai, Piko & Steger, 2011). Moreover, associations 
between MIL judgments and health benefits were present even one year after the 
initial measurement, while also controlling for prior health, values, and other well-
being scores (Brassai, Piko, & Steger, 2015).   
Nevertheless, self-reported measures of MIL have been criticised on several 
accounts.  Firstly, early measures of sense of MIL such as the Life Regard Index 
(LRI; Battista & Almond, 1973) and the Purpose in Life Index (PIL; Crumbaugh & 
Maholick, 1964) have been confounded with some of their predicted correlates, such 
as positive and negative affect, and life satisfaction (Mascaro, Rosen & Morey, 
2004; Schnell, 2009; Steger et al., 2006; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). While these 
issues have been addressed by more recent measures (Steger et al., 2006), many 
questionnaires use items related to purpose (“My personal existence is: (1) utterly 
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meaningless, without purpose, (5) purposeful and meaningful”; Crumbaugh & 
Maholick, 1964) and coherence (“Do you have the feeling that you are in an 
unfamiliar situation and don’t know what to do?”; Antonovsky, 1987). As I will 
discuss later, coherence and purpose are constructs related to MIL, but these should 
be distinguished from more global MIL judgments (for differences between sense of 
purpose and MIL judgments, see George & Park, 2013). In this sense, measures such 
as the Perceived Personal Meaning Scale (PPMS; Wong, 1998; e.g., to what extent 
do you “feel your life as a whole has meaning”) are more appropriate to measure 
MIL judgments in isolation (George & Park, 2013). Finally, sense of MIL ratings 
have been influenced by theoretically unrelated factors such as mood (Hicks & King, 
2009b; King, Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006), and socially desirable responding 
(Ebersole & Quiring, 1989). However, the latter association is similar to that 
between social desirability and other well-being measures (Heintzelman, Trent, & 
King, 2015), and is even sometimes absent (e.g., Steger et al., 2006).  
Predictors of MIL Judgments 
Studies using open-ended questions have identified several potential sources 
of MIL (e.g., Wong, 1998; Delle Fave, Brdar, Wissing, & Vella-Brodrick, 2013; 
Schnell, 2009; for a summary of sources identified across several research 
programmes see Schnell, 2011, p. 669). Within these studies, participants’ responses 
are organised into categories such as religion, community, family, self-growth, and 
autonomy. Moreover, in experimental studies, various factors have been shown to 
influence MIL judgments, such as regularities in one’s environment (Heintzelman, 
Trent, & King, 2013), counterfactual thinking (Kray et al., 2010; Seto, Hicks, Davis, 
& Smallman, 2015) and knowledge about one’s perceived “true self” (Schlegel, 
Hicks, King, & Arndt, 2011). Apart from these few experimental studies, most of the 
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research in this area is correlational or qualitative. As such, the direction of causation 
is mainly inferred theoretically, as opposed to demonstrated empirically. In what 
follows, I discuss three of the most well-researched, or theoretically-promising 
predictors of MIL judgments: relationships to others, personal control and self-
esteem.  
 Relationships to others. “Hell is other people” is Sartre’s often cited line 
from the play “No Exit” (Sartre, 1944/1989) and is almost just as frequently 
misunderstood to mean that relationships with others are undesirable, negative. In 
fact, Sartre, by his own statements (see Grippe, 2012), meant to underline the 
importance of others in that we define ourselves through the means that others 
provide. Quite different from a message of alienation, Sartre stresses the importance 
that our relations play in making sense of ourselves and our existence. Jovchelovitch 
(2007) explains that the world cannot be represented in isolation: as the child is 
vulnerable at birth, it is dependent on another. Winnicott (1960) famously remarked, 
there is no such thing as just a baby, instead there is always a baby and its caregiver. 
Moscovici (1984) described his construct of social representations as a means of 
“making something familiar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” (p. 37), but as the 
“social” in the name suggests, they are necessarily constructed in acts of 
communication with others 
In the past 50 years of meaning research, social relationships emerge as “the 
most consistent and compelling source of meaning” (O’Donnell et al., 2014, p. 45). 
In their review, O’Donnell and colleagues focus on three important types of 
relationships: family, romantic and friendship. In urban samples from seven 
countries, across 3 continents (Australia, Africa and Europe), 83.9% of participants 
mentioned family as a source of meaning in life (Delle Fave et al., 2013). In a study 
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of young adults in the United States, 68% of participants picked family or a specific 
family member (e.g., mother) as “one thing that makes life most meaningful for 
you”, and the second most frequent contributor was friends, with 14% (Lambert et 
al., 2010, Study 1). Finally, relationships emerge as associated with MIL even when 
using non-verbal methods (Steger et al., 2013). Participants were asked to “take 
photos of the things that make your life feel meaningful” (p. 534), as well as to 
describe the pictures and explain what they meant. Over 89% percent of the 
submitted pictures (and their corresponding descriptions) were placed by 
independent coders under one of the 5 sub-categories of the “relationships” main 
category: family, friends, romantic partners, child, co-workers.  
Conversely, when people are systematically deprived of healthy relationships 
they report lower levels of meaning. Both being a victim and being a perpetrator of 
bullying correlated negatively with sense of MIL (Henry et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
those who are faced with the loss of an important other, sometimes report 
experiencing “meaning crises” (Lichtenthal, Currier, & Keesee, 2013; Wheeler, 
2001).  
Relationships that induce a sense of belonging have been shown to have the 
most positive impact on sense of MIL (Lambert et al., 2013). Belonging is a 
universal human need (Baumeister and Leary, 1995) and has been defined as “a 
secure sense of fitting in” (Lambert et al., 2013, p. 1418). Previous studies have 
shown that identities that engendered a sense of belonging provided a sense of MIL 
both correlationally and prospectively (Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & 
Scabini, 2006). Moreover, in experimental studies, participants who were asked to 
reflect on belongingness reported a higher sense of MIL than those who reflected on 
social support or on being valued by others (Lambert et al., 2013; Study 3).  
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Personal control. Sense of personal control can be defined as “the person’s 
belief that he or she is capable of obtaining desired outcomes, avoiding undesired 
outcomes, and achieving goals” (Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015, p. 695). Defined in 
this broad way, the notion of personal control subsumes subtly different constructs 
such as efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Critically, 
control and sense-making or coherence (discussed later in relation to MIL) are 
related. For instance, participants who received feedback that was non-contingent on 
actual performance (lack of control) scored higher on need for structure (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008). In the same paper, participants who received the random feedback 
on a task (lack of control) were more likely to identify an image within a grainy 
picture when no such image existed. These findings suggest that people can 
compensate for a personal control threat by bolstering their sense of coherence.  
More direct evidence for the link between personal control and MIL 
judgments comes from research on the related construct of free will. Believing in 
free will is broadly defined as the belief that one can freely decide and act (but the 
specifics of this definition are still debated; see Shepard & Reuter, 2012). Free will 
belief is positively correlated with sense of MIL (Baumeister & Brewer, 2012; 
Bergner & Ramon, 2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2015). 
Finally, the related constructs of autonomy (i.e., a desire to “self-organise experience 
and behaviour”; Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 231) and competence (similar to having a 
sense of efficacy) have been linked to eudaimonic well-being which has been 
conceptually related to MIL (Ryan & Deci, 2001). These constructs, alongside 
relatedness, have also been shown to predict higher sense of MIL three days later 
(Martela, Ryan, & Steger, 2017).   
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Self-esteem. People are driven by a universal need to self-enhance (e.g., 
Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003; Seidkides & Strube, 1997; Taylor & Brown, 
1988) which is related to seeing oneself more positively, i.e., having high self-esteem 
(Rosenberg, 1965). High self-esteem has been consistently associated with high 
sense of MIL (e.g., Steger et al., 2006). Moreover, sense of MIL has been shown to 
mediate the relationship between religiosity and self-esteem, accounting for as much 
as 76% of the shared variance between these two constructs (Steger & Frazier, 
2005). Additionally, aspects of one’s identity that are seen as most central and which 
also fulfil self-esteem needs predict sense of MIL (Vignoles et al., 2006). Moreover, 
mortality salience was found to decrease people’s perceptions of MIL but only for 
participants low in self-esteem (Routledge et al., 2010). This would suggest that self-
esteem has a protective role for MIL judgments.  
Meaning in Life as Coherence, Purpose and Significance 
Gradually, researchers have converged on the idea that MIL is comprised of 
three definitional components: coherence (or comprehension), purpose and 
significance (George & Park, 2016a; King et al., 2006; Martela & Steger, 2016; 
Steger et al., 2006). These accounts have been referred to as tripartite models of MIL 
(George & Park, 2016a; Martela & Steger, 2016), and this dimensionality has also 
been reflected in recent definitions of MIL:  
“Meaning is the web of connections, understandings, and interpretations that 
help us comprehend our experience and formulate plans directing our 
energies to the achievement of our desired future. Meaning provides us with 
the sense that our lives matter, that they make sense, and that they are more 
than the sum of our seconds, days, and years.” (Steger, 2012a, p. 165).  
24 
 
If coherence, purpose and significance are facets of MIL, then these would be 
expected to relate to MIL judgments: feeling that life makes sense, has purpose and 
is worthwhile should make one feel that life is more meaningful. The three 
dimensions positively predicted MIL judgments, accounting for more than 60% of 
variation in sense of MIL on two different self-report measures (George & Park, 
2016b). Moreover, each dimension of MIL correlated with MIL judgments while 
controlling for the effect of the other two dimensions, suggesting that coherence, 
purpose and significance each have unique predictive ability. This suggests that MIL 
dimensions may operate as more proximal predictors of MIL judgments than the 
ones previously discussed. Proximal predictors explain more variation in MIL 
judgments, and they may explain a large portion of the variance previously 
accounted by the more distal predictors. Nevertheless, the dimensions of MIL have 
not been shown to be distinct from other conceptually-related predictors of MIL (e.g. 
significance and global self-esteem). Moreover, if MIL judgments are formed on the 
basis of sense of coherence, significance and purpose, that implies a causal direction 
from dimensions to sense of MIL which had not be tested by previous correlational 
designs.   
Below, I describe each of the three dimensions of MIL in turn, with the aim 
of defining each construct and establishing its conceptual boundaries. Furthermore, I 
explain the emergence of each construct in relation to MIL and MIL judgments, and 
flag potential gaps and areas for further investigation.  
Coherence. Coherence is understood as making sense of one’s experiences 
or the world more broadly (Heintzelman & King, 2014a). As described earlier, 
researchers have previously included items related to coherence or comprehension 
within self-report measures of MIL (e.g., “I understand my life’s meaning”, MLQ-P; 
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Steger et al., 2006). Indeed, meaning and coherence have been sometimes conflated. 
Inspired by the work of Kierkegaard (1846/1997) and Heidegger (1953/1996) 
psychologists have talked about absence of meaning in terms of any “awareness of 
nonrelations” (see Proulx & Heine, 2010). Similarly, Nagel (1971) has talked about 
the absurd and meaninglessness as a consequence of individuals seeing systems of 
justifications about themselves as arbitrary. In contrast, perceiving regularities in 
one’s environment has been associated with sense of MIL (Heintzelman et al., 2013), 
and some have even suggested that MIL judgments are about coherence 
(Heintzelman & King, 2014a). Nevertheless, coherence is a broad construct and it is 
necessary to understand what kind of coherence (e.g., self-related versus world-
related) is most relevant to MIL judgments 
One influential account has suggested that people do not differentiate 
between the content of different kinds of incongruities (e.g., self-related versus 
world-related inconsistency) when reacting to any form of consistency-threatening 
information (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Within the Meaning Maintenance Model 
(MMM; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006), people’s responses to various forms of threat 
have been interpreted as an effort to restore “meaning” (used here to denote 
consistency or coherence). The MMM describes a regulatory model where meaning-
making is a process that aims to return an individual to a “normal state” in response 
to incoherence. Meaning-making can be achieved by participants deploying several 
strategies. Using Piaget’s (1929/2011) terminology, people can either accommodate 
or assimilate in response to anomalous stimuli (Proulx & Heine, 2010b; Proulx & 
Inzlicht, 2012). Accommodating involves restructuring one’s challenged views of 
the world to fit the novel stimulus, whereas assimilation involves warping the 
dissonant stimulus to fit one’s views. Assimilation involves distortion and might not 
26 
 
be an ideal strategy, whereas accommodation involves more cognitive resources and 
is time-consuming. Alternatively, people can cope with the coherence threat by 
affirming their commitment to an unrelated domain. Affirmation has been previously 
proposed as a coping strategy within other theories of threat compensation (e.g., 
Hogg, 2000; Steele, 1988).  
Affirmation effects have been demonstrated with a diversity of stimuli. When 
people read an absurd parable by Franz Kafka that defied narrative conventions 
(compared to a classic parable), participants more strongly identified with their 
ingroup (Proulx et al., 2010). Even trivial violation-of-expectation manipulations 
such as doing a task with reverse-coloured playing cards (where spades would be 
red, and hearts would be black) led people to compensate by showing stronger 
support for social inequality if that was congruent with their original beliefs (Proulx 
& Major, 2013). Moreover, studies employing different uncertainty manipulations 
seem to produce comparable compensatory effects (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & 
Spencer, 2001; McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2009).  
Nevertheless, while these studies suggest that people have a pervasive need 
for coherence, these stimuli might also elicit unique, content-specific effects. For 
instance, research has shown that, when they are given the option, people will 
respond in ways that directly address the specific threat they have experienced 
(Knowles, Lucas, Molden, Gardner, & Dean, 2010; Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & 
Keefer, 2011). Critically, these stimuli might influence different kinds of perceptions 
of coherence. Meaning-threat studies have not usually included state measures of the 
coherence-related experience being manipulated (e.g., uncertainty). Even in the few 
studies where these have been measured and reported, there is no direct comparison 
of the elicited psychological experience by different stimuli. 
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When studying sense of coherence, I suggest that there is an important 
distinction between coherence about the world, and coherence about oneself and 
events in one’s lives (life story coherence, e.g., Bluck & Habermas, 2000; self-
continuity, e.g., Vignoles, 2011) . In general, self-relevant information has been 
shown to be preferentially processed (e.g., Bargh, 1982). For instance, sense of MIL 
is important for identity construction, alongside self-continuity and other identity 
motives (e.g., Vignoles et al., 2006). Finally, MIL is about “my life”, so coherence, 
as a component of MIL, should have a similar personal focus.   
Purpose. Similar to coherence, purpose has also been used interchangeably 
with MIL (e.g., Ryff, 1989). More recently, purpose has been seen increasingly as a 
separate but related concept to MIL (George & Park, 2013; Kashdan, Rottenberg, 
Goodman, Disabato, & Begovic, 2015; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). This is 
supported by a recent study which identified different correlates for sense of MIL 
and sense of purpose, despite the two being highly correlated (r = .61; George & 
Park, 2013). MIL judgments (captured using the PPMS; Wong, 1998) were 
positively associated with religion and spirituality, when controlling for sense of 
purpose (as measured by the Purpose subscale of the Ryff Psychological Well-being 
Scale; Ryff, 1989). While controlling for MIL judgments, sense of purpose was 
positively correlated with optimism and negatively correlated with pessimism, 
stressful life experiences and goal violations. Both sense of MIL and sense of 
purpose were positively correlated with positive affect and life satisfaction, and 
showed an inverse correlation with negative affect.  
Purpose has been defined in relation to goals and behaviour, and presented as 
a motivational component of MIL (Martela & Steger, 2016). For instance, purpose is 
“a central, self-organizing life aim that organises and stimulates goals, [and] 
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manages behaviours” (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009), and the accompanying feeling 
is a “sense of intentionality and goal-directedness” (Boyle et al., 2009, p. 574). 
Unlike goals, purposes do not require an outcome to be obtained. Instead, purpose 
acts as a “supraordinate goal manager” (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009, p. 243) that, 
once a goal is fulfilled, stimulates the generation of other goals consistent with each 
other. Purpose can be seen as predominantly prescriptive and future-oriented, 
creating a vision of how life should be.  
Significance. Significance is a construct that has received comparatively less 
empirical attention, compared to purpose and coherence (but see previous work on 
related constructs such as the “valued life” dimension; Morgan & Farsides, 2009). 
Nevertheless, within philosophy, the connection between MIL and the, arguably 
equivalent, idea of “having a worthwhile life” has often been debated (for a 
theoretical separation see Metz, 2012). Significance (or “existential mattering”; 
George & Park, 2014) has been defined as the extent to which individuals consider 
that life matters and is worth living. Despite the vastness of the Universe, the 
shortness of human life, as well as the likely future destruction of our planet, our 
solar system and, ultimately, the Universe, people draw symbolic value from various 
elements in their lives (religion, close others etc.) which gives them a sense of 
significance.   
Significance is an evaluative construct (Martela & Steger, 2016), similar to 
self-esteem, but defined more broadly as a “global evaluation from a spiritual or 
existential level” of one’s life (George & Park, 2014, p. 47). For this reason, much of 
the evidence that links significance to MIL is the same as that which links self-
esteem to MIL. Indeed, research needs to demonstrate that sense of significance is a 
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distinct experience from sense of self-esteem, and that the former is a stronger 
predictor of MIL judgments. 
Meaning Frameworks 
The term “meaning” has also been used in the context of meaning 
frameworks (see also meaning systems, MacKenzie & Baumeister, 2014). The term 
has been most widely used within the MMM literature (described earlier) and 
“meaning”, in this context, again refers to sense-making (Heine et al., 2006). 
Meaning frameworks can refer both to simple propositions about things in the world 
(e.g., a chair is a piece of furniture) as well as to complex clusters of propositions 
(e.g., religious belief; George & Park, 2016a). Meaning frameworks have been also 
referred to as mental representations (Proulx & Heine, 2010a), and are seen as akin 
to existing constructs in psychology such as schemata (see Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012).  
Meaning frameworks have been mainly conceptualised as structures that 
serve a need for coherence (e.g., Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012), but 
some have suggested that meaning frameworks contribute to all three dimensions of 
MIL (George & Park, 2016a). For instance, attitudes can be seen as meaning 
frameworks that perform evaluative functions ( “attitudes refer to general 
evaluations”, Petty & Briñol, 2010, p. 217 ), and values as prescriptive or 
proscriptive constructs (Koltko-Rivera, 2004), which would correspond to the 
functions of significance and purpose, respectively (see Martela & Steger, 2016). 
Meaning frameworks may be differentially related to each of the three dimensions of 
MIL (George & Park, 2016a), and these variations might explain why some 
frameworks contribute more to a sense of MIL than others. This is an under-
researched area, particularly given the difficulty of operationalising people’s 
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meaning frameworks. Below, I discuss some features of meaning frameworks that 
are relevant to modelling their relation to MIL  
Meaning frameworks vary in complexity, with more complex ones expected 
to better satisfy sense of coherence, purpose and significance, and, in turn lead to 
higher sense of MIL. For instance, simple mental representations of things in the 
world such as expectations that coffee is similar to tea, but dissimilar to battery acid 
would not make one feel that life is particularly meaningful (but, as previously 
discussed, violating this expectation might undermine a sense of coherence derived 
from assumptions of an orderly environment). In contrast, more complex meaning 
frameworks such as worldviews (i.e., “beliefs regarding the underlying nature of 
reality, ‘proper’ social relations or guidelines for living, or the existence or 
nonexistence of important entities”; Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 5), would occupy a 
superordinate position in information processing. Similarly, identities are 
psychological structures that encompass a diverse range of self-related information 
(both personal and social; Vignoles, in press.). Therefore, complex meaning 
frameworks would influence more aspects of one’s life and have a more pervasive 
influence on MIL and MIL-related constructs.  
In addition to complexity, the content of meaning frameworks is important.  
For instance, holding a British national identity will afford different inter-related sets 
of associations about the world and oneself (e.g., ingroups and outgroups) compared 
to having a Romanian national identity. This example also helps to illustrate how 
meaning framework content is culturally prescribed. Simplified, narrativized 
versions of history (i.e., myths) are grounded in institutions and subject to change as 
a consequence of shifting power-relations (Bell, 2003). These myths bind people, 
who are otherwise unknown to each other, under a common national identity. 
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However, I recognise that there is also a lot of variability in how individuals within a 
culture internalise or resist cultural norms (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001). Nevertheless, 
meaning frameworks are thus contrasted with the previously discussed sources of 
MIL judgments. I consider the distal (e.g., belongingness) and proximal (e.g., 
purpose) sources of MIL judgments to be universal, with the conditions under which 
they are fulfilled being dependent on cultural and individual factors (for a similar 
account in the context of identity see Vignoles, 2011). 
Religion. Finally, meaning frameworks derived from religious belief might 
be particularly important for MIL. Conceptually, similar to MIL, religion is about 
matters of “ultimate concern” (Tillich, 1951; see also Yalom, 1980).  Religious 
belief has been, unsurprisingly, linked to sense of MIL at the individual level (e.g. 
Dezutter, Soenens & Hutsebaut. 2006; Martos, Thege & Steger, 2010) and at nation-
level (Oishi & Diener, 2014).  
Religion also seems to relate positively to all of the previously identified 
sources of MIL. Individuals who thought about lacking personal control expressed 
heightened belief in a controlling God, when they are (Kay et al., 2008). Religious 
attendance was associated with increased self-esteem among those who were faced 
with the sudden death of a close other (Sherkat & Reed, 1992). Moreover, despite 
the image of the spiritual recluse who finds enlightenment in solitude, religion might 
be particularly effective at engendering meaningfulness because it binds people into 
“moral communities” (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Religion provides one with a “sacred 
purpose” (Newton & McIntosh, 2013) that might in turn create a sense of 
significance through suggestions of self-transcendence and unions with higher 
powers (Emmons, 2005). Religious belief is uniquely placed to satisfy the need for 
coherence as it is particularly resistant to evidence that would refute its existential 
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assumptions (see Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Furthermore, affluent 
countries are linked to increased disbelief in God, and this has been attributed to the 
uncertainty-reducing features of more developed countries (e.g., having food 
security; Barber, 2011).  
Overview of the Studies 
In the above review, I have described how various psychological constructs 
and processes could contribute to the subjective experience of meaningfulness. 
Throughout the literature review, I have shown that the meaning literature is 
fragmented, with some areas of research largely avoiding measuring subjective MIL 
entirely (e.g., the MMM), and others (e.g., tripartite models) not explaining how 
newly suggested predictors of sense of MIL would coexist with previously identified 
ones. This PhD project attempts an integrative approach where several factors are 
manipulated or measured alongside each other to determine non-redundant bases of 
making MIL judgments. Nevertheless, capturing fluctuations in sense of MIL is 
particularly challenging due to a) the nature of the MIL construct, e.g., stable across 
time (Steger & Kashdan, 2007), and b) difficulties in measuring MIL judgments, 
e.g., contaminated by constructs such as positive affect (King et al., 2006), difficulty 
capturing low sense of MIL (Heintzelman & King, 2014b). For this reason, Papers 1 
and 2 are experimental, whereas, in Paper 3 a mix of cross-sectional and longitudinal 
designs is used. Finally, Paper 4 captured within-person variation in sense of MIL 
derived from each person’s meaning frameworks.  
In describing the work performed as part of the empirical papers of this thesis 
project, I use the term “we”. This is to reflect the fact that the empirical work 
presented has been a collaborative endeavour between my supervisor, Vivian 
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Vignoles, and me. Otherwise, when describing the thesis project as a whole, I use the 
term “I”, as these observations predominantly reflect my personal interpretations.  
In Paper 1, we investigated whether need for coherence was domain-specific 
by looking at felt uncertainty in response to two types of uncertainty manipulations. 
We predicted that participants who completed a task meant to induce self- 
uncertainty would report higher felt uncertainty about the self compared to those 
who completed a task meant to induce general uncertainty. We also controlled for 
the moderating effect of implicit and explicit self-esteem, and we predicted that self-
esteem would more strongly moderate the relationships for self-uncertainty as they 
are both self-related processes. Findings mostly supported these predictions, showing 
that self-uncertainty induced felt uncertainty about the self but not felt general 
uncertainty. This pattern of findings suggests that processes that undermine 
coherence are not entirely equivalent. The study also included a measure of self-
reported MIL, but this was, unexpectedly, not influenced by either of the uncertainty 
manipulations.  
In Paper 2, we focused specifically on experimentally inducing fluctuations 
in MIL judgments. We aimed to test whether participants draw information from 
MIL-related constructs to form MIL judgments in an additive manner, i.e., fulfilling 
several sources of MIL as opposed to just one would result in higher sense of MIL. 
Alternatively, sources of MIL could be substitutable, i.e., all sources of MIL perform 
a similar function (e.g., need for coherence), so the fulfilment of several sources of 
MIL compared to the fulfilment of just one source would not show a larger increase 
in sense of MIL. The study had a two by two design where we sequentially 
manipulated belongingness and personal control. Belongingness had been previously 
shown to successfully induce higher scores on MIL measures (e.g., Lambert et al., 
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2013) and we aimed to replicate those findings. In contrast, personal control had not 
been shown directly to influence MIL judgments. We captured baseline scores of 
sense of MIL a week before participants were invited to complete the main part of 
the task in the lab. Outcome variables were computed as sense of MIL change 
(difference between post-manipulation scores and baseline scores). Neither of the 
two manipulations, nor their interaction significantly influenced changes in MIL 
judgments. Similar non-significant effects were found for change score of sense of 
purpose (included for exploratory reasons).   
In Paper 3, we moved away from experimental designs to focus on modelling 
fluctuations in MIL judgments over time, using newly developed measures that 
distinctly captured MIL judgments and appraisals of each of the three dimensions of 
MIL. Paper 3 comprised three studies. In Study 1, using a sample of participants 
recruited on social media, we adapted and improved previous scales of MIL 
judgments, sense of coherence, sense of purpose, and sense of significance, by 
adding reverse-phrased items and controlling for acquiescent response style. 
Furthermore, we showed that these are distinct constructs from more distal, 
theoretically-related predictors of MIL: belongingness, self-esteem, personal control 
and self-efficacy. In Studies 2 and 3, we used longitudinal designs with three and 
two time points, respectively, to test whether sense of coherence, sense of purpose, 
and sense of significance would predict MIL judgments one month later. Across both 
studies, sense of significance significantly predicted MIL judgments, but purpose 
and coherence did not. In Study 3, religion moderated the relationship between 
purpose and MIL judgments, and coherence and MIL judgments. Religious people 
relied on coherence, but not purpose, to make MIL judgments. Non-religious people 
relied on purpose, but not coherence. Consciously reflecting on one’s global sense 
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that life has value seems to be a part of judging one’s life as meaningful. This raises 
questions about whether MIL judgments tend to preferentially capture reflective 
psychological phenomena (i.e., deliberate, effortful processes), but not MIL-related 
feelings that are more intuitive (i.e., sense of coherence).  
 Unlike previous papers where we modelled differences between individuals 
on how they make MIL judgments, in Paper 4, we modelled within-individual 
differences in MIL judgments, using participants’ meaning frameworks as the main 
unit of analysis. We aimed to extend findings from Paper 3 by showing that meaning 
frameworks do not only serve a coherence function in relation to MIL judgments, but 
they also provide a sense of purpose and significance. We sought to capture complex 
meaning frameworks that varied in type (beliefs, values, identities and attitudes) and 
content (participants’ specific stances). Participants selected (or formulated) meaning 
frameworks in relation to 12 domains: national identity, religious identity, role 
identities in relation to two important others, family identity, socioeconomic beliefs, 
free will/determinism beliefs, beliefs about human nature, abortion attitudes, death 
penalty attitudes, personal values and moral foundations. Participants then rated each 
of their meaning frameworks on the target measures. We found that meaning 
frameworks that satisfied a sense of purpose, significance, and to a lesser extent, 
coherence, were also rated as providing a higher sense of MIL. In turn, sense of MIL 
predicted how important a meaning framework was. Furthermore, we were able to 
explore how individuals differ in what meaning frameworks they perceive as being 
more meaningful than others by creating individual-level moderating variables from 
participants’ meaning framework content (e.g., religious versus atheist versus 
agnostic). This is the first study to systematically explore the MIL-satisfying 
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function of meaning frameworks, with insight into how this cannot be reduced to 
coherence, and implications for how people would defend when these are threatened.  
In the final chapter of the thesis, I summarise the main findings and discuss 
their implications for the study of MIL in terms of definition and operationalisation, 
limitations and future directions (e.g., cross-cultural research), as well as potential 
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Uncertainty has been operationalised as both a threat to the self and a more 
general threat, but these two types of threat might not be interchangeable. We 
predicted that felt uncertainty about the self would be influenced by a self-
uncertainty induction more than by a general uncertainty manipulation. We also 
predicted that self-esteem would elicit stronger reactions to self-relevant uncertainty. 
Results using data collected from 341 students indicated that the two uncertainty 
primes were not equivalent. Only self-relevant uncertainty increased perceptions of 
self-uncertainty compared to both the baseline and its corresponding control. 
Moreover, this effect was moderated by self-esteem whereas the general uncertainty 
effects were not. These findings suggest that uncertainty regarding the self is 
















“[…] the absurdity of our situation derives not from a collision between our 
expectations and the world, but from a collision within ourselves.” (Nagel, 
1971, p. 722) 
Uncertainty is inherently disquieting; it defies the expectation that the world 
is orderly, and that one can anticipate and react appropriately to events. In response 
to uncertainty-provoking situations, assimilating the dissonant information into one’s 
meaning framework provides an imperfect integration, warping the dissonant 
stimulus to fit pre-existing schemata (Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2010; 
Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Similarly, accommodating one’s meaning framework to fit 
new information can be too cognitively demanding and time-consuming. As an 
alternative, people can cope with the threat by affirming a different meaning 
framework than the one threatened. For instance, under conditions of uncertainty, 
people tend to become more convinced about their positions in relation to important 
social issues such as abortion and capital punishment (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & 
Spencer, 2001), more sensitive to issues of fairness (Van den Bos, 2001), more likely 
to see their possessions as self-expressive (Morrison & Johnson, 2011), and more 
likely to identify with groups that are more distinctive and have more clearly-defined 
boundaries (e.g., Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007). These 
responses have been termed “compensatory convictions” (e.g., McGregor et al., 
2001) 
Across these studies, uncertainty has been operationalised differently. For 
instance, participants have been asked to think and write about an unresolved 
personal dilemma, think and write about what happens to their body when they die 
and the emotions that elicits (McGregor et al., 2001, Study 1), read and summarise a 
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difficult statistics text (McGregor & Jordan, 2007), or think about important aspects 
of their lives that make them feel uncertain about themselves (Hogg et al., 2007; 
Sherman, Hogg, & Maitner, 2009). Employing different uncertainty manipulations 
seems to produce comparable compensatory effects (McGregor et al., 2001; 
McGregor et al., 2009; but see Rios, Wheeler, & Miller, 2012). Nevertheless, 
assuming that, for instance, uncertainty about worldviews, uncertainty about one’s 
identity and uncertainty about objects in one’s environment are equivalent might 
gloss over important differences in how these are experienced by people. Different 
forms of uncertainty might affect one’s well-being in unique ways and implicate 
different domain-specific compensatory mechanisms (e.g., Knowles et al., 2010).  
Different Types of Uncertainty 
Van den Bos (2009) defines personal uncertainty as a “subjective sense of 
doubt or instability in self-views, worldviews, or the interrelation between the two” 
(Van den Bos & Lind, 2009, p. 124). This definition of personal uncertainty would 
equally encompass uncertainty about the world and uncertainty about who one is. 
Some researchers have focused on uncertainty as specifically related to identity 
processes (henceforth called self- uncertainty). For instance, uncertainty-identity 
theory (e.g., Hogg et al., 2007) focuses on “uncertainty about or relating to who one 
is and how one should behave”. Evidence suggests that, in response to uncertainty, 
people identify with groups that have a clearly defined structure (e.g., Hogg et al, 
2007), as well as seek more extreme groups and adopt more extreme attitudes (see 
Hogg & Adelman, 2013).  
In contrast, other research strands (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001), despite 
theoretically positioning personal uncertainty alongside other self-relevant constructs 
such as self-concept clarity (J. D. Campbell, 1990), do not specifically operationalise 
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it as an identity process. Particularly, in one manipulation task participants reflect on 
a personal dilemma in their lives, and evaluate potential consequences associated 
with it and their chance of occurring (McGregor et al., 2001; McGregor & Marigold, 
2003), focusing on contingencies and the likelihood of events happening in one’s life 
(henceforth called general uncertainty) rather than uncertainty regarding the self.  
It is difficult to say whether participants experience the aversive states 
induced by self-uncertainty and general uncertainty manipulations as equivalent. 
Psychological state measures are rarely included (or reported) in uncertainty studies. 
When such measures are included, these are phrased differently across studies. Self-
uncertainty inductions have been paired with corresponding measures of felt 
uncertainty about the self (e.g., Sherman, Hogg, & Maitner, 2009), whereas general 
uncertainty inductions were paired with corresponding state measure such as felt 
general uncertainty (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001). State uncertainty is particularly 
difficult to measure as individuals might be unable or unwilling to evaluate their 
levels of uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009). Nevertheless, self-report measures may 
give more insight into one’s underlying psychological states in response to 
uncertainty, compared to simply recording one’s defensive responses.  
The Moderating Effect of Delay 
Initially rooted in mortality salience research (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1994), it was suggested that people would at first inhibit 
uncertainty-related thoughts in response to an uncertainty prime and that meaning 
maintenance processes would become activated after a short delay (Proulx et al., 
2010). Indeed, participants were shown to have lower accessibility of uncertainty-
related thoughts if this was measured immediately after the manipulation, i.e., no 
delay (Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008; Study 2). However, in some studies, the 
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dependent variable is measured “immediately” after the manipulation and it still 
captures the expected effect (e.g., Hogg et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009). As such, 
delay potentially moderates uncertainty effects but this should be further explored 
with different types of uncertainty.    
The Moderating Effect of Implicit and Explicit Self-esteem 
Traditionally, self-esteem has been operationalised as self-reported positive 
self-views (e.g., Rosenberg, 1965), but such overt measures of self-esteem 
(henceforth called explicit self-esteem; ESE), might obscure self-related views at a 
less conscious level (implicit self-esteem; ISE; Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 
1999). A combination of high ESE and low ISE characterises defensive self-esteem 
(Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; also called unstable or 
fragile self-esteem; Kernis, 2005; Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, 2008). While self-
esteem generally serves an ego protective function in response to threatening stimuli 
(Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 
1988), those who have high ESE but low ISE tend to process self-relevant 
information in a defensive manner (e.g., boasting in response to a good performance; 
Kernis, Greenier, Herlocker, Abend, & Whisenhunt, 1997). The suggested 
explanation is that truly adaptive self-esteem is when ESE and ISE are both high, so 
that the person’s sense of self-worth is stable and does not need constant reinforcing.  
 When faced with uncertainty, those who had low ISE and high ESE formed 
stronger compensatory convictions in response to an uncertainty threat (McGregor & 
Marigold, 2003; Study 3; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005). It is unclear 
how defensive individuals would rate state uncertainty. They might a) report high 
scores of state uncertainty to reflect their heightened sensitivity to threatening 




The current study aimed to address this issue by comparing two 
manipulations of uncertainty: a) self-uncertainty (e.g., Hogg et al., 2007; Sherman et 
al., 2009) and b) general uncertainty (e.g., McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor 
et al., 2001). Our main dependent variables were a measure of felt uncertainty about 
the self and a measure of felt general uncertainty, which have been used previously 
in conjunction with the self-uncertainty and the general uncertainty induction, 
respectively.  
We predicted that both uncertainty manipulation types (self and general) 
would predict higher felt uncertainty scores. However, we predicted that those in the 
self-uncertainty condition would report higher levels of felt uncertainty about the self 
compared to those in the general uncertainty condition. This would be expected if 
there are specific forms of uncertainty (e.g., about the self) which are perceived as 
such, rather than diffusely, as a generic uncertainty feeling.  
Then, we tested whether the effects of the two induction procedures are 
affected by whether an outcome is presented immediately after the manipulation or 
with a short delay. For this purpose, we also included a measure of uncertainty-
accessibility to test whether participants who had no delay would inhibit uncertainty-
related thoughts. 
Furthermore, we tested the moderating effects of ISE and ESE. Firstly, we 
predicted that overall, independent of manipulation condition, those with high ESE 
will report being less uncertain: either earnestly, benefiting from the protective 
effects of genuinely holding positive self-views (high ISE), or by defensively under-
reporting how uncertain they feel (low ISE). For the moderation effect, we predicted 
a four-way uncertainty condition x manipulation type x ISE x ESE interaction. We 
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expected that those with low ISE and high ESE (i.e., defensive self-esteem) will have 
the strongest response to our uncertainty manipulation (either highest uncertainty or 
lowest uncertainty). Critically, we predict that the moderating effects of defensive 
self-esteem will be most pronounced for self-uncertainty predicting felt uncertainty 
about the self as they are both self-related processes. This pattern would strengthen 
the interpretation that not all uncertainty is equal and that people are affected 
differently by specific forms of uncertainty.  
Finally, inconsistent experiences can have a substantial negative impact on 
well-being; for instance, appraising a traumatic event as violating one’s beliefs or 
goals is associated with more post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms (Park, Mills, 
& Edmondson, 2012). Moreover, trivial anomalies may be similar to inconsistencies 
triggered by powerful life events in that they both produce aversive arousal (Proulx, 
Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Furthermore, uncertainty has been conceptualised 
as a threat to one’s sense of meaning (Proulx & Heine, 2012), but previous studies 
looking at compensatory convictions have not included a measure of perceived 
meaningfulness. As such, for exploratory purposes, we included a measure of 
meaning in life, expecting it to be negatively influenced by both of the uncertainty 
inductions. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The study had a 5 x 2 (uncertainty condition x delay condition), between-
participants design with felt uncertainty about the self, felt general uncertainty, 
uncertainty accessibility, and state meaningfulness as outcome variables.  
We collected data using an online questionnaire advertised as being about 
“preferences, personality traits and feelings”. Participants first completed the ISE 
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and ESE measures. Then, participants were asked to complete either the general 
uncertainty manipulation, its corresponding control task, the self-uncertainty 
manipulation, its corresponding control task, or a neutral condition where they would 
not be presented with any task (baseline condition). Afterwards, half of the 
participants across all conditions were asked to complete a short questionnaire that 
acted as a delay before completing the outcome measures. The other half were 
presented with the dependent variables immediately after the manipulation. 
Participants were semi-randomly allocated across conditions through Qualtrics (the 
option was selected to randomly allocate while ensuring even numbers). Uncertainty 
accessibility was the first outcome measure that participants were asked to complete. 
The other three outcome variables (felt uncertainty about the self, felt general 
uncertainty, and state meaningfulness) were presented afterwards to participants, in a 
random order.  
We recruited 341 students who participated in exchange for course credits, as 
well as volunteers from student societies. Of these, 15 participants were excluded for 
not responding to any of our outcome measures. The final sample consisted of 326 
participants (267 females, 81.9 %; 51 males, 15.6% and 8 who did not specify), 
mostly first and second year Psychology students (N = 290; 89.5%). Their age 
ranged from 18 to 44 years (M = 20.15, SD = 3.19). Most participants were non-
religious (N = 232, 71.2%), followed by Christians (N = 63, 19.3%) with the 
remaining participants coming from a mix of religious backgrounds.  
Materials  
The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was created and distributed online 
through the survey software, Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/).  
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ISE and ESE. We measured ISE using the single-item measure: “How much 
do you like your name, in total” (Gebauer, Riketta, Broemer, & Maio, 2008). In 
order to avoid suspicion as to the true purpose of the experiment, this item was 
embedded among similarly-phrased filler items (e.g., “How much do you like your 
course, in total?”). All responses were given on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all; 9 = 
Very much). Similarly, ESE was measured using the Single Item Self-Esteem (SISE) 
measure (“I have high self-esteem”; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001), 
embedded among items from the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI, Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; e.g. “I am extraverted, enthusiastic”). Responses were 
again given on a 9-point scale (1 = Does not apply at all; 9 = Applies completely). 
Both of these short measures have been used separately in uncertainty studies (e.g. 
Rios et al., 2012), as well as in conjunction with each other to capture defensive self-
esteem (Haddock & Gebauer, 2011).  
General uncertainty manipulation. For inducing general uncertainty, we 
used the “personal dilemma” task (McGregor, Haji, & Kang, 2008; McGregor & 
Marigold, 2003; McGregor et al., 2001). Participants are asked to think about an 
unresolved dilemma in their lives about which they are “not yet sure whether to take 
action or just leave things as they are”. After naming the dilemma, they commented 
on a) the value of taking action and b) the value of changing the way things are. 
Participants then had to list both the immediate and long-term consequences 
associated with each of these approaches and the estimated likelihood of these 
consequences’ occurrence (in percentages). The associated control condition asked 




Self-uncertainty manipulation. The self-uncertainty induction asked 
participants to list three aspects of their lives that they feel most uncertain about 
(Hogg et al., 2007; Sherman et al., 2009). Participants then have three text boxes in 
which to list the three separate aspects. The corresponding control condition was 
identical with the key difference that participants had to list aspects of their lives 
they felt most certain about.  
Delay. We used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;  
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) for the delay manipulation. This measure has been 
previously used as a filler task between the uncertainty manipulation and a number 
of outcome variables (e.g., McGregor et al., 2001; van den Bos, 2001; van den Bos, 
Ameijde, Gorp, & Russell, 2006; van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007).  
Uncertainty accessibility. Adapting an existing uncertainty-accessibility 
measure (Smith, James, Varnum & Oyserman, 2014), we created 25 word stems, of 
which 6 could be completed either with neutral words or with uncertainty-related 
words: “DO_ _ _” (“doors” vs. “doubt”), “SH_ _Y” (“shady” vs. “shaky”), “MU_ 
_” (“must” vs. “mull”), “T_ _N” (“teen” vs. “torn”), “_NS_RE” (“insure” vs. 
“unsure”), R_ _ _LESS (“ruthless” vs. “restless”). Uncertainty-accessibility was 
calculated as the total number of uncertainty-related words that people generated 
(scores ranged from 0 to 6).   
Felt general uncertainty.  Felt general uncertainty was measured by asking 
people to rate the extent to which they experienced each of 19 feelings related to 
personal uncertainty (e.g. “confused”, “of two minds”, “torn”; McGregor et al., 
2001). Participants responded using a 5-point scale (1 = Very slightly or not at all; 5 
= Very much). Responses on all 19 words were averaged to form a scale of felt 
uncertainty and the scale showed excellent internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .95).  
48 
 
Felt uncertainty about the self. Additionally, participants were asked 
“Overall, how uncertain/certain do you feel about yourself?” with responses on a 9-
point scale (1 = Very uncertain; 9 = Very certain) (Grant & Hogg, 2012; Hogg, 
Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010; Sherman et al., 2009).  
State meaningfulness. We used a measure adapted from the Meaning in Life 
Questionnaire, Presence subscale (MLQ-P; Steger et al., 2006), where participants 
were asked “Right now, how much do you feel...” followed by 8 items related to 
meaning in life (4 were reverse-phrased), e.g. “...you understand your life’s 
meaning”. Responses were given on a 5-point scale (1= Not at all, 5 = Entirely)1.  
Items showed good internal reliability and were averaged to form a measure of 
meaning in life (Cronbach’s α = .73).  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
A series of tests was run to ensure that participants were indeed randomly 
distributed across conditions. A one-way, between-participants ANOVA with ten 
levels corresponding to our 5 x 2 design revealed no significant differences in the 
age of our participants across groups, F(9, 308) = .91, p = .521, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .026. Similarly, 
we found no significant differences between conditions on ESE, F(9, 316) = 1.28, p 
= .248, η² = .035, or ISE scores, F(9, 316) = 1.13, p = .343, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .031. For the 
categorical demographic variables in our data, Chi-square tests of association were 
run with gender, 𝜒2(9) = 10.22, p = .333, period of time lived in the UK (“always 
lived in the UK” or “other”), 𝜒2(9) = 3.89, p = .919, course studied (“Psychology” or 
                                                 
1 This was included as part of a larger battery of items capturing six identity 
motives (Motivated Identity Construction Theory, Vignoles, 2011), based on the 
personal identity motive scale (W. E. Thomas et al., 2017). These items were 
included for scale validation purposes, and may be reported elsewhere. 
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“Not Psychology”), and religious belief (“Non-religious” vs. “Religious”), 𝜒2(9) = 
8.52, p = .483. All were non-significant suggesting that the randomisation was 
successful.  
Main Analysis 
In our main analysis, we sequentially tested the moderating effect of delay, 
followed by the moderating effect of having defensive self-esteem. These 
moderators were run in separate analyses, as our sample size did not support 
studying 5-way interaction effects. 
We first tested whether having a delay after our manipulations would affect 
uncertainty-related outcomes. We ran a three-way ANOVA with uncertainty 
condition (control vs. uncertainty) by manipulation type (general vs. self) by delay 
condition (no delay vs delay) on uncertainty accessibility. We found no significant 
main effects or interaction effects, Fs(1, 248) = .02 – 3.26, p = .072 -.879. However, 
as people had very low scores on the uncertainty accessibility measure (Ms = .88 – 
1.12, SDs = .63 - .93), we were concerned about floor effects. Consequently, we ran 
a three-way MANOVA with the two main uncertainty outcomes (felt uncertainty 
about the self and felt general uncertainty), but this also showed no significant main 
effects or interaction effects, Fs(2, 247) = .50 – 2.20, p = .113 -.856. Therefore, we 
concluded that delay did not inhibit uncertainty-related thoughts and we did not 
include it as a moderator in further analyses. Descriptive statistics across our 





Table 1.1. Means (standard deviations) for felt uncertainty about the self, felt general uncertainty, and perceived meaningfulness across conditions 
 
Self-uncertainty  
 (N = 67) 
General uncertainty  
(N = 62) 
Self-related control  
(N = 68) 
General control  
(N = 61) 
Baseline  
(N = 68) 
Felt uncertainty about the self 4.82 (2.08) 4.34 (1.81) 4.19 (1.99) 4.44 (1.90) 4.13  (1.81) 
Felt general uncertainty 2.19 (.86) 2.35 (.82) 2.28 (.93) 2.19 (.79) 2.06 (.76) 




Then, we ran a two-way MANCOVA with uncertainty condition (control vs. 
uncertainty) by manipulation type (general vs. self-related) on felt general 
uncertainty and felt uncertainty about the self. ISE and ESE were included in the 
model as covariates, alongside all interaction terms. As suggested by Aiken and 
West (1991), continuous variables (i.e., ISE and ESE) were centred at their 
respective means. 
Looking at the covariates, there was a significant multivariate effect of ESE, 
F(2, 239) = 31.40, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .208, with separate univariate analyses showing 
that higher self-esteem was associated with lower felt general uncertainty, F(1, 240) 
= 28.34, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .106, r = -.24, and with lower felt uncertainty about the self, 
F(1, 240) = 49.43, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .171, r = -.38. This effect was qualified by a 
significant multivariate interaction between ESE and ISE, F(2, 239) = 4.03, p = .019, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .106, with separate univariate analyses showing that the ESE and ISE 
interaction was not significantly associated with felt uncertainty about the self, F(1, 
240) = .04, p = .846, 𝜂𝑝
2 < .001, but it was significantly associated with felt general 
uncertainty, F(1, 240) = 7.30, p = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .030. However, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
ISE did not significantly predict felt general uncertainty for low levels of ESE (-1 
SD), b = .03, p = .653, with 95% bias-corrected adjusted confidence intervals (BCa 
CI), between -.10 and .16, nor for high levels of ESE (+1SD), b = -.15, p = .090, 




Figure 1.1. Simple slopes for the interaction effects of ESE and ISE on felt general 
uncertainty 
Looking at our main predictor variables, there were no significant 
multivariate main effects of uncertainty condition, F(2, 239) = 1.68, p = .189, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.014, or manipulation type, F(2, 239) = .23, p = .798, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002. However, the key 
multivariate interaction of uncertainty condition and manipulation type was 
significant, F(2, 239) = 4.54, p = .012, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .037. Corresponding univariate analyses, 
indicated that the interaction effect was not significant for felt general uncertainty, 
F(2, 239) = .86, p = .356, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .004. Instead, the effect was only significant for felt 
uncertainty about the self, F(2, 239) = 6.53, p = .011, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .026. As shown in Figure 
1.2, for the general manipulation, being in the control or uncertainty condition had 
no significant effect on felt uncertainty about the self, b = .22, p = .486, 95% BCa CI 






























reported more felt uncertainty about the self, than those in the control condition, b = 
-1.01, p = .003, 95% BCa CI [-1.70, -.22].  
 
Figure 1.2. Felt uncertainty about the self for uncertainty condition by manipulation type. 
 
Finally, the predicted four-way interaction showed marginal multivariate 
significance, F(2, 239) = 2.89, p = .059, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .023. Corresponding univariate 
analyses showed that, for felt general uncertainty, the interaction term was not 
significant, F(1, 240) = .41, p = .525, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002, but it was significant for felt 
uncertainty about the self, F(1, 240) = 4.33, p = .038, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .018. In unpacking this 
interaction (see Figure 1.3), we found that for those with low ESE and low ISE, low 
ISE and high ESE, or high ISE and high ESE, there was no significant effect of 
manipulation type, Fs(1, 240) = .46 - 1.52, p = .218 - .492, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002 - .006, 
uncertainty condition, Fs(1, 240) = .57 - 1.17, p = .282 - .419, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002 - .005, or 
their interaction, Fs(1, 240) = .56 - 2.00, p = .158 - .454, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002 - .008. However, 
for high ISE and low ESE , while there was no effect of manipulation type, F(1, 240) 
= .061, p = .806, 𝜂𝑝
































= .002, their interaction was significant, F(1, 240) = 5.68, p = .018, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .023. For 
the general manipulation, those exposed to the uncertainty condition did not 
significantly differ from those exposed to the control, b = 1.03, p = .169, 95% BCa 
CI [.17, -.38]. In contrast, for the self manipulation, those in the uncertainty 
condition reported higher levels of felt uncertainty about the self than their control 
condition counterparts, b = -2.05, p = .042, 95% BCa CI [-.58, 2.64]. 
We also compared the two uncertainty-inducing conditions to the baseline 
condition, while controlling for ISE, ESE and their interactions on felt general 
uncertainty and felt uncertainty about the self. The effect of condition was 
significant, F(2, 184) = 3.36, p = .037, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .035, with the self-uncertainty 
manipulation (M = 4.85, SE = .22) significantly increasing felt uncertainty about the 
self compared to baseline (M = 4.06, SE = .22), t =-.79, p =.032, 95% BCa CI [.05, 
1.53], but with no other significant differences. 
Finally, we looked at MIL judgments as the dependent variable, with 
manipulation type by uncertainty condition. First, we ran the moderation model with 
the delay manipulation in an ANCOVA. This yielded no significant main effects or 
interactions, Fs(1, 245) = .02 – 1.71, ps = .192 -.889. Then, we ran an ANCOVA 
with for ISE and ESE as moderators. This yielded a significant positive main effect 
of ESE, F(1, 237) = 48.77, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .171. No other effects were significant, 
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Figure 1.3. Felt uncertainty about the self for uncertainty condition by manipulation type by ISE by ESE. Note. Greyed out panel 





































Interpreting the Findings 
This study aimed to tease apart the effects of general uncertainty from those 
of self-uncertainty. Self-uncertainty led to higher felt uncertainty about the self when 
compared to either an empty control condition, or a self-certainty condition. 
Furthermore, self-uncertainty had no effect on felt general uncertainty which would 
suggest that effects were specific to the self rather than related to general uncertainty. 
Supporting this interpretation, ISE and ESE, as well as manipulation type, moderated 
the effect of uncertainty on felt uncertainty about the self. Specifically, those who 
had high ISE, but low ESE reacted more strongly to the manipulation by reporting 
higher felt uncertainty about the self, but only when exposed to the self-uncertainty 
induction. This does not replicate previous findings that show low ISE – high ESE 
individuals reacting more strongly to uncertainty (e.g., McGregor et al., 2005; Rios 
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, an interaction with ISE and ESE that was exclusive to the 
self-related uncertainty processes supports our prediction that there are specific self-
related uncertainty effects.  
In contrast, there were no effects of the general uncertainty induction on 
either of the two types of uncertainty measures. This finding contradicts previous 
research that shows the general manipulation influencing felt general uncertainty 
(e.g., McGregor et al., 2001). Given that the measure of felt uncertainty was 
influenced by other factors in line with predictions (e.g., ESE, and ISE and ESE 
interaction), this seemed to have worked as intended. Then, it is possible that the 
general uncertainty induction failed to elicit feelings of uncertainty. Delay did not 
moderate the effect of manipulations on any uncertainty measure, suggesting that the 
current results cannot be readily explained in terms of uncertainty inhibition. 
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Nevertheless, completing the PANAS might not have created a sufficiently long 
delay (other studies used longer delays; e.g., Hogg et al., 2010). As such, if the 
general uncertainty induction was more threatening than the self-uncertainty 
inductions, then participants might have self-affirmed by inflating their responses on 
both the felt uncertainty about the self, and the felt general uncertainty measures.  
It is also worth noting the difference in corresponding control conditions for 
the two types of manipulations. While the self manipulation had a self-certainty 
inducing control condition, the general manipulation asked participants to think 
about an unresolved dilemma in a friend’s life. The latter is arguably neutral at best 
and uncertainty-inducing at worst, perhaps obscuring the effect of the corresponding 
uncertainty condition. Nevertheless, even when compared to the baseline condition, 
general uncertainty did not significantly influence any uncertainty judgment. 
Moreover, the difference in control conditions would not explain why self-
uncertainty influenced felt uncertainty about the self but not felt general uncertainty.     
Finally, neither of the two uncertainty manipulations decreased perceptions 
of subjective meaning in life. This would seem to contradict the suggestion that 
uncertainty of any kind threatens one’s sense of meaning (see Meaning Maintenance 
Model; MMM; Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). However, measures of 
perceived meaningfulness have been shown to be consistently high (Heintzelman & 
King, 2014a) and stable across time (Steger & Kashdan, 2007). Consequently, given 
that our manipulations only induced slightly above average ratings of perceived 
uncertainty, it is doubtful whether such small fluctuations would make people more 
likely to agree with statements such as “[…] your life is meaningless”. Our findings 
suggest that self-reported meaningfulness ratings would not vary with trivial 
inconsistencies as is predicted by the MMM.  
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Despite not capturing experiences associated with general uncertainty, we 
have shown that the self- uncertainty manipulation uniquely influenced felt 
uncertainty about the self, while also being singularly moderated by self-related 
processes (e.g., ISE and ESE). These findings suggest that self-uncertainty might be 
experienced differently than more general feelings of uncertainty.  
Implications and Concluding Remarks 
Even if the two uncertainty manipulation procedures are experienced 
differently, the two types of uncertainty are expected to lead people to form similar 
compensatory affirmations (Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2010; Proulx, 2012). 
A next step is to directly compare the compensatory reactions they elicit. If one form 
of uncertainty threatens the self, while others do not, then self-uncertainty 
manipulations would lead to identity-related affirmations (e.g., Rios et al., 2012) as 
opposed to simply shifting focus to beliefs about the world that are not under threat 
(e.g., Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 2010).  
To the extent that people are motivated to maintain a sense of coherence and 
structure, it is important to understand how people experience their disruption. If one 
feels uncertain about circumstances in one’s life (e.g., moving home, career change), 
then this experience could be very different from feeling uncertain about aspects 
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To understand whether factors that influence judgments about meaning in life (MIL) 
and purpose exert their effects additively or in a substitutable manner, we used two 
theoretically-distinct MIL-relevant experiences: sense of belonging and sense of 
personal control. In a 2x2 between participant design, 112 students were induced to 
feel low/high belongingness and low/high control by writing two essays. Outcome 
variables were measures of MIL and purpose in life change (computed by 
subtracting scores obtained from participants one week prior to the main experiment 
from scores given after the manipulation). We predicted that participants in the low 
belonging-low control condition would report the most negative MIL and purpose in 
life change. In contrast, those in the high belonging – high control would display 
levels of MIL and purpose change that were either a) positive and highest (additive 
account) or b) similar to those in the two mixed conditions (e.g. low belonging- high 
control). However, we found no significant main or interaction effects of our 
manipulations on MIL or purpose change scores, preventing us from distinguishing 
between an additive or substitutable explanation. Results are discussed in terms of 











Reflecting concerns traditionally studied by philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, 
c.350BCE/1962; Camus, 1942/1955), the concept of meaning in life (MIL) has also 
inspired fruitful research programmes within psychology. Subjectively judging one’s 
life as meaningful (for a broader discussion on subjective meaningfulness see Paper 
3 and Paper 4) has been shown to be both desirable (Steger, Kashdan, Sullivan, & 
Lorentz, 2008) and linked to positive mental and physical health outcomes (Bower, 
Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 1998; Brassai et al., 2011; Brassai et al., 2015; Reker, 
Peacock, & Wong, 1987;; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). Given the recognised benefits 
of having a meaningful life, many studies have looked at potential precursors. Across 
different research programmes, a large number of sources of meaningfulness have 
been suggested, such as regularities in one’s environment (Heintzelman et al., 2013), 
connection to nature (Howell, Passmore, & Buro, 2013), gratitude and grit (Kleiman, 
Adams, Kashdan, & Riskind, 2013), and knowledge about one’s perceived “true 
self” (Schlegel et al., 2011). Nevertheless, some of these factors might overlap and 
be redundant with one another, or they might capture constructs at different levels of 
abstraction. It is unclear whether non-overlapping factors have an interchangeable 
effect on feelings of MIL or whether their effects are additive.   
The current study aims to investigate how two proposed sources of sense of 
MIL, belongingness and control, interact to influence perceptions of meaningfulness. 
We chose belongingness as relationships are considered “the most consistent and 
compelling source of meaning” (O’Donnell et al., 2014, p. 45), and Schnell (2011) 
identified interpersonal relationships as a common source of MIL across several 
research programmes. In contrast, personal control is a less researched source of 
MIL, but is theoretically interesting, given its link to models of eudaimonic well-
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being (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Moreover, personal control would have minimal overlap 
with belongingness, in contrast to other factors such as self-esteem (Leary, 2005) .  
Social Relationships and MIL 
 Being socially integrated is highly desirable and provides wide-ranging 
benefits (e.g., being a valued member of an ingroup; Correll & Park, 2005), such that 
it is unsurprising that positive relationships are associated with higher MIL. When 
asked to express freely what gives them MIL, participants consistently select family 
or friends as one of the most important sources (Delle Fave et al., 2013; Lambert et 
al., 2010). Also, when asked to submit pictures of what makes their life meaningful, 
89% of participants submitted a picture that was classed as pertaining to 
“relationships” (Steger et al., 2013). Moreover, in a two-wave longitudinal study, 
Krause (2007) found evidence that social support positively predicted MIL 
judgments. Similarly, being deprived of healthy relationships has a negative impact 
on perceived meaningfulness. Both being a victim and being a perpetrator of 
bullying correlated negatively with MIL scores (Henry et al., 2013). Additionally, 
when faced with the loss of an important other, people seem to suffer “meaning 
crises” (e.g., Lichtenthal et al., 2013; Wheeler, 2001).  
It has been suggested that relationships that give a sense of belonging (i.e., “a 
secure sense of fitting in”, Lambert et al., 2013, p. 1418) are most relevant to MIL. 
Belonging and MIL, as motivational constructs underlying identity construction, 
have been shown to correlate with one another (Vignoles et al., 2006). In a series of 
experimental findings, those who were exposed to a belonging manipulation came to 
judge their lives as more meaningful compared to those in a social support condition 
or a social worth condition (Lambert et al., 2013).  
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Personal Control and MIL 
Previous empirical and theoretical work has linked control-related constructs 
to MIL. Broadly defined, personal control is “the person’s belief that he or she is 
capable of obtaining desired outcomes, avoiding undesired outcomes, and achieving 
goals” (Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015, p. 695) and subsumes related constructs 
such as self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) and locus of control (Rotter, 1966). Within 
Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), the related construct of autonomy 
(i.e., “the organismic desire to self-organize experience and behavior”; Deci & Ryan, 
2000, p. 231) has been related to eudaimonic well-being (i.e., wellness obtained 
through self-actualization rather than through subjective happiness; Ryan & Deci, 
2001). Moreover, autonomy predicted higher MIL scores three days later (Martela et 
al., 2017). Similarly, having a sense of control in one’s most important role (e.g., 
father, spouse) was related to self-reported MIL and purpose in life ratings (Krause 
& Shaw, 2003). Furthermore, the related experience of having free will beliefs (see 
Nichols, 2004) has been positively associated with MIL scores (Bergner & Ramon, 
2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2015). Finally, 
Baumeister (1991) includes self-efficacy as a central MIL need, sometimes used 
interchangeably with the notion of personal control (e.g. Sommer, Baumeister & 
Tillman, 2012).  
Sources of MIL Interchangeable Versus Additive 
Despite the wealth of research on sources of MIL, it is unclear whether an 
individual judges the meaningfulness of their life by whatever source of MIL is 
salient (sources are substitutable) or whether one integrates information across 
several relevant sources (sources are additive). In support of substitutability, studies 
have shown that when people’s meaning frameworks are undermined, they 
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compensate by affirming an unrelated framework (Proulx & Heine, 2006, 2008). 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the beneficial effects of indirect coping 
strategies may not endure over time, and people might first try to address a threat 
directly and, only when that seems unfeasible, might they attempt to affirm 
alternative meaning domains (Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). Indeed, 
when people’s sense of belonging is undermined, they prefer to restore it directly by 
affirming social values rather than intellectual values (Knowles et al., 2010). 
Among studies that have aimed directly to influence people’s MIL ratings, 
only a few have looked at the interaction between two or more predictors. Several 
studies have shown that when positive social relatedness information was available, 
it was used to inform MIL judgments, whereas otherwise participants relied on their 
affective state (Hicks & King, 2009b; Hicks, Schlegel, & King, 2010). This result 
suggests that being in a good mood and thinking about relationships does not have 
an additive effect on MIL. Nevertheless, this finding might be specific to mood as a 
source of MIL. According to mood as information accounts (Schwarz & Clore, 2003, 
1983), when people judge an abstract life domain, they tend to rely on affect when 
more relevant information is not salient. In order to test whether sources of MIL are 
substitutable with each other or additive, two similarly relevant sources of MIL 
should be manipulated. While there is little prior evidence for an additive account, it 
would make conceptual sense that an abstract and encompassing life appraisal such 
as judging MIL would involve aggregating information from several domains.  
Measuring Meaningfulness: Distinguishing MIL and Purpose in Life 
MIL has been mainly studied as a subjective experience (Hicks & King, 
2009a). The most widely-used measure of MIL, the Meaning in Life Questionnaire – 
Presence subscale (MLQ-P; Steger et al., 2006) has items asking people to make an 
65 
 
abstract judgment about the meaningfulness of their lives (e.g. “I have a good sense 
of what makes my life meaningful”). Notably, three of the five MLQ-P items are 
related to purpose, and previous research has used the terms MIL and purpose in life 
interchangeably (e.g., Boyle, Barnes, Buchman, & Bennett, 2009; Crumbaugh & 
Maholick, 1964). However, recently the two constructs have been discussed 
separately (e.g., McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). Furthermore, George and Park (2013) 
found that while the two constructs are strongly correlated (r = .61), measures of 
sense of MIL and purpose were related to different constructs. Sense of MIL was 
positively related to religiousness and spirituality, whereas sense of purpose was 
positively related to optimism, as well as negatively associated with pessimism, 
stressful life experiences, and goal violations. 
Current Study 
Here, we aimed to test whether two theoretically non-overlapping 
experiences (sense of belonging and sense of personal control) would be 
substitutable or additive in influencing MIL ratings. We asked participants to write 
two essays. For one of the essays, half of the participants wrote about a situation 
when they felt rejected (low belongingness), and the other half wrote about a time 
when they felt accepted (high belongingness). In the other essay, half of the 
participants wrote about a situation where they were not in control (low control), and 
the other half about when they were in control (high control). We obtained 
participants’ judgments of meaningfulness and purpose in life in a preliminary test 
one week before the lab visit and, again, immediately after the manipulation. This 
allowed us to determine the change in MIL and purpose judgments due to our 
manipulation, compared to participants’ baseline levels. 
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We expected that individuals who experience mixed conditions of either low-
belonging and high-control, or high belonging and low control, would report levels 
of MIL comparable to baseline, regardless of the process by which sources 
contribute to MIL. If the sources are additive, then undermining one while boosting 
another should cancel the two effects. If they are substitutable then participants will 
use the affirmed source to restore the threatened sense of MIL. Similarly, when both 
belonging and control are undermined, participants should experience lowest levels 
of MIL. Evidence for either additive or substitutable accounts of MIL processes 
should emerge when bolstering both belongingness and control. If the effects are 
additive, then this doubly affirming condition should result in the highest MIL 
ratings. If the sources are substitutable, then this should elicit levels of MIL ratings 
similar to the mixed condition: the second positive meaning source would be 
redundant after reaping the benefits of the first one.   
 In addition, aside from a measure of self-reported MIL, we also included a 
measure of purpose. Given previous research showing MIL and purpose having 
distinct correlates (George & Park, 2013), we aimed to explore whether 
belongingness and control have the same pattern of relationships with purpose as 
they do with MIL. For instance, personal control might be more strongly predictive 
of purpose than of MIL.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited among undergraduate psychology students in 
exchange for credits. The study was also advertised to other University of Sussex 
students and staff, who were invited to participate voluntarily. One hundred and 
forty-four participants completed our preliminary measures, but, of these, only 120 
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attended the main experimental study. Of the latter, 8 cases could not be matched 
across time points, possibly because the participants mistyped their unique 
identifying codes.  
Our final sample consisted of 112 participants (87 women, 23 men, 2 non-
specified “other”)2. Of these, 104 were University of Sussex students. Due to a 
programming error, participant age was not recorded. However, participants had to 
confirm that they were at least 18 years old before proceeding to the study. Given 
previous data collected among the student population at University of Sussex, age is 
expected to range between 18 and 54 (see Paper 3). The majority of participants 
reported being born in the UK (N = 69; 61.1%) with the remaining participants 
coming from a mix of countries. Most participants were not religious (N = 84; 75%), 
followed by Christians (N = 22; 19.6%). 
Materials and Procedure 
Preliminary measures. One week before the main study (T1), participants 
completed an online questionnaire containing items that assessed demographics as 
well as sense of purpose and MIL. In order to measure sense of MIL, we used items 
adapted from Wong’s (1998) Perceived Personal Meaning Scale (PPMS) and the 
Meaning in Life Questionaire - Presence subscale (MLQ-P, Steger et al., 2006). The 
scale included items such as “My entire existence is full of meaning” and “My life is 
meaningless” (reverse-coded) and had excellent reliability (α = .93). Sense of 
purpose was measured using items adapted from the Purpose subscale of Ryff’s 
(1989) Psychological Well-Being Scales), e.g. “I have a good sense of what I am 
                                                 
2 Previous studies testing the effect of feelings of relatedness on self-reported MIL and their 
interaction with another measured variable (e.g., positive affect) have found a significant effect with 
as few as 65 student participants (Hicks & King, 2009b, Study 3). However, given the scarcity of 
evidence showing that personal control manipulations influence feelings of meaningfulness, we aimed 




trying to accomplish in life” and “I often feel like I am wandering aimlessly through 
life” (reverse-coded). The scale had very good reliability (α = .88). The two scales 
were highly correlated, r = .72.  Participants were invited to schedule a time when 
they could come to the laboratory and complete the main part of our study. The 
booking had to be made at least 7 days after completing the initial survey, so as to 
reduce demand characteristics.  
Main study. In the main part of the study (T2), participants were led to a 
private cubicle where they were invited to follow the instructions on the computer 
screen. Participants first completed the two essays about belonging and personal 
control. For the belonging essay, half of the participants were allocated to the low 
belonging condition whereas the other half were allocated to the high belonging 
condition. Participants were split in the same way for the control essay. Participants 
were semi-randomly allocated to conditions by Qualtrics 
(https://www.qualtrics.com/; the option to ensure relatively even allocation was 
selected). The order in which they completed the essays on control and belonging 
was counterbalanced.  
The high [low] belonging essay instruction (adapted from Knowles et al., 
2010) read: 
 
Please recall a particular incident in which you have felt accepted 
[intensely rejected] in some way, times that you felt as if you belonged [did 
not belong]. These can be experiences of acceptance [rejection] from another 
person (e.g. a time when someone wanted to be your friend [a time when 
someone no longer wanted to be your friend]) or they can be experiences of 
acceptance [rejection] from a group (e.g., a time when you were included in a 
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group of people [a time when you were excluded from a group of people]). 
Please describe the situation in which you felt you belonged [did not 
belong]– what happened, how you felt, etc.  
 
The high [low] control essay instruction (adapted from Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008) read: 
 
Please recall a particular incident in which you were in complete 
control of the situation [you did not have any control over the situation]. 
Please describe the situation in which you felt in complete control [a 
complete lack of control]– what happened, how you felt, etc. 
 
Following the manipulation, mood was measured using the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). Participants were 
presented with 10 negative affect (NA) words (e.g., “Stressed”; α = .86) and 10 
positive affect (PA) words (e.g., “Excited”; α = .90) and were asked to respond about 
how they felt “at the present moment” on a scale from 1 = “Very slightly or not at 
all” to 5 = “Very much”.  Then, participants answered the same measures of sense of 
MIL (α = .91) and purpose (α = .88) that had been presented in the preliminary 
questionnaire. Upon finishing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed by the 
experimenter and were given the opportunity to ask any questions about the study. 
Participants’ data were anonymously matched across the two time points using a 




Manipulation Check and Randomisation Check 
First, we inspected the essays produced in response to our manipulation 
prompt. Two cases were excluded because participants did not comply with the 
manipulation (e.g., “To be honest, I cannot remember a particular incident in which I 
felt rejected in some way.”).  
To check that we randomly allocated participants to conditions, we first 
tested whether participants had similar baseline levels of MIL and purpose at Time 1 
in each of the four conditions. We ran a one-way MANOVA with four levels 
corresponding to each of the study conditions (high-belonging-high control, high 
belonging-low control, low belonging-high control, low belonging-low control). 
There was a significant multivariate effect: F(6, 216) = 2.38, p = .030, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .062. 
However, separate univariate ANOVAs revealed non-significant effects of condition 
on Time 1 MIL, F(3, 108) = .934, p = .427, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .025, and on Time 1 purpose, F(3, 
108) = 2.12, p = .102, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .056.  
We also ran Chi-square tests of association with gender (male and female), 
𝜒2(3) = 1.47 p = .690, country of birth (recoded as UK and non-UK), 𝜒2(3) = 3.34, p 
= .342, and religious belief (recoded as non-religious and religious), 𝜒2(3) = 2.08 p = 
.556. All were non-significant, suggesting that random allocation was successful. 
Ideally, our manipulations would not influence mood. Consequently, we ran 
a 2 (low belonging vs. high belonging) by 2 (low personal control vs. high personal 
control) between-participants MANOVA on positive affect and negative affect. As 
expected, multivariate tests showed no significant main effects by type of 
manipulation: belonging, F(2, 107) = .79, p = .457, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .015; personal control, F(2, 
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107) = 1.43, p = .243, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .026. Similarly, there was no significant multivariate 
interaction effect, F(2, 107) = .54, p = .583, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .010.  
Main Analyses 
In order to control for Time 1 MIL and Time 1 purpose, we created MIL 
difference and purpose difference scores by subtracting Time 1 MIL and purpose 
scores, respectively from their Time 2 counterparts. Scores on these difference 
variables showed a leptokurtic distribution. This was addressed by removing 8 cases 
with unusually high/low scores (as identified by inspecting the boxplots)3. 
Descriptive statistics for the two outcome variables across the four study conditions 
are displayed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1. Means (standard deviations) for MIL difference and purpose difference scores 
across conditions 
 Belonging 
 Low  High 
 Personal control  Personal control 
Outcome variable Low  
(N = 21) 
 High  
(N = 30) 
 Low  
(N = 35) 
 High  
(N = 22) 
MIL difference .09 (.81)  .22 (.67)  .27 (.69)  .27 (.63) 
Purpose difference .12 (.65)  -.01 (.61)  .13 (.57)  -.04 (.66) 
 
We ran a two-way MANOVA to test whether the belonging and control 
manipulations led to significant changes in MIL judgments and sense of purpose. 
There were no significant multivariate effects: main effect of belonging, F(2, 99) = 
.44, p = .644, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .009; main effect of personal control, F(2, 99) = 1.16, p = .317, 
𝜂𝑝
2= .023; interaction, F(2, 99) = .65, p = .526, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002. Similarly, there were no 
significant univariate effects in predicting change in MIL judgments, Fs(1, 100) = 
.20 - .73, ps = .395 - .653, or in sense of purpose, Fs(1, 100) = .01 – 1.45, ps = .232 - 
.931.  
                                                 
3 We also ran the subsequent analyses with these 8 cases included and this did not change the 




 In this study, we aimed to test the interaction between belongingness and 
control in influencing MIL and purpose ratings. Nevertheless, both our sense of 
belonging and sense of personal control manipulations failed to significantly 
influence changes in MIL or purpose ratings. Consequently, our study could not 
differentiate between accounts that explain the effects of sources of MIL as additive 
or substitutable. Furthermore, we could not observe differential effects of these 
sources on MIL and purpose.   
In our design we assumed that the low control and low belonging condition 
would elicit the lowest levels of MIL, even if participants in the other conditions 
would display similar levels of MIL (as predicted by a substitutable account). 
However, if people felt threatened by our manipulation, this might not have been 
captured by the MIL measure used. Self-reported ratings of meaningfulness might 
fail to capture how meaningful one’s life actually is (Leontiev, 2013). This might be 
analogous to the literature on defensive or fragile self-esteem, where people’s self-
reported levels of an experience might not align with levels captured by more 
implicit measures  (Jordan et al., 2003; Kernis, 2005; Laws & Rivera, 2012). To the 
extent that people sometimes respond to threats automatically (e.g. Brady et al., 
2016) and threats to meaning trigger fluid compensation (e.g. Heine et al., 2006; 
Proulx et al.  2012), people might inflate their MIL ratings as a form of 
compensating to having their sense of belonging and personal control undermined. In 
previous research, when people were subliminally primed with meaninglessness-
related words (e.g., empty, futile), they reported higher levels of MIL (Van Tongeren 
& Green, 2010). As such, given that participants might use self-reported MIL 
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measures as an opportunity to restore threatened MIL, future studies should look into 
alternative ways of capturing MIL fluctuations.  
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The concept of meaning in life (MIL) has traditionally suffered from definitional 
ambiguity. Recent theoretical accounts have implicated three reflective components 
(i.e., a product of active, effortful deliberation) in the experience of MIL: coherence, 
purpose and significance. However, very little empirical research has tried to 
separate the three dimensions and determine their relationship to MIL judgments. In 
Study 1 (N = 314; social media snowball sampling), we improved the measurement 
of these constructs by adding reverse-phrased items and controlling for 
acquiescence. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we showed that sense of 
coherence, purpose, significance and MIL judgments were separable constructs, and 
that they were distinct from related constructs (e.g., self-esteem). Study 2 (T1 N = 
168, T2 N = 135, T3 N = 121; student sample) and Study 3 (T1 N = 442, T2 N = 
326; Prolific Academic respondents) employed longitudinal designs with 
measurements spaced one month apart aiming to test the directional relationship 
between coherence, purpose, significance, and MIL judgments. Across Studies 2 and 
3, sense of significance consistently emerged as a prospective predictor of MIL 
judgments. Purpose and sense of coherence did not significantly predict MIL 
judgments across time. However, this was qualified by a moderating effect of 
religion: MIL judgments were predicted by purpose and significance for non-
religious participants, and by coherence and significance for religious participants. 
These results have implications for the role of reflective processes on MIL 
judgments. Notably, significance emerges as a context-independent key component 
of experiencing one’s life as meaningful.  





Experiencing one’s life as meaningful is associated with measurable benefits. 
Self-reported meaning in life (MIL) has been linked to healthier eating, more 
physical activity, higher life satisfaction and lower depression (e.g., Brassai et al., 
2015; Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992). MIL is also 
distinct from other well-being constructs. For instance, Steger and Kashdan (2007) 
found that MIL recorded a year later was predicted by initial ratings of MIL, but not 
by life satisfaction. Despite its usefulness, the concept of MIL has raised unique 
challenges for empirical researchers trying to converge on a unitary definition 
(Leontiev, 2013). Psychologists have often focused on the subjective experience of 
MIL (e.g., Hicks & King, 2009a). However, treating meaning as a subjective 
judgment raises the question: What is this judgment about? 
Meaning in Life as Subjective Judgment 
MIL is an abstract construct that is related to leading a “good life”, perhaps 
according to some objective criteria (e.g., Wolf, 2010). Nevertheless, some have 
pointed to the difficulty in defining such criteria, while others have questioned the 
utility of having any objective components in definitions of MIL (e.g., Haidt, 2010; 
Koethe, 2010). Most research within psychology has avoided such debates by 
focusing on subjective appraisals called MIL judgments (or sense of MIL). These are 
captured in people’s responses to statements such as “My life is meaningful” 
(George & Park, 2016a; Heintzelman & King, 2014b). In turn, MIL judgments have 
been criticised for asking participants directly about meaningfulness when there is 
currently no consensually agreed definition of MIL (Leontiev, 2013). Furthermore, 
MIL judgments seem to be influenced by unrelated factors such as positive affect 
(e.g., King et al., 2006).  
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Meaning in Life as Coherence, Purpose and Significance  
In order to address some of these shortcomings (George & Park, 2016a; 
Leontiev, 2013), researchers have suggested increasingly sophisticated definitions, 
portraying MIL as a multi-faceted construct:  
“Meaning is the web of connections, understandings, and interpretations that 
help us comprehend our experience and formulate plans directing our 
energies to the achievement of our desired future. Meaning provides us with 
the sense that our lives matter, that they make sense, and that they are more 
than the sum of our seconds, days, and years.” (Steger, 2012a, p. 165).  
Such definitions suggest that a meaningful life is characterised by three 
dimensions: coherence, purpose and significance (King et al., 2006; Steger et al., 
2006; see also Reker & Wong, 1988). Models of MIL based on these dimensions are 
sometimes referred to as tripartite models (see George & Park, 2016a; Martela & 
Steger, 2016).  
Coherence has been defined as the process of making sense of one’s 
experiences or the world more broadly (Heintzelman & King, 2014a), and has often 
been conflated with meaning (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). For instance, absence of 
meaning has been described as resulting from perceived inconsistencies or an 
“awareness of nonrelations” (see Proulx & Heine, 2010; cf. Nagel, 1971). 
Furthermore, the widely used Meaning in Life Questionnaire – Presence subscale 
(MLQ-P; Steger et al, 2006) contains items related to comprehension and coherence 
such as “I understand my life’s meaning”. Evidence suggests that MIL might depend 
on perceiving regularities in one’s environment (Heintzelman et al., 2013). However, 
if coherence predicts a dependent variable that also measures coherence, then the 
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finding is tautological. Instead, the link between sense of coherence and sense of 
MIL should be tested empirically rather than assumed. 
Different kinds of coherence (e.g., coherence in self views versus coherence 
about the world) have been seen as equivalent (see Heine et al., 2006). When faced 
with information that undermines coherence, people often use strategies that are not 
specific to the type of coherence being undermined. Despite these fluid 
compensation mechanisms, however, different kinds of consistency violations might 
be perceived differently. For instance, one can selectively induce feelings of 
uncertainty about the self without influencing general feelings of uncertainty (see 
Paper 1). Given that sense of MIL is linked to identity processes (e.g., Vignoles et 
al., 2006; see also Vignoles, 2011), and that MIL is personal, focusing on “my life”, 
we suggest that self-related coherence (similar to life story schema construction; 
Bluck & Habermas, 2000)  is the key sense-making dimension of MIL. Self-related 
sense of coherence will be henceforth simply called sense of coherence, defined as 
the feeling of “making sense of one’s experiences in life” (Reker & Wong, 1988, p. 
220).  
Similar to coherence, purpose has also been conflated with earlier measures 
of MIL, e.g., “My personal existence is: (1) utterly meaningless, without purpose, (5) 
purposeful and meaningful” (Purpose in Life Test; Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964), 
three out of five of the MLQ-P items (Steger et al., 2006) are related to purpose 
Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus that purpose is a separate but related 
construct (George & Park, 2013; Kashdan et al., 2015; McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). 
For the current paper, purpose is seen as a motivational dimension of MIL (Martela 
& Steger, 2016), defined as “a central, self-organizing life aim that organises and 
stimulates goals, [and] manages behaviors” (McKnight & Kashdan, 2009, p. 242). 
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Consequently, having a sense of purpose is the feeling of having a life aim and 
working towards fulfilling it. Having a sense of purpose has been associated with 
important positive outcomes such as lower mortality rates (Boyle et al., 2009; Hill & 
Turiano, 2014).  
Significance (also called “mattering”; George & Park, 2014) refers to value, 
worth and importance (Martela & Steger, 2016) and transcending “the trivial or 
momentary” conditions of our lives (Heintzelman & King, 2014a). Having a sense of 
significance involves feeling that one’s life matters, and that it is worth living 
(Martela & Steger, 2016; George & Park, 2016a). While MIL researchers have 
hinted at similar meaning-related constructs in the past (e.g., the “valued life” 
dimension; Morgan & Farsides, 2009), significance has received less empirical 
attention compared to the other two MIL dimensions (George & Park, 2014).  
Measuring Sense of Coherence, Purpose, and Significance  
If MIL is about coherence, purpose and significance, then feeling a sense of 
coherence, purpose and significance should predict feelings of MIL (i.e., MIL 
judgments). George and Park (2016b) showed that sense of significance, purpose and 
coherence accounted for 60-71% of the variance in MIL judgments. However, 
despite reporting correlations between the dimensions and positive affect, they did 
not directly test whether mood explains the relationship between significance, 
purpose, coherence, and MIL judgments. Furthermore, results are based on cross-
sectional data, making it unclear whether the feeling of meaningfulness is about 
significance, purpose and coherence or vice versa.  
Martela and Steger (2016) expect that the three dimensions will be closely 
related to one another. For instance, perceiving that one’s life is fulfilling a broader 
purpose might engender a sense of significance. This can be seen in the context of 
80 
 
religious belief. Religion can prescribe a sense of purpose consisting of “spiritual 
strivings” which involve transcending the self and forming a union with a higher 
power (Emmons, 2005). The contrast between the fleeting smallness of one’s life 
and the vastness of the Universe (e.g., George & Park, 2014) is then bridged by 
having a sacred purpose that makes one feel that life matters on a higher level. The 
reverse is also plausible: feeling that life matters would lead to a stronger sense that 
there are objectives worth pursuing (Martela & Steger, 2016). Similarly, if one 
believes that one’s life is significant, then an individual might be more likely to 
project order onto one’s life experiences, thus increasing one’s sense of coherence. 
In turn, sense of coherence seems necessary for seeing unifying themes in one’s 
goals and constructing future objectives.   
George and Park (2016b) werethe first to attempt to separate empirically the 
dimensions of  significance, purpose and coherence. In their Multidimenstional 
Existential Meaning Scale (MEMS), each of the three dimensions showed a different 
pattern of correlations with theoretically-related constructs, providing evidence that 
they are distinct facets of meaning. However, the measure did not have a balanced 
set of positive and reverse-phrased items, which raises the issue of whether 
relationships between the variables are not a product of acquiescent response style, 
i.e., participants’ “tendency to agree with attitude statements regardless of content” 
(Winkler, Kanouse, & Ware, 1982, p. 555)4.   
                                                 
4 Some studies suggest that reverse-phrased items might be a source of bias and advise 
against using them (e.g. Schriesheim & Hill, 1981). Nevertheless, the advantages of negative 
responses might outweigh the problems, especially if these are used in a balanced way (even numbers 
of negatively and positively phrased items), are dispersed throughout the questionnaire, are carefully 
worded (e.g., avoiding the use of negation) and use fully labelled response scales (Weijters & 
Baumgartner, 2012). One can control for acquiescent responding by including several reverse phrased 




Dimensions of MIL and Related Constructs 
Dimensions of MIL are similar to previously studied constructs within 
psychology which have also been associated with sense of MIL. To establish the 
utility of tripartite accounts in predicting MIL judgments, one would need to 
distinguish them from such theoretically-related constructs. For instance, 
significance is a self-relevant evaluative construct, similar to self-esteem 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Furthermore, previous research has hypothesised links between 
self-esteem and sense of MIL (Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986), and has 
shown that identities are rated as more central if they satisfied needs of both MIL 
and self-esteem (Vignoles et al., 2006). However, self-esteem is an inadequate 
dimension of MIL because it operates at a lower level of abstraction compared to 
sense of significance, construed as a “global evaluation from a spiritual or existential 
level” of one’s life (George & Park, 2014, p. 47).  
Additionally, significance needs to be separated from measures of social 
relatedness, which are also linked to self-worth (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 
2005). Close relationships have been consistently associated with sense of MIL 
across qualitative and quantitative studies (see O’Donnell et al., 2014). Specifically, 
belonging, defined as “a secure sense of fitting in” (Lambert et al., 2013, p. 1418), 
has been suggested as the key feature of social relationships that leads to perceiving 
life as meaningful.  
Furthermore, competence and autonomy have been related to eudaimonic 
well-being (i.e., wellness obtained through self-actualization rather than subjective 
happiness; Ryan & Deci, 2001). A recent study found that autonomy, competence 
and relatedness were positively predictive of MIL scores three days later (Martela et 
al., 2017). Autonomy (i.e., a desire to “self-organise experience and behaviour”; 
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Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 231) has been indirectly related to the notion of coherence 
(through the related construct of control; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In contrast, 
competence is related to having a sense of efficacy (Ryan & Deci, 2000). As such, 
competence would be more related to attaining desired outcomes and achieving 
goals (Bandura, 1977; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001) and, consequently, more related to 
having a sense of purpose.  
The dimensions of MIL are often more integrative life-appraisals than their 
non-MIL-related counterparts. However, the usefulness of tripartite accounts of 
meaning depends on whether significance, purpose and coherence are separable from 
each other, as well as distinct from, but related to, self-esteem, belonging, 
competence, and control.   
Overview of the Present Studies  
The current paper has three aims: (a) to test whether significance, purpose, 
coherence, and MIL judgments are distinct constructs that are also separable from 
theoretically-related predictors of MIL; (b) to understand the unique contribution of 
each of the three dimensions of MIL to MIL judgments; (c) to test the prospective 
direction between each of the three dimensions and MIL judgments.  
To address these aims, in Study 1, we developed a set of items that could 
measure significance, purpose, coherence, and MIL judgments, without overlap with 
other conceptually-related predictors of MIL, while controlling for acquiescent 
response style by modelling this as a common method variance factor. Additionally, 
Study 1 provided a cross-sectional test of the expected relationships from 
significance, purpose, and coherence to MIL judgments, while controlling for mood. 
Studies 2 and 3 used causally-sensitive longitudinal designs to test whether MIL 
judgments were predicted by the three dimensions or vice versa. Both studies tested 
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the constructs using latent factors to control for measurement error and partialling 
out acquiescence. Data was analysed using cross-lag panel analysis which controls 
for participants’ responses at an earlier time point on the same measure. Based on 
findings from Study 2, we pre-registered Study 3 (e.g. hypotheses, sample size, 
analyses to be performed) prior to collecting and analysing our data.  
Study 1  
The first step was to create items that measured sense of significance, 
purpose, and coherence, as well as MIL judgments, and to test whether these four 
constructs are distinguishable from one another. Our scale was inspired by the 
MEMS (George & Park, 2016b), with added items to capture additional facets, e.g. 
coherence items related to life story schema coherence (Bluck & Habermas, 2000). 
We sought to create short measures (4 items) that still retained desirable scale 
properties. Furthermore, we aimed to test that the dimensions, and MIL judgments 
are not confounded with theoretically-related constructs (self-esteem, self-
competence, belonging and control) or affect, which has been shown to contaminate 
MIL ratings (King et al., 2006). Throughout our models, we controlled for 
acquiescent responding. Unlike previous measures (e.g., George & Park, 2016a), we 
aimed to include a balanced set of positive and reverse-phrased items.  
Method  
Participants and procedure. An online survey (see Appendix 3) was 
created using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/). Data were collected online 
using snowball sampling through social networking websites (Facebook, Twitter). 
The study was advertised to people over the age of 18 who had “a good level of 
English” as a study about “how people experience their lives as having or not having 
meaning”. Participants’ mood was first measured, followed by MIL judgments. 
84 
 
Subsequent measures were displayed in a randomised order for each participant. 
Finally, participants provided demographic information.5 
Of the 403 participants who accessed our questionnaire, 84 participants quit 
before proceeding to the questionnaire items. This left 319 participants out of whom 
5 were excluded owing to non-engagement with the items: they gave the same 
response to all items of a measure (e.g., Neither agree nor disagree for all statements 
that formed a scale).  
The final sample consisted of 314 participants (166 complete responses). 
Missing data was handled using full maximum likelihood estimation. Demographic 
information was recorded at the end of the questionnaire, so we only have complete 
demographics for complete responses. The mean age was 31.77 (SD = 10.97) and 
ranged from 18 to 78. There were 116 females, 49 males, and 1 agender. Participants 
were from a mix of countries, most were Romanian (N = 70), followed by British (N 
= 41), then from USA and Canada (N = 23). Most participants were Christian (N = 
87) and 8 reported other religious backgrounds, while the rest (N = 71) did not have 
any religious affiliation. Participants were highly educated: 86 reported having a 
Masters degree or higher, and only 21 participants were educated only to high-school 
level.   
Measures. An item pool was created for significance, purpose, coherence, 
MIL and related constructs. For all items described below, participants were asked to 
indicate their “feelings at the present moment”. Unless otherwise specified, all 
                                                 
5 Participants were invited to provide their email address to be contacted for follow-up 
questionnaires. Because of the very low sign-up, data from these later time points were not included 




responses were recorded on a 7-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly 
agree).  
MIL judgments. The measure aimed to captured an overall, abstract feeling 
of meaningfulness, without involving any of the three dimensions of meaning. Six 
items (3 reversed) were inspired or adapted from the MLQ-P (Steger et al., 2006) 
and from the Perceived Personal Meaning Scale (PPMS; Wong, 1998). Items 
included: “My life as a whole has meaning” and “My existence is empty of 
meaning” (reverse-phrased).  
Sense of coherence. We compiled a 17-item pool pertaining to self-related 
coherence. This included all comprehension items from the MEMS scale (George & 
Park, 2016b), e.g. “I can make sense of the things that happen in my life”. 
Additionally, items about life story schema coherence (Bluck & Habermas, 2000) 
were created. These related to the concept of temporal coherence, similar to the 
notion of self-continuity (i.e., “the need to feel a connection between past, present, 
and future identities”, Vignoles, 2011, p. 413), e.g. “I can see a connection between 
past, present and future events in my life”, thematic coherence (i.e., perceiving a 
consistent theme throughout life-events), e.g. “My experiences tend to have common 
themes”, and causal coherence (i.e., sense that one can generate explanations of why 
events occurred and how they led to future ones), e.g. “I can see how my decisions 
are influenced by my previous experiences”. Reverse-phrased counterparts were also 
included (7 reversed), e.g. temporal coherence: “I see past, present and future events 
in my life as disconnected”.  
Sense of purpose. As with coherence, we included items from the MEMS 
scale such as “I have overarching goals that guide me in my life”. We also adapted 
items from the purpose subscale of the Ryff Psychological Well-Being Scales (Ryff, 
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1989): “I often feel like I am wandering aimlessly through life” (reverse-phrased). 
There were 15 purpose items in total (6 reversed).  
Sense of significance. “Mattering” items from the MEMS scale were used to 
capture the significance construct, e.g. “Even considering how big the universe is, I 
can say that my life matters.” Reverse-phrased items that corresponded to the 
existing ones were added, e.g. “Given the vastness of the universe, my life does not 
matter”. Additionally, we created an item and its reverse-phrased counterpart that did 
not make reference to grander notions of time or the universe, e.g. “My life is 
inherently valuable”. In total, there were 9 sense of significance items (4 reversed).  
Sense of control. Six items (3 reversed) were generated based on the 
personal control manipulation checks used in the compensatory control literature 
(e.g. Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, & Laurin, 2008), e.g. “The events in my life are 
mainly determined by my own actions”, “I feel constrained by things outside of my 
control.” (reverse-phrased). 
Sense of belonging. We aimed to capture feelings of acceptance and fitting 
in rather than simply having close relationships (Lambert et al., 2013). For this 
purpose, 10 items (5 reversed) were adapted from the Sense of Belonging Inventory 
– psychological state (SOBI-P; Hagerty & Patusky, 1995), e.g. “I feel that I fit in” 
and from Lee and Robbins' (1995) Social Connectedness Scale (e.g. “I don’t feel that 
I participate with anyone or any group”, reverse-phrased).  
Self-esteem and self-competence. The Self-liking/Self-competence Scale – 
Revised version (SLCS-R; Tafarodi & Swann Jr., 2001) had 16 items in total with 8 
items per scale (4 reversed). The self-liking scale included items such as “I am very 
comfortable with myself”, while the self-competence scale included items such as “I 
am highly effective at the things I do“.  
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Mood. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 
1988) included 10 negative affect words (e.g. “Stressed”) and 10 positive affect 
words (e.g. “Excited”). For each word, participants were asked to respond about how 
they felt “at the present moment” on a scale from 1 = “Very slightly or not at all” to 
5 = “Very much”.6 
Results 
Analytical approach. Analyses were performed using MPlus Version 6 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2010). All models were estimated using full maximum 
likelihood. In order to assess the global fit of our models, we followed Hu and 
Bentler’s (1999) criteria for considering a good fitting model to the data: (1) root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) values close to .06 or below, (2) 
standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) close to .08 or below. Hu and 
Bentler (1999) recommend accepting models with a comparative fit index (CFI) 
value of .95 or greater, but others have criticised this standard as being too stringent 
for many models (Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004). As such, values of CFI higher than 
.90 were considered acceptable (Brown, 2015). Finally, we also reported 𝜒2 despite 
its many important shortcomings in assessing global fit (Brown, 2015; Kline, 2005). 
The 𝜒2 was used for comparisons between nested models where a statistically 
significant Δ𝜒2 suggests that the more inclusive model is a better fit to the data. 
These criteria will be used in all subsequent studies unless otherwise specified. 
Item selection and construct validation. We ran a confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) with the expected 8 factors: MIL, significance, purpose, coherence, 
                                                 
6 We also measured: belief in freewill / determinism (FAD-Plus; (Paulhus & Carey, 2011), 
religious belief  (Steger & Frazier, 2005), belief in a controlling God (Kay et al., 2008), identification 
with family members, close friends and “important others” using the Inclusion of Others in Self scale 
(IOS; Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992),  and government support (Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & 




belonging, control, self-liking and self-competence. Indicators corresponding to each 
predicted latent factor were a balanced mix of positively and negatively worded 
items. Following the instructions of Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al. (2003), we 
controlled for acquiescence by modelling it as a common method variance (CMV) 
latent factor that loaded onto each item, with all loadings fixed to 1. The CMV factor 
was assumed to be uncorrelated with the target constructs: its covariance with other 
latent factors in the model was fixed to 0. 
The initial CFA showed adequate fit for RMSEA and SRMR, but the CFI 
was poor: 𝜒2(2973) = 5484.24, p < .001; CFI = .79; RMSEA = .053 (90% CI = .051 
- .055); SRMR = .074. In aiming to improve the fit of our model and reduce our total 
item pool, we excluded items from newly developed scales in the following order: 
(a) based on low factor loadings – │βs│ < .4 (6 items removed); (b) based on cross-
loadings - if an item had a modification index (MI) of more than 10 and two or more 
other significant cross-loadings (MI > 4), or two cross-loadings with MIs larger than 
10, then that item was dropped (16 items removed); (c) if item removal produced 
only minimal loss of scale reliability while still maintaining reliability scores over .8 
(7 items removed). We aimed to remove items in such a way that maintained a 
balance of positive and negatively worded items. No items were removed from the 
previously validated SLCS-R. The final model showed adequate fit: χ2(831) = 
1414.37, p < .001; CFI = .894; RMSEA = .048 (90% CI =.044 - .053); SRMR = 
.0627. All factors loaded significantly onto their respective latent factors (│βs│ > 
.49, p < .001; see Table 3.1) and there was little cross-loading (estimated 
                                                 
7 Even though the CFI was marginally below the conventional threshold of .90, CFI is 
known to decline in correctly specified models with larger numbers of variables, and it should be 
judged in conjunction with the RMSEA (Kenny & McCoach, 2003). Given that both the RMSEA and 
SRMR were below their thresholds of .06 and .08, respectively, we consider the model to be of 
adequate fit.  
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standardised path coefficients < .30)8. We calculated composite reliabilities for each 
latent factor using the formula proposed by Raykov (1997) and all values were larger 
than the recommended value of .70 (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010).  
                                                 
8 As an additional check, we also ran a simple structure random intercept exploratory factor 
analysis (RI-EFA; Aichholzer, 2014) using the final, four-item solution for each MIL-related 
construct (MIL judgments, coherence, purpose, and significance), while modelling acquiescence as an 
individual random intercept and using the oblique Quartimin rotation. The model had an excellent fit, 
χ2(61) = 107.90, p < .001; CFI = .980; RMSEA = .051 (90% CI: =.035, .066); SRMR = .023. Items 
showed standardized loadings above .54 on their target factor, with the exception of the item “My life 
feels like a sequence of unconnected events” (β = .36). Standardized cross-loadings were smaller than 
.21, with the exception of item “I don’t know what I’m trying to accomplish in life” (β = .33).    
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Table 3.1. Final selection of MIL items and related constructs in Study 1 





MIL judgments (4 items) .89  
My life as a whole has meaning.  .79 
My entire existence is full of meaning.  .82 
My life is meaningless.  -.81 
My existence is empty of meaning.  -.83 
Purpose (4 items) .85  
I have a good sense of what I am trying to accomplish in life.  .83 
I have certain life goals that compel me to keep going.  .72 
I don’t know what I am trying to accomplish in life.  -.81 
I don’t have compelling life goals that keep me going.  -.69 
Coherence (4 items) .77  
I can make sense of the things that happen in my life.  .57 
Looking at my life as a whole, things seem clear to me.  .75 
I can’t make sense of events in my life.  -.77 
My life feels like a sequence of unconnected events.  -.60 
Significance (4 items) .92  
Whether my life ever existed matters even in the grand scheme of the 
universe. 
 .87 
Even considering how big the universe is, I can say that my life matters.  .85 
My existence is not significant in the grand scheme of things.  -.85 
Given the vastness of the universe, my life does not matter.  -.89 
Control (5 items) .75  
The events in my life are mainly determined by my own actions.  .69 
I feel like I am free to make my choices.  .71 
I feel that I have complete control over my life.  .66 
I am not in control of most things that occur in my life  -.49 
I feel constrained by things outside of my control.  -.52 
Belongingness (6 items) .90  
I feel included.  .86 
I feel that I fit in.  .84 
I feel accepted.  .78 
I don’t feel that I participate with anyone or any group.  -.61 
I feel excluded.  -.77 
I feel like an outsider.  -.77 
Self-liking (8 items) .93  
I tend to devalue myself.  -.72 
I am very comfortable with myself.  .84 
I am secure in my sense of self-worth.  .83 
It is sometimes unpleasant for me to think about myself.  -.68 
I have a negative attitude towards myself.  -.89 
I feel great about who I am.  .85 
I never doubt my personal self-worth.  .71 
I do not have enough respect for myself.  -.74 
Self-competence (8 items) .83  
I am highly effective at the things I do.  .76 
I am almost always able to accomplish what I try for.  .63 
I perform very well at many things.  .67 
I am very talented.  .53 
At times, I find it difficult to achieve the things that are important to me.  -.60 
I sometimes deal poorly with challenges.  -.66 
I sometimes fail to fulfil my goals.  -.64 
I wish I were more skilful in my activities.  -.46 
Note. All factor loadings were significant at p < .001.  
a Composite reliabilities calculated using Raykov’s (1997) formula for latent factors  
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All the latent factors were significantly correlated with each other (ps <.001) 
and, critically, intercorrelations between the each of the three dimensions and the 
other predictors of MIL ranged between .37 and .63 (see Table 3.2). This suggests 
that the dimensions do not overlap with other relevant concepts, supporting the 
separation between dimensions and predictors of MIL. However, intercorrelations 
between MIL judgments and the dimensions were higher, ranging from .65 to .72, 
raising the possibility that one of the meaning dimensions could be redundant with 
the other two. 
Table 3.2. Intercorrelations between MIL judgments, MIL dimensions and related constructs 
in Study 1 
Note. All constructs are represented by latent factors. All correlations were significant at p < .001. 
Therefore, we wanted to test whether the obtained items for significance, 
purpose, coherence and MIL judgments would not be explained better by a smaller 
number of factors. We ran a four-factor CFA on the meaning-related items. This 
model showed good fit: χ2(97) = 179.97, p < .001; CFI = .964; RMSEA = .054 (90% 
CI =.041 - .066); SRMR = .045. We conducted a nested-model comparison between 
this model and a one-factor model. The results show that the single-factor model fit 
the data significantly worse than the four-factor model, Δχ2(6) = 618.30, p < .001. 
The one-factor model also showed inadequate fit in absolute terms: χ2(103) = 
798.27, p < .001; CFI = .70; RMSEA = .151 (90% CI =.141 - .160); SRMR = .103.  
 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 MIL judgments -        
2 Significance .65 -       
3 Purpose .71 .49 -      
4 Coherence .65 .48 .72 -     
5 Belonging .54 .37 .45 .52 -    
6 Control .56 .44 .39 .42 .44 -   
7 Self-liking .63 .57 .52 .63 .59 .58 -  
8 Self-competence .45 .38 .41 .57 .35 .48 .68 - 
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We then compared the four-factor model to all 6 three-factor models that could be 
created by collapsing any pair of factors into a single factor. Each of these three-
factor models showed a significantly worse fit than the four-factor model—all 
Δχ2(3)  > 77.73 and all ps < .001. Thus, despite being highly intercorrelated, 
significance, purpose, coherence, and MIL judgments are distinguishable constructs.    
Structural equation model. Next, an initial structural model between the 
dimensions and MIL was tested. PANAS items were also included in the model to 
ensure that relationships are not explained by mood. A six-factor measurement 
model with significance, purpose coherence, MIL judgments, and positive and 
negative affect showed good fit: χ2(579) = 1006.01, p < .001; CFI = .924; RMSEA = 
.048 (90% CI =.043 -.053); SRMR = .053. Then, we modelled paths from each of the 
meaning dimensions and affect factors to the MIL judgments factor. The dimensions 
and affect factors were allowed to correlate (see Figure 3.1). As expected, there was 
a significant effect of sense of significance (β = .31, p < .001) and sense of purpose 
(β = .38, p < .001) on MIL. Interestingly, there was no significant direct effect of 
coherence on MIL (β = .15, p = .217). This model accounted for 66.3% of the 
variance in MIL judgments. These findings support the idea that purpose and 
significance have an effect on MIL judgments beyond what can be explained by 
mood. However, the unique relationship between coherence and MIL judgments 
























Figure 3.1. MIL judgments as an outcome of meaning dimensions and affect, in Study 1. Structural equation 
model with latent factors showing standardized estimates of correlations and paths from dimensions, and 
positive and negative affect to MIL judgments. Non-significant paths were not included in the figure. 





We found evidence that the factors are separate from one another and from 
MIL judgments. Moreover, sense of significance, coherence and purpose were 
distinct from theoretically related predictors of meaning: self-liking, belongingness, 
control and self-competence. Finally, we found initial support for significance and 
purpose predicting MIL judgments. Interestingly, the path from sense of coherence 
to MIL was not significant. Nevertheless, because the data is correlational, we can 
only speculatively infer the direction of these relationships. To address this, Study 2 
employed a longitudinal design.  
Study 2 
Study 2 aimed to clarify the directional relationships between the dimensions 
of meaning and MIL judgments. The meaning dimensions and MIL judgments scales 
developed in Study 1 were administered at three different time points to 
undergraduate students. There is a growing body of literature showing that MIL 
judgments can be susceptible to small short-term fluctuations (e.g., Heintzelman et 
al., 2013; Steger & Kashdan, 2013). However, if having a sense of meaningfulness is 
a product of reflective processes (i.e., deliberate, effortful processes; e.g., Martela & 
Steger, 2016), then the dimensions would be expected to exert their effects over a 
longer period of time. Consequently, we chose a time lag of a month. Firstly, we 
expected that all four constructs will remain moderately stable even across this 
longer timespan. Secondly, we expected that purpose and significance would predict 
MIL judgments a month later while controlling for earlier MIL scores. We also 
tested whether sense of coherence influences MIL judgments across time, but we 
made this prediction more tentatively given the null results from Study 1. Finally, we 
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expected that significance, purpose and coherence would be related to one another, 
but the direction of these relationships was less clear (George & Login, 2016a; 
Martela & Steger, 2016). A cross-lagged panel model with latent variables was used 
to test these predictions.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited among 
undergraduate students in exchange for research participation credits. The study was 
advertised as a longitudinal study with three waves, each one month apart. Students 
were given a link to the Qualtrics questionnaire and were asked to provide their 
email address in a separate survey, thereby allowing us to contact them anonymously 
for future waves. We allowed two weeks for data collection at Time 1 (T1), and one 
week at Time 2 (T2) and Time 3 (T3).  
Participants were asked to generate a unique identifying code so that their 
data could be matched across time points. We recorded 183 responses at T1. Out of 
these entries some were duplicates (i.e., matching identification codes). In these 
instances, the first entry was kept and the second entry was removed, unless the first 
entry contained little or no data (presumably, participants who quit the questionnaire 
almost immediately after accessing it and then came back to do it at a later time). 
Duplicates at T2 and T3 were handled in a similar manner. Moreover, when merging 
the datasets from different time points, some codes did not readily match. Where it 
was reasonable to assume that participants made a mistake in writing the code, the 
cases were matched manually. However, some cases could not be matched at all 
(codes were too different), and these cases were excluded from the final analysis. 
Figure 3.2 explains our exclusions at each step. Participants who dropped out at T2 
and T3, respectively, did not significantly differ from those who completed all time 
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Figure 3.2: Explanation of exclusions at each time point in Study 2 
 
The final T1 sample consisted of 168 participants (126 T2, and 111 at T3) 
with a mean age of 19.78 (SD = 4.90) that ranged from 18 to 54. There were 131 
females, 20 males, 2 participants who described themselves as “gender fluid” or 
“non-binary”, and 15 participants who did not report their gender.  Most participants 
reported being British nationals (N = 131), with the remainder coming from a mix of 
nationalities. In terms of religious affiliation, most participants did not identify with 
Time 1 
Initial: 
 N = 183 
After excluding duplicates:  
N = 168 
Time 2 
Initial: 
 N = 157 
After excluding duplicates:  
N = 126 
Time 3 
Initial: 
 N = 131 
After excluding duplicates:  
N = 111 
Lost to follow-up 
N = 42 
Lost to follow-up 
N = 21 
T1 participants re-joining 
after T2 dropout  
N = 6 
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any religion (N = 97), followed by those who identified as Christian (N = 42), 
Muslim (N = 5), and Jewish (N = 5). 
As in Study 1, we were transparent about the purpose of our study, 
introducing it as being about “how people experience their lives as having or not 
having meaning across time”. We measured MIL judgments first, followed by 
dimensions of meaning presented in random order9. Demographics were collected at 
the end of the questionnaire. 
Measures. MIL, significance, purpose and coherence were measured using 
the final selection of 24 items described in Study 1, using the same 7-point response 
scale.  
Results 
Measurement invariance across time. Measurement invariance needs to be 
established before running any structural equation modelling procedure on 
longitudinal data; otherwise, the relationships observed might simply occur because 
of the constructs naturally varying over time (Brown, 2015). For cross-lagged 
models where we are interested in examining covariance relations, a minimum 
requirement is to have loading invariance (i.e., when the loading of corresponding 
indicators is the same at each time point; Little, Preacher, Selig, & Card, 2007). To 
test this, we first created an unconstrained measurement model with 12 latent 
variables: MIL judgments, significance, coherence and purpose at each of the three 
time points. All latent factors were allowed to correlate with each other and error 
                                                 
9 Apart from the measures reported here, we also measured mood at all three time points 
using the International PANAS Short Form (I-PANAS-SF; Thompson, 2007). Additionally, at T1, we 
measured belief in freewill / determinism (FAD-Plus; Paulhus & Carey, 2001), religious belief (M. F. 
Steger & Frazier, 2005), belief in a controlling God (Kay et al., 2008), meritocratic beliefs (based on 
items from Zimmerman & Reyna, 2013), identification with family members and close friends 
(Inclusion of Others in Self scale; Aron et al., 1992), social values (Short Schwartz's Value Survey; 
Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005), and national/ethnic/sexual identity (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013). 
Results from these measures will be reported elsewhere.   
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terms for the same observed variables at different time points were also allowed to 
correlate. This model was then compared to a loading invariant model (the two 
models are nested). The ΔCFI statistic has been recommended as superior to the 
Δχ2for testing measurement invariance, with ΔCFI value of .01 or smaller 
suggesting that the models are invariant (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). We found that 
constraining the model did not substantially worsen the fit to the data, ΔCFI =  .001. 
Therefore, we could assume loading invariance (Brown, 2015). This final model 
with constrained factor loadings had an acceptable fit, χ2(984) = 1524.15, p < .001; 
CFI = .905; RMSEA = .057 (90% CI =.051 -.063); SRMR = .063. Correlations 














Note. All correlations were significant at p <.001. 
 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 MIL judgments T1 -            
2 MIL judgments T2 .83 -           
3 MIL judgments T3 .79 .92 -          
4 Significance T1 .74 .72 .67 -         
5 Significance T2 .85 .80 .73 .85 -        
6 Significance T3 .64 .64 .69 .79 .83 -       
7 Purpose T1 .52 .53 .55 .44 .45 .45 -      
8 Purpose T2 .57 .62 .61 .57 .52 .43 .81 -     
9 Purpose T3 .52 .54 .65 .51 .46 .55 .79  .85 -    
10 Coherence T1 .58 .57 .56 .53 .45 .48 .51 .49 .49 -   
11 Coherence T2 .63 .70 .64 .49 .51 .46 .52 .59 .55 .83 -  
12 Coherence T3 .59 .58 .62 .56 .54 .63 .50 .51 .55 .72 .78 - 
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Cross-lagged longitudinal model. To model the relationships between 
constructs across time, we used a cross-lagged model (Finkel, 1995) with the four 
constructs as latent factors across the three time points. Having established loading 
invariance, item loadings in this model were constrained to be invariant over time. 
All auto-regressive and cross-lagged paths were included between constructs at 
different time points. This model was statistically equivalent to our measurement 
model and, consequently, had the same values on the global fit statistics. Before 
testing our main hypotheses, we tested some assumptions of the model. Firstly, we 
assumed that the relationship between T1 and T3 variables should be mainly 
explained through the T1-T2 and T2-T3 pathways. Indeed, removing all T1 to T3 
paths did not produce a significantly worse-fitting model, Δχ2(16) = 13.55, p = .632. 
As such, the T1-T3 paths were not included in the final model. Secondly, we 
expected that the relationships between T1 and T2 variables would be the same as 
those between T2 and T3. However, constraining T1-T2 loadings to be equal to T2-
T3 produced a model that was significantly worse, Δχ2(16) = 30.57, p = .015. Given 
that we could not assume similar T1-T2 and T2-T3 relationships between our 
variables, and considering the relatively low number of participants as compared to 
the number of items in our model, we decided to model T1-T2 and T2-T3 relations 
in two separate models. 
In Model T1-T2, illustrated in Figure 3.3, all the constructs showed stability 
across time (autoregressive paths: βs = 56 - .75, ps < .001). In line with our 
prediction, T1 significance positively predicted T2 MIL (β = .22, p = .029). 
However, T1 purpose did not predict T2 MIL judgments (β = .12, p = .101). 
Moreover, sense of coherence did not go in the expected direction: T1 coherence did 
not significantly predict T2 MIL, but T2 coherence was predicted by T1 MIL 
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judgments (β = .30, p = .021). Additionally, T2 purpose was predicted by T1 
significance (β = .22, p = .028). 
 
In contrast, in Model T2-T3 (see Figure 3.4), no cross-lagged paths were 
significant. However, this failure to capture substantive cross-lagged effects could be 
due to the unusually large auto-regressive paths (βs = .72 - .91 ps < .001). In fact, 
82.8% of the variance of T3 MIL judgments was explained by T2 MIL judgments. 
This left almost no variance in T3 MIL to be explained by the other dimensions.  
 






















Figure 3.3. Relationships between MIL judgments and purpose, coherence and 
significance at T1-T2, in Study 2. Cross-lagged model with latent factors showing 
standardized estimates of paths between T1 and T2 MIL judgments, purpose, coherence 
and significance, 𝜒2(429) = 757.24, p < .001; CFI = .914; RMSEA = .067 (90% CI =.060 -
.075); SRMR = .061. Correlations between latent factors are included in the model but not 
displayed for ease of interpretation. Non-significant paths were not included in the figure. 





Figure 3.4. Relationships between MIL judgments and purpose, coherence and significance 
at T2-T3, in Study 2. Cross-lagged model with latent factors showing standardised estimates 
of paths between T2 and T3 MIL judgments, purpose, coherence and significance, χ^2(429) 
= 608.55, p < .001; CFI = .942; RMSEA = .056 (90% CI =.046 -.066); SRMR = .061. 
Correlations between latent factors are included in the model but not displayed for ease of 
interpretation. Non-significant paths were not included in the figure. *p < .05, **p < .01, 
***p <.001. 
Discussion 
Study 2 showed evidence that our items captured the same underlying 
constructs of MIL judgments, significance, purpose and coherence across time. 
Nevertheless, our main hypotheses were only partially supported. As expected, sense 
of significance predicted MIL judgments a month later. However, sense of purpose 
was not predictive of subsequent feelings of meaningfulness. Intriguingly, MIL 
judgments emerged as a precursor of coherence, which contradicts what would be 
expected according to tripartite accounts. However, this is aligned with Study 1 
results showing coherence and subjective meaning as highly correlated despite 
having no directional path from coherence to MIL judgments, perhaps hinting at the 
possibility of an inverse directional relationship. Additionally, two dimensions were 
related to one another across time: sense of significance predicted having a sense of 























would lead to being more committed to pursuing one’s purpose (Martela & Steger, 
2016) or to constructing and/or perceiving themes in one’s goals.  
The four constructs were stable across time, such that scores at one time 
highly predicted subsequent scores. However, it was intriguing that these stability 
paths were much stronger between the T2 and T3 than between T1 and T2. In fact, 
constructs were so stable between T2 and T3 that this raised concerns that no 
additional variance was left to be explained by the other factors. Indeed, this might 
be a key reason why we failed to model any substantive relationships between T2 
and T3 factors. It could be that participants remembered their responses from T2 and 
attempted to give consistent responses at T3.  
Study 2 had a relatively small sample size relative to the number of items 
included in the model. Moreover, the pattern of cross-lagged effects – although 
consistent with the correlational findings of Study 1 – was not predicted in advance. 
As such, we addressed this by running a pre-registered replication in Study 3, using a 
simplified design and a larger sample size. 
Study 3 
Study 3 aimed to replicate Study 2 findings by using a large, non-student 
sample. For ease of data collection, we included only two time points, administered 
again one month apart. We pre-registered Study 3 on AsPredicted.org where we 
committed to collect data from 500 participants at T1, hoping to retain at least 300 
participants with complete T1-T2 responses. Based on Study 2 findings and 
consistent with original theorizing, we expected that: significance would predict MIL 
judgments (H1). We also predicted that MIL judgments would influence coherence 
(H2). More tentatively, we predicted that significance would influence purpose (H3). 
Based on Study 1 results as well as tripartite accounts, we also tested whether 
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purpose would influence MIL judgments (H4). Finally, because of our larger 
projected sample size, we aimed to test also whether the relationships would be 
moderated by key demographic factors: native language, religion, gender, 
relationship status, wealth and political orientation.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. We collected data from Prolific Academic 
(https://www.prolific.ac/) participants using a Qualtrics questionnaire. The study was 
advertised as a two-part longitudinal study about meaning in life where only 
participants who completed our questionnaire at T1 were invited to complete the T2 
questionnaire. Participants were paid £0.35 for completing T1 (aprox. $0.45) and 
£0.65 upon completing T2 (aprox. $0.83). T2 participation had a higher financial 
incentive to reduce dropout rates.  
Participants were asked to enter the unique identifying code (series of 
numbers and digits) generated by Prolific Academic. This is the default procedure 
for anonymously paying respondents. We used this code to match data across time 
points. We recorded 509 responses at T1 and 379 responses at T2 (130 were lost to 
follow-up). Participants who dropped out at T2 did not significantly differ from 
those who completed both time points. As specified in our pre-registration, we 
removed participants who failed to correctly respond to one or more of the 4 
attention checks embedded within the questionnaire (e.g., “Please select somewhat 
agree”) (64 cases removed). Additionally, 3 participants were excluded for not 
engaging with the questionnaire items: they gave the same response to all items on 
two or more scales. As in Study 1 and 2, missing data was handled using full 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
105 
 
The final sample at T1 consisted of 442 participants (326 at T2) aged 
between 18 and 70 (M = 31.51, SD = 10.30). Participants were 229 females and 205 
males, as well as 8 participants who did not disclose their gender. The largest 
national group was British (N = 127), followed by US (N = 86) and Portuguese (N = 
42), with the remaining 172 who answered this question coming from a mix of 
nations. Only 140 participants were in higher education. Most participants reported 
not belonging to any religious group (N = 280), and the second largest group was 
formed of Christians (N = 129), while other religious affiliations formed a small 
subset of our sample (N = 25). Finally, most participants were not in a relationship 
(N = 156), followed by those in a committed relationship (N = 132), then by those 
who are married (N = 125).  
Our items were displayed following the sequence in Study 2: MIL judgment 
items, followed by meaning dimension items in randomised order, and finally 
demographics plus measures of relative wealth and political orientation.  
Measures. We used the same measures of MIL, significance, purpose and 
coherence as in Studies 1 and 2. Relative wealth was measured by asking 
participants to mention their level of financial wealth, compared to other people in 
their country on a 7-point scale (1 = “Very poor”, 4 = “Average wealth”, 7 = “Very 
rich”). Political orientation was measured on an 11-point scale, 1 = “Left”, 6 = 
“Centre”, 11 = “Right”). 
Results 
Measurement invariance across time. Following our procedure from Study 
2, we first created a measurement model with 8 latent variables corresponding to 
MIL judgments, significance, purpose and coherence at the two time points, with the 
residuals of the same observed variables at each of the two time points allowed to 
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covary. Then, we tested loading invariance by comparing this initial model to a 
model where factor loadings were constrained to be the same across time. A nested-
model comparison showed that the constrained model did not significantly worsen 
the fit to the data, ΔCFI =  .001. Consequently, we could assume loading invariance. 
The model with constrained factor loadings had a good fit, χ2(429) = 946.423, p < 
.001; CFI = .951; RMSEA = .052 (90% CI =.048 -.057); SRMR = .048. Correlations 
between latent factors across time can be seen in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Intercorrelations between MIL judgments, MIL dimensions and related constructs 









Note. All correlations were significant at p <.001. 
Cross-lagged longitudinal model. To test directional paths, we constructed 
an auto-regressive cross-lagged model corresponding to the loadings invariant 
measurement model described earlier (see Figure 3.5). As in Study 2, all auto-
regressive paths and cross-lagged paths were included between constructs at 
different time points. The constructs showed stability across the two time points 
(autoregressive paths: βs = 64 - .78, ps < .001). Importantly, our main prediction 
(H1) was supported: T1 significance predicted higher T2 MIL judgments (β = .21, p 
< .001).  However, against our predictions, T1 purpose did not predict T2 MIL 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 MIL judgments T1 -        
2 MIL judgments T2 .82 -       
3 Significance T1 .72 .70 -      
4 Significance T2 .67 .78 .85 -     
5 Purpose T1 .72 .63 .57 .47 -    
6 Purpose T2 .66 .67 .54 .53 .83 -   
7 Coherence T1 .70 .56 .44 .40 .65 .59 -  
8 Coherence T2 .65 .67 .51 .50 .65 .65 .82 - 
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judgments (β = .08, p = .193) (H4), T1 MIL judgments did not predict T2 coherence 
(β = -.06, p = .517) (H2), and T1 significance did not predict T2 purpose (β = .06, p 
= .316) (H3). Finally, T2 coherence was positively predicted by T1 significance (β = 
.16, p = .013) and marginally positively predicted by T1 purpose (β = .14, p = .053). 
 
Figure 3.5: Relationships between MIL judgments and purpose, coherence and significance 
at T1-T2, in Study 3. Cross-lagged model with latent factors showing standardised estimates 
of paths between T1 and T2 MIL judgments, purpose, coherence and significance, 𝜒2 (429) 
= 946.423, p < .001; CFI = .951; RMSEA = .052 (90% CI =.048 -.057); SRMR = .048. 
Correlations between latent factors are included in the model but not displayed for ease of 
interpretation. Non-significant paths were not included in the figure. Solid lines show 
significant paths and dotted lines show marginally significant paths (p < .06). *p < .05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Moderators. We tested whether the pattern of results would differ according 
to participants’ backgrounds. This was achieved by splitting the data on each of the 
suggested moderating factors. Then, we tested factorial invariance and performed 
multi-group comparisons on the split data.  
First, we were concerned by the large numbers of participants coming from 
non-English-speaking countries. We tested whether the pattern of findings would be 
different when accounting for the language spoken by participants. Where available, 
we used data provided through Prolific Academic about participants’ first language 


























speakers (N =190). First, we tested measurement invariance across the two groups. 
Constraining factor loadings between native and non-native English speakers did not 
substantially worsen the unconstrained model, ΔCFI = .001, additionally 
constraining intercepts did not worsen the loading invariant model, ΔCFI = .001. 
Thus, we could establish intercept invariance (Brown, 2015), which suggests that the 
means of corresponding indicators across groups are comparable. There was no 
difference between native and non-native English speakers in their latent factor 
means (ps > .05). Then, we tested the structural model with constrained loadings and 
intercepts between groups and showed that constraining the paths to be equal across 
groups did not significantly worsen the model, Δχ2(16) = 22.00, p = .143. Therefore, 
pattern of relationships did not differ by language proficiency.    
Next, we tested the moderating effect of religious belief. Because few 
religious participants in our sample were non-Christian, we simply split our sample 
into non-religious and religious, with the latter category including participants from 
all religions. We first established intercept invariance (ΔCFIs < .01). The final model 
also showed good absolute fit: χ2(892) = 1607.71, p < .001; CFI = .930; RMSEA = 
.061 (90% CI =.056 -.066); SRMR = .060. Then, we specified the structural model 
(with constrained loadings and intercepts) and found that constraining paths to be 
equal between religious and non-religious participants significantly worsened the 
model: Δχ2(16) = 36.35, p = .003. As such, we looked at the pattern of relationships 
for religious and non-religious people separately (see Figure 3.6). We also 
constrained cross-lag paths one at a time and performed nested model comparisons 
to test see what relationships were significantly different between groups. Religious 
belief did not significantly moderate the relationship between T1 significance and T2 
MIL judgments, Δχ2(1) = 2.29, p = .130, such that both religious and non-religious 
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participants relied on sense of significance to make MIL judgments (βs = .14-.35, ps 
< .021). However, religious belief significantly moderated the relationship from 
purpose to MIL judgments, Δχ2(1) = 7.81, p = .005, such that T1 purpose 
significantly positively predicted MIL judgments for non-religious participants (β = 
.17, p = .021), but not for religious participants (β = -.18, p = .076). Moreover, 
religious belief significantly moderated the path from coherence to MIL judgments, 
Δχ2(1) = 6.77, p = .009: T1 coherence significantly positively predicted T2 MIL 
judgments for religious participants  (β = .24, p = .047), but not for non-religious 
participants (β = -.13, p = .078). Interestingly, T1 MIL judgments predicted T2 
purpose for religious participants (β = .45, p = .017), but not for non-religious 
participants (β = .01, p = .919), and this difference was also statistically significant, 












Figure 3.6: Relationships between MIL judgments and purpose, coherence and significance 
at T1-T2 for religious and non-religious participants, in Study 3. Cross-lagged model with 
latent factors showing standardised estimates of paths between T1 and T2 MIL judgments, 
purpose, coherence and significance for religious participants, in Study 3. Correlations 
between latent factors are included in the model but not displayed for ease of interpretation. 

















































Latent factor means were compared between the two groups showing that 
religious participants scored significantly higher on all meaning constructs compared 
to the non-religious (ps < .010). However, given that all variances were also 
significantly higher for the religious group, we ruled out ceiling effects explaining 
the differential pattern of relationships.   
A similar procedure was used for gender, relationship status, wealth and 
political orientation. Wealth was recoded into 3 categories: “Below average wealth” 
(Responses: 1-3, N = 130), “Average wealth” (Response: 4, N = 180), and “Above 
average” (Responses: 5-7, N = 124). Similarly, political orientation was recoded into 
3 categories: “Left” (Responses: 1 to 4, N = 177), “Centre” (Responses: 5 to 7, N = 
175), “Right” (Responses: 8 to 11, N = 82). For relationship status we only used 
“Not in a relationship”, “Married” and “In a committed relationship” as very few 
participants reported having a different status (N =21). After establishing intercept 
invariance between different groups within each category (all ΔCFI < .01), 
constraining the paths to be equal in the corresponding structural models did not 
result in a significantly worse fit. Therefore, we can assume that the relationships do 
not differ according to gender, relationship status, wealth or political orientation.  
Discussion 
H1 was supported, showing that significance predicted MIL judgments one 
month later. This replicated the findings in Study 2, suggesting that significance is 
the most reliable of the three meaning dimensions at influencing MIL judgments. 
Unlike Study 2, coherence was not predicted by MIL judgments (H2 not supported). 
Nevertheless, we found that coherence was predicted by significance and, again, at 
each time point, coherence was correlated with concurrent MIL judgments. This 
suggests that sense of coherence might be a parallel construct to MIL judgments, 
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rather than a precursor. As in Study 2, purpose failed to predict MIL judgments (H4 
not supported), despite the cross-sectional evidence in Study 1, suggesting a path 
from purpose to MIL. Significance did not predict purpose (H3 not supported). This 
would suggest that the interrelations between significance, purpose and coherence 
are more variable. Finally, we explored whether participants’ backgrounds would 
influence the pattern of relationships. We ruled out the possibility that the pattern of 
findings might be different according to participants’ native language, gender, 
relationship status, wealth and political orientation. However, our results suggested 
that non-religious participants rely on significance and purpose to make MIL 
judgments whereas religious participants rely on significance and coherence.  
General Discussion 
Leading a meaningful life is both intuitively appealing and empirically linked 
to measurable mental and physical benefits. However, there is still debate about what 
MIL is and how it should be defined and measured. It has been suggested that MIL is 
about purpose, coherence and significance. Across three studies, we aimed to test 
whether a person’s MIL judgements (i.e., personal appraisals of life’s 
meaningfulness), are informed by his or her sense of purpose, coherence, and 
significance. In Study 1, we found evidence that sense of significance, sense of 
purpose, sense of coherence, and sense of MIL are distinct dimensions that correlate 
with each other. We sought to extend George and Park’s (2016b) finding that sense 
of significance, purpose and coherence had non-overlapping contributions to MIL 
judgements, by also ruling out two alternative explanations in terms of (a) 
acquiescent responding or (b) mood effects. Study 1 results only partially supported 
their findings – showing that significance and purpose, but not coherence, 
significantly contributed to a contemporaneous prediction of MIL.  
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Given that coherence, purpose and significance have been suggested as 
definitional components of MIL (George & Park, 2016, Martela & Steger, 2016), 
this should be reflected in people’s appraisals of subjective meaningfulness. We 
recognise that seeing one’s life as meaningful, and actually having a meaningful life 
are not the same thing, but MIL judgments are valuable as a subjective experience in 
their own right (Hicks & King, 2009a), and they might be informative about the 
“actual meaningfulness” of people’s lives, if such a notion exists (Heintzelman & 
King, 2015). Of the three dimensions, significance emerged as the most robust 
predictor of MIL judgments across all our samples. Thus, when trying to decide 
whether their life is meaningful or not, people tend to ask whether their life matters 
in spite of their smallness in time (homo sapiens have existed for over 200,000 years, 
and the Universe has existed for more than 13.73 billion years) and space (the 
vastness of the Universe). This finding held across gender, wealth, political 
orientation, relationship status and religion. As such, there is initial evidence that the 
link to MIL judgments holds regardless of whether one’s life is seen to matter in a 
spiritual sense (i.e., being God’s creation) or in a secular sense (e.g., mattering to 
important others in one’s life; O’Donnell et al., 2014). 
The relationship between MIL judgments and either sense of coherence or 
sense of purpose was less straightforward. This was particularly surprising given that 
both coherence and purpose have been long associated with MIL, and in some cases, 
seen as coterminous with MIL (e.g., Antonovsky, 1987; Crumbaugh & Maholick, 
1964). Across Studies 2-3, neither coherence nor purpose seemed to predict sense of 
MIL. Instead, sense of coherence was a significant outcome of MIL judgments in 
Study 2. In Study 3, coherence was predicted by significance and, marginally, by 
purpose, suggesting that sense of coherence might be a parallel outcome to sense of 
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MIL rather than a predictor. Similarly, purpose did not predict MIL judgments in 
Studies 2 and 3. However, these relationships were qualified by the moderating 
effect of religious belief.  
For religious participants, sense of coherence predicted sense of MIL. In 
providing definitive answers about the nature of existence itself, religion establishes 
a truth (Kinnvall, 2004; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Thus, religion tends to blur the lines 
between a subjective meaning in life and an absolute objective meaning of life. 
Consequently, sense of coherence might serve to affirm the broader tapestry of 
divine order thus heightening one’s sense of meaning in (of) life. Alternatively, 
individual differences in the need “to cognitively structure their worlds in simple, 
unambiguous ways” (i.e., personal need for structure; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; p. 
114), and not religion, might be the key moderator. Various types of religiosity have 
been associated with having a high need for structure (Ladd, 2007). The same urge 
that makes worldviews such as religion appealing to certain people might also lead 
them to derive meaningfulness from order-affirming feelings such as sense of 
coherence.  
Purpose predicted MIL judgments for non-religious but not for religious 
participants. Developing an overarching life aim might give a secular sense of 
meaningfulness to one’s life through perceiving one’s goals as related and unitary: 
“once a purpose becomes developed, purpose drives meaning” (McKnight & 
Kashdan, 2009, p. 243). Conversely, for religious people, purpose was preceded by 
feelings of MIL; this might follow from religion prescribing an absolute purpose: 
“meaning is embedded within religion’s sacred character, so that it points to 
humanity’s ultimate purpose” (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, p. 16).  
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Implications and Future Directions 
Our paper is the first to test prospective relationships from the dimensions of 
significance, purpose, and coherence to MIL judgments, using a longitudinal design 
(Studies 2 and 3). While we found evidence for only one of the three dimensions of 
MIL (significance) uniformly informing MIL judgments across contexts, this does 
not disqualify purpose and coherence as components of MIL. Instead, some of our 
theoretical assumptions should be revisited.  
MIL has been understood as both a product of both intuitive and reflective 
processes (King, 2012). Recent findings support the role of intuition in making MIL 
judgments (Heintzelman & King, 2016), and some have questioned to what extent 
people’s sense of MIL reflects anything beyond “the general positive affect 
accompanying it” (Leontiev, 2013, p. 468). This paper aimed to determine the role of 
reflective processes (in the form of significance, purpose, and coherence), in the 
experience of MIL. Some have suggested that MIL-related reflective processing 
mainly serves to give the impression that one’s existence is of value (Heintzelman & 
King, 2016). Our findings support this as significance emerged as the most reliable, 
context-independent predictor of MIL judgments. Nevertheless, in future studies, 
researchers should test whether the dimensions of MIL can be captured as intuitive 
judgments, perhaps through implicit measures of dimensions of MIL. 
The finding that self-reported significance predicts self-reported MIL 
judgments could be read as tautological. People’s lay definitions of meaningfulness 
and significance may overlap, which would explain the temporal sequence between 
the constructs. We consider this unlikely given that significance and MIL judgments 
emerged as separate, but correlated factors in Study 1, which was in line with our 
initial prediction.  
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Interestingly, we found evidence that paths to meaningfulness might not be 
wholly context-independent. We have shown that religious belief has a moderating 
effect. However, future studies should explore religion beyond the religious/non-
religious dichotomy and aim to capture the multidimensional nature of religion, such 
as extrinsic and intrinsic orientations (Allport & Ross, 1967), and quest orientation 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Batson & Ventis, 1982). This might be particularly 
relevant as different religious orientations have different associations with structure-
seeking tendencies (Ladd, 2007). Furthermore, exploring moderators might be 
particularly relevant in relation to the coherence-MIL judgments relationship, given 
that coherence has been shown to either be predicted by (Study 2, across the sample), 
predict (Study 3, for religious participants), or be a parallel outcome to MIL 
judgments (Study 3, for non-religious participants). 
Findings should also be interpreted in light of the time lag used across our 
studies. Despite making a theoretically-informed time lag choice, there are no 
previous studies suggesting over what span of time purpose, coherence and 
significance inform MIL judgments. If this process occurs over a shorter or a longer 
span than the one month lag chosen  for Studies 2 and 3, our design would 
underestimate these relationships (Taris & Kompier, 2014). Moreover, it is possible 
that significance, coherence and purpose exert their influence on MIL judgments 
over different periods of time. Future research should aim to test this, using 
differently spaced measurement points.  
Conclusions 
The current paper shows evidence that MIL judgments are not reducible to 
significance, purpose and coherence. Two theoretically-established, reflective, 
meaning-related constructs, coherence and purpose, seemed to have a complicated 
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relationship to forming MIL judgments that seems contingent on religious belief. In 
contrast, sense of significance plays a more generalizable role in making MIL 
judgments. People who feel that their lives matter tend to feel that their lives are 
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Research into people’s sense of meaning in life (MIL) has tended to focus on either 
contents that people may find meaningful (e.g., religious beliefs, relationships, 
values, etc.) or dimensions that may contribute to a sense of meaningfulness (e.g., 
sense of purpose, significance, or coherence). Bringing these two research foci 
together for the first time, allows us to understand the functions that various beliefs, 
values, identities and attitudes serve in fulfilling a sense of MIL. We aimed to test 
whether meaning frameworks (i.e., systems of relationships used to make sense of 
the world; e.g., worldviews, identities, attitudes) associated with higher sense of 
purpose, significance and coherence are also associated with higher MIL judgments 
(i.e., abstract appraisals that one’s life is meaningful). In turn, we expected that MIL 
judgments are linked to the perceived importance of the meaning framework. The 
effects of individual-level moderators were also explored. Using multilevel structural 
equation modelling (Level 1 with meaning framework ratings, and Level 2 with 
individual-level differences in meaning framework content), within-person ratings of 
significance, purpose and coherence predicted MIL judgments which, in turn, 
predicted perceived importance. These findings suggest that meaning frameworks 
satisfy feelings of MIL not just through coherence but also through significance and 









Issues concerning meaning have occupied people’s imaginations for 
thousands of years (e.g., Aristotle, c.350BCE/1962), sometimes with paralysing 
intensity: “As long as I do not know the reason why, I cannot do anything” (Tolstoy, 
1957/1983, p.27). In a more mundane form, when people ask themselves whether a 
job, or activity, or relationship is worthwhile, people are ultimately asking: How can 
I lead a “good” life? Seeking positive, moral and worthwhile pursuits beyond 
momentary pleasures is, at a minimum, desirable, and, in more extreme cases, “a 
matter of life and death” (Yalom, 1980, p. 419).  
Despite increased interest in meaning within psychology (e.g., Leontiev, 
2013), there has been a persistent lack of consensus as to how the construct should 
be defined and operationalised (Hicks & King, 2009a; Leontiev, 2013). At times, the 
term “meaning” has been used to describe how people make sense of themselves and 
their environment, and it has been studied under conditions of threat (e.g., Heine et 
al., 2006). Other research has focused on the positive effects of having meaning in 
life (MIL), which range from better physical and mental health (Brassai et al., 2015; 
Steger et al., 2009; Zika & Chamberlain, 1992) to increased longevity (Boyle et al., 
2009; Hill & Turiano, 2014). MIL either has been used synonymously with the 
subjective, abstract appraisals made by people regarding whether their life is 
meaningful, or has been seen as a multi-faceted construct (e.g., George & Park, 
2016a; Martela & Steger, 2016; Reker & Wong, 1988; Schnell, 2009). In what 
follows, we aim to bridge these research strands and test the link people’s sense-
making frameworks to MIL.  
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Defining and Measuring Meaningfulness 
Recent theoretical accounts of MIL define it in terms of three facets: purpose, 
significance and coherence (George & Park, 2016a; Martela & Steger, 2016b), 
henceforth called dimensions of MIL. Sense of purpose is a motivational construct 
that acts as an overarching life aim which subsumes and organises other goals 
(McKnight & Kashdan, 2009). Sense of coherence involves “making sense of one’s 
experiences in life” (Reker & Wong, 1988, p. 220). Finally, sense of significance 
consists of an evaluation that one’s life matters (George & Park, 2014; George & 
Park 2016a). Furthermore, initial studies suggest that these constructs are distinct 
from one another, and each has been shown to correlate with theoretically-related 
constructs (George & Park, 2016b; see Paper 3).  
Nevertheless, it is unclear how such definitions of MIL relate to people’s 
subjective appraisals of how meaningful their lives are (also known as MIL 
judgments; George & Park 2016a). MIL is an abstract construct which might also 
involve an objective component (e.g., Wolf, 2010). By extension, meaningful lives 
might, in principle, be distinctly identified by external observers using some form of 
criteria (Martela, 2017). In contrast, MIL judgments (or sense of meaningfulness) 
refer specifically to the subjective appraisals made by individuals about their own 
lives. MIL judgments have often been implicitly equated with MIL: the most widely 
used measure of MIL includes items such as “I have a good sense of what makes my 
life meaningful” (Meaning in Life Questionnaire – Presence subscale; Steger et al., 
2006). Regardless of whether MIL can be reduced to MIL judgments, feeling that 
life is meaningful should be at least partially indicative of how meaningful life is 
(see Heintzelman & King, 2014a). Consequently, if MIL is defined as purpose, 
significance and coherence, then feeling that one’s life has purpose significance and 
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coherence should also lead to feeling MIL. It is still unclear under what 
circumstances each of the three dimensions (particularly purpose and coherence) 
lead one to judge life as meaningful (see Paper 3). 
The Relation Between Meaning Frameworks and MIL 
 Another prominent strand of research has used the term meaning to denote 
sense-making, involving the construction and use of meaning frameworks (or mental 
representations; Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2010). Meaning frameworks 
broadly refer to “expected relationships” used to make sense of the world (Proulx & 
Inzlicht, 2012, p. 317). They form a broad construct that encompasses both single 
propositions (e.g. grass is green) and clusters of propositions (e.g. identities; George 
& Park, 2016a).  
Meaning frameworks have been frequently studied in relation to threat 
(Proulx & Heine, 2006, 2008, 2009), alongside work on threat compensation where 
people respond to violations of expectation in one life domain by affirming an 
alternative domain (e.g., Hogg, 2000; Steele, 1988). Consequently, this work has 
been criticised for only explaining what happens when meaning is lacking, but not 
accounting for the positive experience of having MIL (Steger, 2012b).  
There have been indirect attempts to link meaning frameworks to MIL 
judgments, through their presumed coherence-affirming properties (Heintzelman & 
King, 2014a; Heintzelman et al., 2013). Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent 
different meaning frameworks with varying complexity and content are of 
differential use in providing a sense of MIL. Apart from their obvious coherence-
related functions, meaning frameworks can also be evaluative (e.g., attitudes), or 
prescriptive or proscriptive (e.g., values; Koltko-Rivera, 2004), suggesting they 
could also be related to significance and purpose (framed as evaluative and 
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motivational components, respectively; Martela & Steger, 2016). Indeed, it has been 
proposed recently, but not tested, that meaning frameworks are related to MIL to the 
extent that they elicit a higher sense of significance, purpose and coherence (George 
& Park, 2016a). Testing this proposition is a central goal of our current study. 
So far, the term meaning frameworks has been used to describe a wide range 
of psychological constructs (e.g., schemata, beliefs) as they have been shown to 
serve similar needs for consistency (e.g., Heine et al., 2006). Regardless, not all of 
these meaning frameworks have the same potential to elicit meaningfulness. For 
instance, successfully identifying a piece of furniture as a “chair” might not make 
one’s life more meaningful, but believing that people have free will might (Bergner 
& Ramon, 2013; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 2015). Highly 
complex meaning frameworks such as those related to free will have been called 
worldviews, defined as “beliefs regarding the underlying nature of reality, ‘proper’ 
social relations or guidelines for living, or the existence or nonexistence of important 
entities” (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 5). These belief systems are either arrived at 
through abstraction from personal experience or culturally prescribed. Worldviews 
orient individuals to what is worth knowing and to how knowledge can be obtained, 
thus occupying a superordinate position in cognition (Koltko-Rivera, 2004; Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Consequently, to the extent that MIL is a product 
of reflection and information integration (Martela & Steger, 2016), then worldviews 
should be highly important for MIL. 
 Other complex meaning frameworks include attitudes, which are evaluative 
structures, perhaps operating downstream from worldviews (e.g., Van Hiel, Cornelis, 
& Roets, 2007). Furthermore, identities might be similar to worldviews in their 
central relationship to MIL (Vignoles, 2011). Identities serve to make sense of both 
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personal and social self-relevant information (Vignoles, in press.) and variations in 
self-construal are linked, in turn, to differences in cognitive and affective processes, 
as well as in behaviour (reviewed by Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011).   
Even when complexity and type of information (self-relevant, evaluative etc.) 
are taken into account, meaning frameworks can still differ in important ways. For 
instance, believing in free will, as opposed to determinism, is associated with higher 
MIL judgments (Bergner & Ramon, 2013), despite both free will and determinism 
addressing the same issue and being equally complex. People might also draw on 
different sources of information to judge MIL, depending on their endorsed meaning 
framework (e.g., religious versus non-religious people; see Paper 3).  
Finally, if feeling meaningfulness is a highly desirable experience (Steger et 
al., 2008), then meaning frameworks associated with a higher sense of MIL may be 
perceived as being more important. Furthermore, if MIL judgments reflect MIL in a 
way that is not reducible to other psychological states, then sense of MIL is expected 
to predict meaning framework importance even while controlling for other important 
psychological needs, such as identity motives (Vignoles, 2011) or need for control 
(Galinsky, Whitson, Huang, & Rucker, 2012).     
Current Study 
Whereas previous studies have focused on measuring and predicting 
individual differences in MIL judgments (see Paper 3; George & Park, 2016b; Steger 
et al., 2006), here we focused on intrapersonal variation across different worldviews, 
attitudes and identities—i.e., rather than predicting which individuals perceive their 
life as more meaningful compared to other individuals, we sought to predict which of 
people’s meaning frameworks they perceive as more meaningful compared to other 
frameworks. Participants selected (or formulated) statements reflecting their 
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identities, beliefs, attitudes or values in each of the following 12 domains: national 
identity, religious identity, role identities in relation to two important others, family 
identity, socioeconomic beliefs, free will/determinism beliefs, beliefs about human 
nature, abortion attitudes, death penalty attitudes, personal values and moral 
foundations. A participants’ responses for each of the 12 domains are henceforth 
referred to as a participants’ meaning frameworks. Meaning-related measures were 
modelled as within-person variation across the various meaning frameworks 
identified. Capturing diverse meaning frameworks was essential to ensure variation 
in ratings of MIL judgments and the three dimensions of meaning. Consequently, 
domains were selected to vary in the type and complexity of the meaning 
frameworks they were meant to elicit (e.g., worldviews, attitudes). Each meaning 
system was rated for meaningfulness, purpose, significance and coherence. 
Participants also rated the perceived importance of each meaning framework, and to 
what extent it fulfilled psychological needs of belongingness, self-esteem, self-
efficacy, distinctiveness, continuity and personal control.  
We predicted that participants would derive a stronger sense of 
meaningfulness from those meaning frameworks that made them feel a stronger 
sense of purpose, significance and coherence. Furthermore, we expected that MIL 
judgments would predict the importance of one’s meaning frameworks, even while 
controlling for fulfilment of other important psychological needs. This within-person 
technique has some important advantages above the widespread practice of using 
self-report measures of MIL at the individual level. By using ratings of multiple 
meaning frameworks, people do not directly judge the level of meaningfulness of 
their lives as a whole, which might insulate our results from socially desirable 
response style, especially as participants would not necessarily be aware of the 
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statistical patterns within their data that formed the focus of our analyses. Moreover, 
a statistical focus on within-person variation insulates our results from acquiescent 
response style, and it provides information about the associations between MIL and 
other constructs for each individual in the sample, whereas an individual-differences 
approach would only allow us to explore these associations across the sample as a 
whole.  
A second aim was to explore the moderating effect of individual-level 
variables derived from people’s meaning framework content—i.e., we sought to 
explore how individuals differ in what meaning frameworks they perceive as more 
meaningful compared to others. We attempted to replicate previous findings that 
religious orientation would moderate the relationship between purpose and MIL 
judgments and between coherence and MIL judgments (see Paper 3), while 
differentiating between atheists and agnostics. Agnostics stand out from religious 
people and atheists as they display a “lack of either belief or disbelief in God” (Hood 
et al., 2009, p. 132), suggesting that agnostics should be treated as a separate 
category, rather than a “mid-point” between religiosity and atheism.  
More speculatively, we explored whether those who believe in free will form 
MIL judgments differently to those who believe in determinism. Also, we looked at 
people’s beliefs about human nature in terms of whether they saw people as more 
bad-natured as opposed to good-natured (e.g., Koltko-Rivera, 2004). Furthermore, 
given that relationships with others have been linked to MIL judgments (Krause, 
2007; Lambert et al., 2013; Steger et al., 2013; for a review see O’Donnell et al., 
2014), we also tested differences between those who pursue life-guiding principles 
(or personal values; Schwartz, 1992) that have a social focus as opposed to a 
personal focus (Schwartz et al., 2012). Similarly, we explored differences between 
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those who made moral judgments based on individualizing foundations, where the 
individual is the locus of morality (foundations of Harm/care and 
Fairness/reciprocity), as opposed to binding foundations, where the group is the 
fundamental source of morality (foundations of Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect 
and Purity/sanctity; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2008). Finally, given the 
motivational dimension of purpose (e.g. Martela & Steger, 2016), we also compared 
those who preferred values that had a growth focus to those who selected self-
protective values (Schwartz et al., 2012).  
Method 
Participants  
We collected data from MTurk (https://www.mturk.com) US participants 
using an online survey created using Qualtrics (https://www.qualtrics.com/). The 
study was advertised as a study of 20-30 minutes about beliefs and worldviews. 
Participants were paid $1 for completing the questionnaire.  
Because most incomplete responses did not include any meaning framework 
ratings, we decided to include only complete response sets in our analysis. 
Therefore, of 408 participants who accessed our questionnaire, we initially retained 
372 complete cases. Out of these, a further 164 participants were removed who 
failed to respond correctly to one or more of the three attention checks embedded 
within the questionnaire (e.g., “Please select somewhat disagree”); their attention 
check failure was interpreted as indicating non-engagement with the task10.  
                                                 
10 We compared the scores of participants who were excluded based on attention check 
failures to those retained in the final sample. Across all meaning frameworks, ratings of MIL, 
purpose, coherence, and significance were significantly higher for those who failed the attention 
checks (Ms between 5.19 and 5.32, SDs between 1.59 and 1.64) compared to those who did not (Ms 
between 4.76 and 4.96, SDs between 1.77 and 1.85). However, we obtained the same pattern of 
within-person relationships regardless of exclusions.  
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The final sample consisted of complete responses from 208 North American 
participants: 108 females, 98 males and 2 self-identified as “gender queer”. Ages 
ranged from 20 to 74 (M= 38.46, SD = 13.22). Most participants were Christian (N = 
92), followed by atheists (N = 51) and agnostics (N = 43), with the other 22 
participants identifying as Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist or “other” (with entries such as 
“spiritual, but not religious”, “mormon” etc.). Most participants were in full-time 
employment (N = 120), followed by part-time or self-employed (N = 50), with the 
remaining participants either in education (N = 24), or retired/unemployed (N = 14). 
Finally, most participants were married (N = 81), followed by those not in a 
relationship (N = 71), then by those in a committed relationship (N = 39). 
Questionnaire and Procedure 
The questionnaire (see Appendix 4) comprised two sections. First, we 
collected information to determine participants’ meaning frameworks in relation to 
the 12 domains of: national identity, religious identity, role identities in relation to 
two important others, family identity, socioeconomic beliefs, free will/determinism 
beliefs, beliefs about human nature, abortion attitudes, death penalty attitudes, 
personal values and moral foundations. Then, the elicited meaning frameworks were 
displayed one at a time, in a randomised order. Participants were asked to rate each 
of them on several aspects.   
Eliciting meaning frameworks. Participants first completed demographic 
information, which included questions about their religious belief and their 
nationality. Afterwards, participants were presented with a statement-choosing task 
intended to identify their beliefs, values and identities. Participants were shown 
domain names one at a time, in a random order, followed by the instruction to select 
a statement that reflected their position on the respective domain. For most domains, 
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participants were given the option to select “Other” and write their own statement in 
relation to the domain. Table 4.1 illustrates the statements displayed for each 
domain. Then, participants were asked to specify their role for two important people 
in their lives, in the format “I am [name of person]’s [role in relation to the other 
person]” (e.g., “I am Sam’s mother”). Finally, family identity was not defined by 
participants (e.g., by providing a family name) in order to maintain anonymity. 
Family identity was simply referred to later using the phrase “Being a member of my 
family”. 
Meaning framework ratings. Each of the 12 participant-specific meaning 
frameworks was rated separately. Participants’ saw each of their meaning 
frameworks (presented in random order) displayed at the top of the screen, followed 
by a series of questions. We first measured perceived importance, using an attitude 
importance measure, “How important is this to you personally?” (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005), with responses given on a 5-point scale (1 = “Not at all important”, 5 
= “Extremely important”). Participants then selected to what extent each meaning 
framework gave them a sense of MIL (“Believing that / Valuing / Being [meaning 




Table 4.1. Meaning framework domains and corresponding response options  
Domain Response options Theoretical bases 
Free will / 
determinism 
beliefs 
One has complete control over the decisions one makes; one can overtake any obstacles if they truly want to 
One could have free will even if scientists discovered all of the laws that govern all human behaviour 
Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, was completely determined by 
prior events 
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random; what happens to people is a matter of chance 
Fate determines one’s successes and failures 
Other 
Free will scales 
(Nadelhoffer, Shepard, 
Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 
2014; Paulhus & Carey, 
2011); Social Axioms 
Survey, SAS II – Fate 
Control scale (Leung et al., 
2012) 
   
Beliefs about 
human nature 
Powerful people tend to exploit others 
The only way to get ahead is to take advantage of others 
People are inherently generous and kind-hearted 
Most people mean well and can be trusted 
Other 
Social Axioms Survey, 
SAS II - Social Cynicism 
scale (Leung et al., 2012) 
   
Socioeconomi
c beliefs 
It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom 
We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally 
Success depends more on the circumstances into which one is born than hard work 




Orientation (Jost & 
Thompson, 2000); beliefs 
in meritocracy 
(Zimmerman & Reyna, 
2013) 
   
Abortion 
attitudes 
Abortion should be legal and readily accessible to people requesting it 
To protect the rights of the unborn baby, legal abortion should never be available 
Abortion should only be allowed only in case of rape, incest, or life-threatening situations 
Other 
Adapted from items used in 
McGregor et al. (2001) 
   
Death penalty 
attitudes 
A murderer deserves to die 
Capital punishment is absolutely never justified 
Adapted from items used in 
McGregor et al. (2001) 
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Capital punishment is necessary for some crimes 
Other 
   
Personal 
values 
POWER (social power, authority, wealth) 
ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition, influence on people and events) 
HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence) 
STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life) 
SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing one's own goals) 
UNIVERSALISM (broad-mindedness, beauty of nature and arts, social justice, a world at peace, equality, 
wisdom, unity with nature, environmental protection) 
BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility) 
TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in life, devotion, modesty) 
CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness) 
SECURITY (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favors) 
Response options from the 
Short Schwartz Value 
Survey (SSVS; Lindeman 
& Verkasalo, 2005); based 
on Schwartz’s (1992) Value 
Theory 
   
Moral 
foundations 
One should avoid causing physical or emotional harm to others 
One should not treat some people differently than others; all people’s rights need to be respected and they 
should be treated fairly 
One should be loyal and place the interests of the group above one’s own 
One should fulfil his or her duties and show respect for legitimate authorities 
Traditions should be upheld as they serve important roles within one's community 
When one makes moral judgments, one must also consider whether things rise to standards of purity and 
decency 
Response items adapted 
from Graham et al., 2009); 
based on Moral 
Foundations Theory (Haidt 
& Joseph, 2004) 
Note. For the option Other, participants wrote their own statement in relation to the specified domain
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Creating individual-level variables. At the analysis stage, from 
participants’ chosen meaning frameworks within a domain, we created seven 
categorical variables indicative of individual-level differences. Religious orientation 
differentiated between atheists (N = 51), agnostics (N = 43), and all other religious 
denominations  (including some of the responses from the “Other” category11; N = 
114). Free will belief differentiated between those who held free will beliefs 
(endorsing statements such as “One could have free will even if scientists discovered 
all the laws that govern all human behaviour”; N = 123) and all other (beliefs in fate, 
randomness etc.; N = 85). Moral foundation preference differentiated between those 
who held individualizing foundations (Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity; N = 172) 
from those who held binding foundations (Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect and 
Purity/sanctity; N = 36; Haidt, 2008).  
From preferred personal values, we created a growth versus self-protection 
focus variable (Schwartz et al., 2012) which differentiated between those who 
selected values of benevolence, universalism, self-direction, stimulation or hedonism 
(growth focus, N = 172) to those who selected values of conformity, security, 
tradition and power (self-protection focus, N = 21). Using the same personal value 
preferences, we also created a social versus personal focus variable (Schwartz et al., 
2012) that contrasted those who selected values of universalism, benevolence, 
conformity and tradition (social focus, N = 98) to those who selected values of self-
                                                 
11 Responses from the “Other” category were judged on a case-by-case basis. Entries were 
included in the religious category if they specified a religious denomination already included in the 
response options (e.g., catholic, orthodox) or other entries such as “mormon” or “pagan”. In contrast, 
entries such as “spiritual” were excluded from comparisons based on religious orientation. Similarly, 
those who wrote “none” were excluded as it was unclear whether they should be included in the 
atheist or agnostic category.  
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direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement and power (personal focus, N = 
101).12 
Results 
Analytical Approach and Preliminary Analyses 
Multilevel analyses were performed using MPlus Version 6 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2010). All models were estimated using full maximum likelihood. Given 
the nested data structure, we tested predictions of within-person variance in MIL 
judgments using a multilevel regression analysis (Hox, 2002). Level 1 units were 
meaning framework categories (N = 2495) and Level 2 units were individuals (N = 
208).  
Firstly, we tested whether MIL ratings varied by type of meaning framework 
that participants had to rate at Level 1, i.e., values (personal values, moral 
foundations), identities (identity roles to two important others, family identity, 
national identity, religious identity), belief (socioeconomic beliefs, free will/ 
determinism beliefs, beliefs about human nature), or attitudes (abortion attitudes, 
death penalty attitudes). We created dummy coded regression coefficients for the 
meaning framework types with attitudes as the reference category. We found that 
MIL ratings, compared to attitudes, were significantly higher for values (β = .08, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.05, .12]) and identities (β = .08, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .11]), but not 
beliefs (β = .03, p = .118, 95% CI [-.01, .06]).  
Meaning Dimensions Predicting Meaningfulness of Meaning Frameworks 
At Level 1, we created dummy coded regression coefficients for the meaning 
framework categories. The reference domain was “Death penalty”; this was chosen 
                                                 
12 Due to being on the border between two types of value focus, those who selected the value 
of achievement were not included in the analysis comparing growth versus self-protection focus. 
Similarly, those who selected the value of security were excluded from the analysis comparing social 
versus personal focus. 
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as it had the lowest self-reported MIL score (M = 3.69). These dummy coded 
variables were included in all models to control for the systematic (i.e., shared across 
participants) variation in MIL judgment scores across the different meaning 
framework domains. The standardised path coefficients from the dummy coded 





Table 4.2. Standardised paths from the dummy coded meaning framework categories to MIL judgments in the within-participants model; means and standard 
deviations for MIL judgments 
 Regression coefficients for MIL 
judgments 
 Means (SDs) 
Domain β [95% CI] SE p  MIL judgments Purpose Significance Coherence 
Role to important other 1 .09 [.06, .12]  .02 < .001  5.94 (1.38) 5.74 (1.36) 5.64 (1.46) 5.82 (1.27) 
Personal values .07 [.04,.10] .02 < .001  5.87 (1.30) 5.90 (1.18) 5.53 (1.49) 5.86 (1.20) 
Role to important other 2  .09 [.06,.13] .02 < .001  5.79 (1.31) 5.52 (1.42) 5.51 (1.48) 5.57 (1.34) 
Family identity .06 [.03, .09] .02 .001  5.51 (1.72) 5.38 (1.78) 5.41 (1.81) 5.51 (1.76) 
Moral foundations .08 [.05, .12] .02 < .001  5.49 (1.35) 5.24 (1.45) 5.07 (1.60) 5.39 (1.35) 
Socioeconomic beliefs .05[.01, .08] .02 .006  5.20 (1.56) 5.18 (1.56) 4.99 (1.69) 5.17 (1.59) 
Free will/ determinism beliefs .03 [.00, .06] .02 .069  4.84 (1.73) 4.78 (1.80) 4.71 (1.82) 4.85 (1.83) 
Religious identity .03 [-.01, .06] .02 .170  4.77 (1.81) 4.70 (1.91) 4.65 (2.01) 4.89 (1.83) 
National identity .02 [-.01, .05] .02 .208  4.47 (1.78) 4.35 (1.78) 4.24 (1.83) 4.63 (1.79) 
Abortion attitudes .01 [-.02, .04] .02 .418  4.01 (1.66) 3.77 (1.67) 3.94 (1.78) 3.97 (1.72) 
Beliefs about human nature .01 [-.02, .04] .02 .721  3.92 (1.78) 3.76 (1.80) 3.77 (1.86) 3.91 (1.83) 
Death penalty attitudes - - -  3.69 (1.72) 3.34 (1.61) 3.69 (1.78) 3.80 (1.77) 
Note. Reference meaning framework domain is Death penalty. Meaning frameworks in descending order of MIL judgments means  
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Intercorrelations between significance, purpose, coherence and MIL ratings 
were high (.74 to .83). Nevertheless, when partialling out the effect of meaning 
framework domain, the residual covariances were slightly lower (.65 to .78; see 
Table 4.3), suggesting that the high correlations are partly due to participants 
showing consensus in rating domains for MIL, significance, purpose and coherence. 
The partial correlations are similar to previous findings which have shown that the 
constructs are not redundant despite their overlap (see Paper 3; George & Park, 
2016b). 
Table 4.3. Zero-order correlations below the diagonal; partial correlations, controlling for 
meaning framework domain, above the diagonal. 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1 MIL judgments  - .69 .72 .65 .60 
2 Significance .77 - .77 .70 .48 
3 Purpose .80 .83 - .78 .53 
4 Coherence .74 .77 .83 - .51 
5 Importance .68 .58 .62 .60 - 
Note. All correlations were significant at p <.001. 
 
A dimension and MIL judgments Level 1 model was run, with paths from 
feelings of significance, purpose, and coherence to MIL judgments. Furthermore, we 
modelled paths from the dimensions and MIL judgments to perceived importance. 
All variables were centred around individual mean scores so that: (a) the within-
person effects would not be confounded with the between-person effects, and (b) 
cross-level interactions would not be confounded with between-person interactions 
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Vignoles et al., 2006)13. This was a perfect-fitting 
                                                 
13 We also previously ran a model where significance, purpose, and coherence were 
modelled at both the within and between level. Constraining Level 1 and Level 2 paths to be equal 
yielded a worse fit than the unconstrained model, χ2(6) = 69.11, p < .001, suggesting that within-
person relationships between variables were different than between-person relationships. 
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saturated model. We found that MIL judgments were significantly positively 
predicted by sense of significance (β = .28, p < .001, 95% CI [.24, .32]), sense of 
purpose (β = .38, p < .001, 95% CI [.33, .43]), and sense of coherence (β = .16, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.12, .20]). This model accounted for 68.9% of within-person variance 
in meaningfulness ratings. Moreover, perceived importance was positively predicted 
by MIL ratings (β = .44, p < .001, 95% CI [.39, .49]). Importance ratings were both 
directly and indirectly (via MIL judgments) predicted by purpose (indirect effect: β = 
.17, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .20]; direct effect: β = .09., p = .004, 95% CI [.03, .15]) 
and coherence (indirect effect: β = .07, p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .09]; direct effect: β = 
.16, p < .001, 95% CI [.11, .22]). In contrast, sense of significance predicted 
perceived importance only indirectly, through MIL judgments (indirect effect: β = 
.12, p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .15]; direct effect: β = .00, p = .913, 95% CI [-.05, .06]). 
The model accounted for 53.5% of within-person variance in importance ratings.  
Next, we tested whether the three dimensions would continue to influence 
perceived importance while controlling for other important psychological needs 
(belonging, self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, continuity and personal 
control). While MIL judgments were again predicted by significance (β = .22, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-.05, .06]), purpose (β = .30, p < .001, 95% CI [.25, .34]) and 
coherence (β = .11, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .14]), they were also predicted by self-
esteem (β = .19, p < .001, 95% CI [.15, .22]), and, more weakly, by continuity (β = 
.04, p = .037, 95% CI [.00, .06]). This model accounted for 71.1% of intrapersonal 
variance in MIL ratings. Perceived importance was both directly and indirectly 
predicted by coherence (indirect effect: β = .04, p < .001, 95% CI [.02, .04]; direct 
                                                 
Nevertheless, between-person intercorrelations between significance, purpose and coherence were 
high (.86 to .95), suggesting multicollinearity. Consequently, the model was worse at capturing the 
individual-level relationships between constructs. This is unsurprising given that the study was 
designed to capture within-person variation.    
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effect: β = .13, p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .18]) and self-esteem (indirect effect: β = .07, 
p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .09]; direct effect: β = .14, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .19]). 
Importance ratings were indirectly predicted by significance (indirect effect: β = .09, 
p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .10]; direct effect: β = -.03, p = .289, 95% CI [-.08, .02]), 
purpose (indirect effect: β = .11, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .14]; direct effect: β = .04, p 
= .213, 95% CI [-.02, .10]) and continuity (indirect effect: β = .01, p = .036, 95% CI 
[.00, .03]; direct effect: β = -.02, p = .344, 95% CI [-.06, .02]). The model accounted 
for 55.5% of the within-person variance in perceived importance.   
Individual-Level Moderators 
Cross-level moderation was tested by splitting the dimensions and MIL 
judgments Level 1 model sequentially, on each of the individual differences 
variables and performing multi-group comparisons. First, for each individual-level 
variable, we tested whether there was an overall moderating effect using nested-
model comparisons between an unconstrained model and a model where paths from 
significance, purpose and coherence to MIL judgments were constrained to be the 
same across groups. If the constrained model showed a significantly worse fit, this 
was taken as evidence for moderation. We followed this up by constraining each 
path successively and comparing each of those models to the unconstrained model, 
in order to determine which paths were moderated.  
Because this method involved running multiple significance tests, we 
controlled for the inflated Type I error, by applying Benjamini and Hochberg’s 
(1995) false discovery rate (FDR) procedure, which has been recommended for use 
in SEM models as it provides more power than standard procedures that control for 
familywise error (Cribbie, 2007). Here we define a family as consisting of tests that 
are related in their intended use (Hochberg & Tamhane, 1987). As such, we apply 
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the FDR procedure for the model-level moderation tests and then, separately, within 
the significant models, for testing differences in paths across groups. 
Religious orientation. Religious orientation was a significant moderator, 
χ2(6) = 16.78, p = .010. However, sense of significance had a similar positive 
association with MIL judgments across all three groups,  χ2(2) = .70, p = .705. 
Similarly, after applying the FDR correction, religion did not significantly moderate 
paths from purpose, χ2(2) = 6.17, p = .046, or coherence, χ2(2) = 6.29, p = .043. 
Nevertheless, for agnostics, coherence was not a significant predictor of MIL 
judgments, β = .07, p = .106, 95% CI [-.02, .16], whereas it was significantly 
predictive for atheists, β = .22, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .30], and religious participants, 
β = .14, p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .21] (see Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4. Comparing paths from meaning dimensions to MIL judgments for religious orientation 
  Agnostics  Atheists  Religious participants 
Dimensions β [95% CI] SE p  β [95% CI] SE p  β [95% CI] SE p 
Significance .28 [.18, .36] .05 < .001  .28 [.20, .36] .04 < .001  .27 [.20, .33] .03 < .001 
Purpose .48 [.38, .58] .05 < .001  .32 [.23, .41] .05 < .001  .37 [.29, .44] .04 < .001 
Coherence .07 [-.02, .16] .04 .131  .22 [.14, .30] .04 < .001  .14 [.08, .21] .03 < .001 
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Moral foundation preference. Moral foundation preference significantly 
moderated paths to MIL judgments, χ2(3) = 13.97, p = .003. As such, we looked at 
the pattern of relationships for each group separately. The relationship between 
significance and MIL judgments did not differ by group, χ2(1) = 2.66, p = .103. 
Similarly, the relationship between purpose and MIL judgments was not 
significantly moderated by moral foundation preference, χ2(1) = .03, p = .861. 
However, moral foundation preference moderated the relationship between 
coherence and MIL judgments, χ2(1) = 10.79, p = .001, such that coherence was 
only predictive of MIL judgments for those who chose an individualizing 
foundation, but not for those who selected a binding foundation (see Table 4.5). 







Social versus personal focus. Having a social versus personal focus 
emerged as a significant moderator, χ2(3) = 11.76, p = .008. Surprisingly, 
significance was more strongly associated with MIL ratings for those with a personal 
focus as opposed to a social focus, χ2(1) = 11.29, p < .001 (see Table 4.6). Social 
versus personal focus did not significantly moderate individual paths to MIL 
judgments from purpose, χ2(1) =  1.84, p = .175, or coherence, χ2(1) = .58, p = .447.  
Other moderators. There was no evidence for moderation by free will 
beliefs, χ2(3) = 1.60, p = .660, by outlook on human nature, χ2(3) = 2.75, p = .432, 
or by growth versus self-protection focus, χ2(3) = 3.82, p = .282. 
 Individualizing foundations  Binding foundations 
Dimensions β  [95% CI] SE p  β  [95% CI] SE p 
Significance .26 [.23, .32] .02 < .001  .37 [.27, .48] .05 < .001 
Purpose .37 [.32, .42] .03 < .001  .39 [.27, .49] .06 < .001 
Coherence .19 [.14, .23] .02 < .001  .00 [-.10, .10] .05 .969 
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We aimed to test whether MIL judgments are informed by feelings of 
purpose, significance and coherence by focusing on within-person variation in 
ratings of meaning frameworks. This allowed us to measure MIL judgments 
indirectly and gain insight into how people rate meaning frameworks for 
meaningfulness. We found that a meaning framework that granted a sense of 
purpose, coherence and significance was also associated with higher sense of MIL. 
In turn, MIL judgments were associated with the importance of a meaning 
framework. These findings persisted even while controlling for how well a meaning 
framework satisfied identity and control needs.   
Interestingly, significance (and purpose, after partialling out the effects of 
satisfying identity motives and need for control), only influenced ratings of 
importance through MIL judgments. In previous research, out of the three 
dimensions, significance most reliably informed MIL judgments prospectively and 
across contextual factors (see Paper 3). The current results support the idea that sense 
of significance is a specific MIL-related construct (Martela & Steger, 2016) that 
informs MIL judgments. In contrast, coherence predicted perceived importance both 
directly and through MIL judgments, which suggests that it might also fulfil 
 Social focus  Personal focus 
Dimensions β [95% CI] SE p  β [95% CI] SE p 
Significance .10 [.04, .15] .03  .001  .15 [.09, .20] .03 < .001 
Purpose .56 [.51, .61] .03 < .001  .61 [.57, .66] .02 < .001 
Coherence .22 [.15, .29] .03 < .001  .12 [.06, .18] .03 < .001 
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psychological functions that are independent of explicit MIL judgments (for a 
similar discussion, see Paper 3).  
We also explored individual-level moderators derived from a participant’s 
meaning framework content. Moral foundation preference was a significant 
moderator such that those who held binding moral foundations were less concerned 
with coherence in judging the meaningfulness of their frameworks. This is surprising 
given that these foundations rely on order-affirming entities such as laws, loyalty and 
authority. However, abstract thinking might elicit a preference for individualizing 
foundations, whereas concrete thinking might prompt a preference for binding 
foundations (Napier & Luguri, 2013). To the extent that a preference for abstract 
thinking makes it more likely to reflect on coherence when making MIL judgments, 
then this pattern of results could be explained by thinking style. Future research 
should examine this possibility.  
Furthermore, there was evidence that those who prioritized values with a 
personal focus (e.g., self-direction, stimulation) judged the meaningfulness of their 
frameworks as more strongly positively associated with significance than those who 
preferred values with a social focus (e.g., benevolence, conformity; Schwartz et al., 
2012). This seems surprising as, particularly in a secular context, people might 
derive a sense of significance from their close relationships to others (e.g., my life 
matters because it matters for other people). Nevertheless, this effect could be 
specific to our US sample as previous research has shown that Western nations tend 
to value self-expression and self-direction more than other cultures (e.g., Vignoles et 
al., 2016). In turn, sense of significance may be fulfilled through leaving a legacy for 
future generations, which involves creating a powerful extension of one’s self (see 
research on generativity; McAdams, Hart & Maruna, 1998). Consequently, sense of 
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significance might be more important for MIL judgments for those who have a 
stronger personal focus within a cultural context that promotes self-expression.  
There was also evidence that religious identity moderated the pattern of 
relationships from dimensions to MIL judgments, although none of the individual 
moderation effects underlying this omnibus finding reached statistical significance, 
when correcting for cumulative Type I error. Nevertheless, the pattern of 
relationships suggests that, at least in terms of the relationship between coherence 
and MIL judgments, agnostics and atheists might not be as similar to one another as 
previously assumed (e.g., Paper 3). This can be addressed in future studies by 
recruiting larger samples from more diverse populations. Alternatively, individual 
differences could be explored using continuous measures. Some meaning 
frameworks are not mutually exclusive within a domain. For instance, people can 
endorse several moral foundations or personal values concomitantly (Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Schwartz, 1992). Comparing participants on their most important 
moral foundation or value endorsed reveals individual differences broadly, but using 
continuous measures might better capture complex moderating effects. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
If certain features of people’s meaning frameworks fulfil a need for MIL, 
then people might be more motivated to hold beliefs, values, identities and attitudes 
that have those features. Previously, meaning frameworks have been thought to 
mainly fulfil a need for coherence in relation to meaningfulness (e.g., Heine et al., 
2006). Our findings show that the other two dimensions of MIL also contribute to 
perceived meaningfulness, thus supporting tripartite accounts of MIL. Furthermore, 
these findings suggest extending the literature studying compensation in response to 
meaning threat to incorporate dimensions beyond coherence. If people experience a 
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deficit in one of the three dimensions of MIL, then they would perhaps show a 
preference for the meaning framework that most strongly affirms that dimension. For 
instance, information that undermines people’s sense of purpose would orient them 
to purpose-affirming meaning frameworks to restore MIL. Discrete purpose, 
significance, or coherence threats would be difficult to induce experimentally 
because the three dimensions of MIL are highly related, but such studies would bring 
strong support for their conceptual utility as distinct factors.    
Moreover, if sense of MIL predicts which meaning frameworks are more 
important, this could contribute to understanding how MIL impacts upon thought 
and behaviour. For instance, when people hold important attitudes on an issue, they 
will seek more related information and process it more deeply, they will be more 
resistant to persuasion against that issue, and they will anticipate distress in response 
to counter-attitudinal policies (Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, & Boninger, 
2005; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996; for a review see Eaton & Visser, 2008). To the 
extent that these findings can be extrapolated to meaning frameworks more widely, 
the role of perceived sense of MIL should also be explored in future studies. Would 
people more strongly defend and preferentially process information related to 
meaning frameworks that are meaningful, regardless of how important they are 
perceived to be?   
The correlational nature of our study design prevents us from inferring 
directional relationships. Each of the dimensions of meaning could be predicted by, 
rather than predictive of, MIL judgments. However, MIL judgments are defined as 
broad, context-free life appraisals, whereas the dimensions are at a lower level of 
abstraction, describing more specific phenomena: sense of purpose is restricted to the 
domain of motivation, sense of significance to evaluation, and sense of coherence to 
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understanding (Martela & Steger, 2016). Furthermore, recent longitudinal evidence 
firmly suggests that significance is a precursor of sense of MIL, at least at the level 
of individual differences (see Paper 3). Nevertheless, future research could model 
within-person variation in MIL judgments across time to provide evidence of 
temporal ordering.  
Finally, our list of meaning framework domains was not meant to be 
exhaustive; we simply aimed to elicit diverse frameworks in terms of content, which, 
in turn, would be associated with a wide range of MIL ratings. Regardless of 
framework content, we have found that framework type was differentially related to 
MIL ratings: values and identities were associated with higher sense of MIL than 
were attitudes, whereas beliefs and attitudes did not differ. Nevertheless, future 
studies should systematically explore how varying the level of specificity of a 
framework domain on the same topic may elicit different levels of MIL. For 
instance, the domain “socioeconomic beliefs” could have been construed more 
broadly as “political ideology” (liberalism versus conservatism), or more narrowly as 
“attitudes towards people on welfare”.   
Concluding Remarks 
To summarise, our current results suggest that people’s judgments about the 
meaningfulness of their meaning frameworks are related to their perceived 
significance, purpose and coherence). This study employed a novel design to provide 
empirical evidence for an account that aimed to integrate insights from the meaning-
threat literature with recent definitions of MIL and previous operationalisations of 
the construct in terms of MIL judgments. We hope that this research may lead to 
better understanding of the role of meaning-related constructs in human functioning 




Summary of Key Findings 
The aim of this thesis was to find factors that are uniquely predictive of the 
subjective experience of MIL. This would help gain further definitional clarity for 
the construct of MIL and test more recent integrative accounts (e.g., George & Park, 
2016a, Martela & Steger, 2016). Furthermore, these results could prescribe ways in 
which people can feel more meaningful either on a more momentary basis or across 
time.   
First, I focused on short-term fluctuations in MIL judgments (Papers 1 and 2) 
and associated constructs (Paper 1) as a response to experimental manipulations. In 
Paper 1, we showed that there are differences in the effects of self-uncertainty and 
general uncertainty inductions on state measures of uncertainty. A self-uncertainty 
induction led to higher felt uncertainty about the self, but not to higher felt general 
uncertainty. Furthermore, this effect was moderated by relevant self-related 
processes such that those with defensive self-esteem (low implicit and high explicit 
self-esteem) showed a stronger effect of the self-related uncertainty manipulation. I 
interpret this as evidence that different types of coherence are associated with 
distinct psychological states. Nevertheless, this finding was qualified by the general 
uncertainty induction not predicting any measure of self-reported uncertainty. 
Moreover, neither manipulation predicted MIL judgments. Similarly, in Paper 2, 
MIL judgments were not influenced by manipulating factors that have previously 
been associated with MIL, belongingness and personal control.    
In Paper 3, we focused on the three dimensions of MIL (coherence, purpose 
and significance) as predictors of subjective MIL judgments across time. In Study 1, 
we developed non-overlapping short measures of sense of MIL, coherence, purpose 
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and significance, which had a balanced set of negative and positively phrased items 
and were distinct from related constructs of belonging, control, self-efficacy and 
self-esteem. Furthermore, we showed that the effects of significance and purpose on 
MIL judgments were not reducible to affect. Studies 2 and 3 used these newly 
developed measures to show that sense of significance was a consistent prospective 
predictor of sense of MIL over a one-month period, across samples (students and 
online panel participants) and other contextual factors (e.g., religion, gender). Sense 
of purpose and coherence were more situationally predictive with their effects being 
moderated by religion: religious participants relied on coherence but not purpose to 
make MIL judgments, whereas non-religious participants relied on purpose but not 
coherence (Study 3).  
Finally, Paper 4 showed that there is within-person variation in how 
meaningful people see their endorsed meaning frameworks (e.g., identities, beliefs, 
values and attitudes), and that this can be explained through sense of significance 
and purpose, and, to a lesser extent, coherence. Furthermore, we were able to show 
that these relationships are moderated by individual differences in moral foundation 
preference, and holding values that focus on growth as opposed to self-protection. 
Implications for the Study of MIL 
Throughout this thesis, I have looked at overt, explicit MIL judgments. In 
this sense, this work has been aligned with accounts that describe meaningfulness 
being attained through a process of active reflection: MIL is seen as “tied up with the 
unique capacity of human mind for reflective, linguistic thinking” (Martela & Steger, 
2016, p. 7). Previous empirical work has also assumed that meaning is associated 
with thoughtfulness and deliberate scrutiny of one’s life. For instance, some have 
attempted to measure MIL based on participants’ ability to articulate why life is 
149 
 
meaningful in an essay (Lambert et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the measure of 
articulated meaning correlated modestly with self-reported MIL scales (r = .28).  
Instead, others have assumed that MIL judgments are a result of effortless, 
automatic processing of stimuli in one’s environment (e.g., King, 2012; Heintzelman 
& King, 2014a; Heintzelman & King, 2016). Meaningfulness does not seem to be a 
rare state that is only attained by the person who has undergone a long process of 
self-discovery and introspection. This is supported by people consistently reporting 
high sense of MIL across studies (Heintzelman & King, 2014b) which suggests that 
it is a common state. Furthermore, research shows that high sense of MIL is 
associated with high faith in intuition (Heintzelman & King, 2016), and having high 
positive affect (King et al., 2006; Hicks & King, 2009b; Hicks, Schlegel, & King, 
2010). Moreover, as shown in Papers 1, 2, and 3 of this thesis project, sense of MIL 
is very resistant to change. 
King (2012) suggests that reflective and intuitive accounts could be 
reconciled using a dual-process model of information processing (e.g., Bargh, 1989) 
where one system (System 1) is rapid and intuitive and the other system is slow and 
effortful (System 2). It is expected that System 1, being less resource-intensive, is 
used most of the time. This system generally signals to the individual that all is right 
(usually through positive affect) and that one can proceed as normal. Applying this 
model to MIL, it has been suggested that System 1 is about coherence: to what 
extent regularities and reliable patterns are perceived in one’s surroundings 
(Heintzelman & King, 2014a; Heintzelman et al., 2013). In contrast, System 2 is 
used to construct meaning when a “problem” is detected, when something does not 
“feel right” (King, 2012, p. 14). Evidence for this system comes from the literature 
on meaning-making in response to stressors (see Park, 2010). Indeed, in feedback 
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received from participants in our research, people do not seem to spontaneously 
think about meaning in their day-to-day lives unless prompted to do so, usually by an 
event that challenges their assumption that life is meaningful. As such, there is an 
interplay between reflective and intuitive modes of processing with the latter 
accounting for most day-to-day feelings of MIL.  
Applied to the current findings, the absence of significant relationships 
between coherence and sense of MIL (Paper 3) or links that were weaker than 
expected (Paper 4), could be explained through our mode of measurement. If “sense 
is not made, but indeed, sensed” (King, 2012, p. 129), then participants would 
struggle to consciously reflect on the coherence of their experiences and accurately 
estimate how coherent their lives feel. Nevertheless, self-related coherence might 
involve a more conscious act of self-reflection than feelings of coherence about the 
world (e.g., people seem to be able to estimate a sense that their identity stays the 
same over time; Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015). This would 
explain why participants could explicitly report that they felt less certain about 
themselves after an overt self-related uncertainty manipulation, but no effects were 
found for general uncertainty (Paper 1). However, our findings suggest that people’s 
MIL judgments are about significance (Papers 3 and 4). Critically, other researchers 
have argued that significance might be the dimension that most strongly relies on 
effortful deliberation (Heintzelman & King, 2016). This pattern of results supports 
the notion that MIL consists of intuitive and reflective processes, and that MIL 
judgments mainly capture the latter.  
If MIL judgments are explicit measures of sense of MIL that capture effortful 
reflection on the topic, then complementary implicit measures of MIL should be 
developed. Similar examples exist in the literature. As described in Paper 1, people 
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have differentiated between implicit and explicit self-esteem, where the two have 
also been described in the context of dual-systems of information processing 
(Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2011). Implicit self-esteem has been measured 
using the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999). In 
the latter task, participants are asked initially to categorise words on one dimension 
(e.g., pleasant versus unpleasant words, or self-related versus non-self-related 
words), and then they are asked to categorise words from both dimensions where the 
difference in reaction times where the categories of self-related and unpleasant are 
paired, as opposed to self-related and pleasant. If participants are faster at associating 
words with the self-related and pleasant pairing, they are said to have high self-
esteem. A similar task could be adapted for meaningfulness, whereby people would 
see MIL-related words (e.g., purposeful) as opposed to meaningless words (e.g., 
pointless). As in the self-esteem literature, high implicit and high explicit sense of 
MIL would be most desirable (e.g., secure self-esteem; Jordan et al., 2003) 
Limitations  
Throughout this project, I have aimed to focus on subjective appraisals of 
meaningfulness as captured within MIL judgments. Nevertheless, some people might 
assume that life is objectively meaningful (e.g., through religious belief and having a 
“sacred purpose”; e.g., Pargament, Magyar-Russell, & Murray-Swank, 2005) 
whereas others might see the world as inherently meaningless. Consequently, some 
participants might use the sense of MIL items to record beliefs in an objectively 
meaningful world rather than their subjective states. No studies have directly 
compared perceptions that the world is meaningful (objective meaningfulness) with 
feelings that one’s own life is meaningful (MIL judgments). In order to further refine 
MIL measurements, one would need to demonstrate that the sense of MIL scale 
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consistently records the same thing. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the utility 
of the MIL construct, measures of MIL judgments should reflect people’s 
ontological and epistemological assumptions about meaning, without being 
completely reduced to them.  
 It is also worth considering who is making these MIL judgments. Across 
papers, we have recruited either single-culture samples (UK, US), or mixed-culture 
samples, as well as student samples or mixed-occupation samples. When findings are 
consistent across studies, the use of diverse samples strengthens our claim that 
significance is a universal precursor of MIL judgments. However, when findings 
diverge, this poses unique interpretational challenges. For instance, in Paper 3, Study 
3, using a culturally-diverse sample, we found a moderating effect of religious belief 
that we did not replicate in Paper 4, using US participants. Thus, it is unclear 
whether this failure to replicate was due to the study design (i.e., MIL judgments 
made at the level of meaning frameworks rather than at an individual-level) or other 
cultural differences between these two samples.     
Future Directions 
Across papers, the universality of sources of MIL judgments has been mostly 
assumed rather than directly measured. In Paper 3, we tested the moderation effects 
of not having English as a first language and found no significant effects. 
Nevertheless, this is no substitute for a systematic study of cross-cultural differences 
using translation and backtranslation procedures (Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 
1973; Sireci, Yang, Harter, & Ehrlich, 2006). Furthermore, relevant cross-cultural 
moderators should be considered (e.g., cultural contexts that either promote self-
expression or harmony; Vignoles et al., 2016). 
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Translating the three dimensions of MIL into other languages might raise 
unique challenges as these fulfil overlapping MIL-related functions (e.g., Martela & 
Steger, 2016), and the terms used to describe them have often been conflated with 
one another. In a practical sense, the similarities in usage between the terms might 
not pose immediate translation problems because of the nature of the items that 
comprise each scale. For instance, the items capturing sense of significance scale 
developed in Paper 3 never use the term “significance”. Instead, they directly get at 
thoughts that would be associated with someone having a sense of significance 
(e.g.,” Even considering how big the universe is, I can say that my life matters”). 
However, if the terms for purpose, significance, coherence and meaning have 
different semantic similarities in other languages, then this would have consequences 
for how construct-relevant information is retrieved (e.g., Baddeley, 1966; Craik & 
Levy, 1970). For instance, the Romanian term for significance (“semnificaţie”) 
would just as commonly (or more commonly) be used in relation to “understanding”. 
The Romanian equivalent of phrases like “What’s the significance of this text?” is 
more likely to be interpreted as “What’s the meaning of this text?” rather than 
“What’s the importance of this text?”. Before use in a cross-cultural context, MIL 
measures that differentiate between the three dimensions of MIL should go through a 
rigorous process of validation, to avoid cross-cultural findings driven by linguistic 
artefacts. 
Regardless of cultural context, the seemingly universal link between 
significance and MIL judgments may be qualified by moderating factors not 
considered in the current research project. For instance, narcissism is a positive self-
view that involves seeing oneself as better than others, but, unlike self-esteem, it is 
not linked to communal traits (e.g., agreeableness, morality; W.K. Campbell, 
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Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). In line with the Paper 4 finding that having a personal 
focus (as opposed to a social focus) is related to a stronger association between 
significance and MIL judgments, those who are more narcissistic, compared to those 
who hold other forms of positive self-regard, may derive more meaningfulness from 
the sense that their life matters on a global scale. While subclinical narcissism is 
associated with wellbeing factors (e.g., higher life satisfaction, lower anxiety; 
Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004), it is also associated with 
defensiveness and low implicit self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003). As such, it is 
unclear whether potential interventions aimed at bolstering significance to increase 
meaningfulness would be adaptive for this population.   
Potential Applications  
Research on defining MIL has been considered an endeavour pursued for the 
sake of gaining knowledge but with unclear practical applications. For instance, 
conducting research in this area has been compared to declaring: “I am conducting 
research with no practical implications that I know of, and I am proud” (Arpaly, 
2010, p. 85). This statement is misleading as most researchers studying MIL hope to 
attain insight into how people can lead the best possible lives, with eventual 
applications similar to those of other positive psychology constructs (see Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The reason that not many practical applications have 
stemmed out of this endeavour yet is perhaps more indicative of the ambitious scope 
of this project, rather than its uselessness.  
Insights from this thesis could contribute to existing therapeutic interventions 
focused on increasing feelings of MIL (e.g., L. P. M. Thomas, Meier, & Irwin, 2014; 
Wong, 1997). These approaches are largely based on Frankl’s (1956/2004) 
logotherapy. As these therapeutic interventions are based on reflection and 
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introspection, I consider that the current findings highlighting the role of significance 
in increasing explicit sense of MIL are relevant. Perhaps a heightened focus on 
making the person feel valued, or reflective practices on why individual lives are 
worthwhile could enhance existing therapeutic techniques.   
Furthermore, understanding how some meaning frameworks are rated as 
more meaningful than others could facilitate transition to more secular systems of 
understanding. Religion has been shown to fulfil important protective roles in 
people’s lives such as helping adjustment to negative life events (e.g., McIntosh, 
Silver & Wortman, 1993), buffering against reminders of one’s mortality (e.g., 
Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006), and buffering against diminished personal control 
(Kay et al., 2008). Moreover, MIL judgments have been shown to mediate between 
53.4% and 92.3% of the effect of religiosity on other well-being outcomes (Steger & 
Frazier, 2005). Nevertheless, attendance at religious services has been associated 
with heightened willingness to sacrifice for one’s religious ingroup and increased 
hostility towards religious outgroups (e.g., Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan, 2009). In 
addition, more extreme religious beliefs have been linked to prejudice against 
minority groups (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), as well as discriminatory 
views against gays (e.g., Laythe, Finkel, Bringle & Kirkpatrick, 2002). These 
findings suggest that other sources of existential security and meaningfulness should 
be sought. Findings from this thesis project show how alternative, non-religious 
meaning frameworks can provide a sense of MIL to the extent that they make one 
feel that one’s life matters and provide a sense of directionality.   
Final Remarks 
This thesis project can be distilled into several key findings. Firstly, people’s 
MIL judgments seem resistant to influence from brief experimental manipulations, 
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and this might explain why there have been more correlational studies looking at 
sense of MIL compared to experimental studies. Secondly, people seem to be better 
able to express disruptions in perceived self-related coherence, than they are able to 
express disruptions in sense of coherence more generally. Nevertheless, sense of 
coherence seems to be, at best, a weak, situationally-contingent predictor of MIL 
judgments. Instead, sense of significance consistently informs MIL judgments. This 
pattern of findings does not necessarily suggest that coherence is not an important 
facet of MIL, but, instead, it raises the possibility that it might be best captured using 
implicit measures. Overall, our findings support the idea that MIL is about 
significance and, possibly, about purpose and coherence. Furthermore, we show how 
people’s webs of propositions about themselves and the world (i.e., meaning 
frameworks) serve a need for meaningfulness which in turn predict their importance.  
The study of MIL within psychology has been questioned, despite people’s 
fascination with the construct and its links to desirable outcomes. This area of 
research can seem inscrutable due to the inconsistent use of terminology and the 
highly abstract nature of the target construct. Furthermore, empirical work can be 
highly frustrating as key constructs are difficult to operationalise and measure 
cleanly. Finally, findings often raise more questions than they answer. However, 
researchers do not study certain topics because they are easy, but because they are 
interesting. In this sense, few other topics have sparked people’s imaginations so 
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Paper 1 questionnaire 
Introduction and consent 
Welcome to our study on preferences, personality traits and feelings. The study is 
brief and would take around 15-20 minutes to complete. The first part of the 
questionnaire will ask about your preferences and assess your personality. Then, you 
will be asked to complete a short reflective task. Finally, you will get to select 
among a series of adjectives and characteristics which describe the way you might 
feel and complete a short cognitive task. There are no right or wrong answers; we 
would simply like to know what you think. Also, don't spend to long on any one 
item; often, the first answer that comes to mind is the best. We only require that 
you complete the questionnaire in one sitting (no breaks).      This study has 
received ethics approval from the Science and Technology Cross-Schools Research 
Ethics Committee (C-REC) of the University of Sussex. Your participation is 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving an 
explanation. All data we collect from you will be treated as confidential and will 
only be accessed by the research team. At the end of the study, you will be debriefed 
and the aims and purposes of the study will be fully explained. The results of the 
study will likely be written up for my PhD thesis and for academic papers that may 
be submitted for publication. No identifiable information will be used in the write-
up. Please tick the box below to acknowledge that you have read the information 
above and that you agree to proceed to the study: 






Name-liking task (and filler items) 
Below are a few questions assessing your preferences. Please use the scale below to 
indicate how much you like the things described: 
[Anchors: Not at all (1) to Very much (5)] 
How much do you like your course, in total? 
How much do you like your name, in total? 
How much do you like the colour orange? 
How much do you like autumn, on the whole? 
How much do you like sports, in general? 
How much do you like watching films? 
 
Single item self-esteem scale (SISE; and filler items) 
Below, there are a number of personality traits. Please use the scale next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which it does or does not apply to you. When the 
statement includes a pair of traits, you should rate the extent to which the pair of 
traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other. 
[Anchors: Does not apply at all (1) to Applies completely (5)] 
I am extraverted, enthusiastic. 
I am critical.  
I am extraverted, enthusiastic. 
I have high self-esteem. 
I am dependable, self-disciplined.  
I am anxious, easily upset. 
I am open to new experiences, complex. 
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I am reserved, quiet. 
I am sympathetic, warm. 
I am disorganized. 
I am calm, emotionally stable.  
I am conventional, uncreative.  
 
Personal dilemma manipulation 
Please try to think of an unresolved personal dilemma in your life. Such 
predicaments are characterized by the fact that you are not yet sure whether to take 
action in order to change things. You feel very uncertain and you ask yourself 
whether it might not be better to leave things as they are. In other words, you haven't 
decided to take action, but you haven't decided against it either. Please do not select 
a problem that is easy to solve, or that you have already made your mind up about. 
On the other hand, do not select one for which a solution will likely never be 
reached. The problem should be complex and should take the form of "Should I . . . 
or not?" 
Please name the dilemma: 
________________________________________________________________ 
In a word or two, please summarize your primary general value associated with 
changing the way things are: 
________________________________________________________________ 
In a word or two, please summarize your primary general value associated with not 




With regard to the above dilemma, please take a few minutes to list possible 
IMMEDIATE consequences, positive and negative, of making a decision that 
involves change. 
o 1 ________________________________________________ 
o 2 ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 
o 5 ________________________________________________ 
 
Now please try to think of and list any possible LONG-TERM consequences that 
could result from the immediate consequences you listed above. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 





Finally, beside each consequence listed above, please rate the certainty of occurrence 
in percentage. [piped text from earlier] 




































Please take a few minutes to list possible IMMEDIATE consequences, positive and 
negative, of leaving things the way they are and not making a change. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 




Now please try to think of and list any possible LONG-TERM consequences that 
could ensue from the immediate consequences you listed above 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 
o 5 ________________________________________________ 
 
Finally, beside each consequence listed above, please rate the certainty of occurrence 
in percentage [piped text from earlier]. 





























Friend’s dilemma manipulation 
Please try to think of an unresolved personal dilemma in the life of a friend or 
acquaintance of yours. Choose a predicament characterized by the fact that your 
friend is not yet sure whether to take action in order to change things – but you feel 
like you know what would best for your friend to do. Your friend feels very 
uncertain and asks him or herself whether it might not be better to leave things as 
they are. In other words, your friend hasn't decided to take action, but hasn't decided 
against it either.   The friends' problem that you choose should be complex and 
should take the form of "Should I . . . or not?" 
 





In a word or two, please summarize what your friend thinks is the primary general 
value associated with changing the way things are: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
In a word or two, please summarize what your friend thinks is the primary general 
value associated with not changing, and leaving things the way they are: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
With regard to the above dilemma of your friend, please take a few minutes to list 
possible immediate consequences, positive and negative, of his or her making a 
decision that involves change. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 






Now please try to think of and list any possible long-term consequences for your 
friend that could result from the immediate consequences you listed above. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 
o 5 ________________________________________________ 
 
Finally, beside each consequence listed above, please rate the certainty of occurrence 
in percentage. 




























Please list the expected difficulties that your friend might face in trying to implement 









Please take a few minutes to list possible immediate consequences for your friend, 
positive and negative, of leaving things the way they are and not making a change. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 
o 5 ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Now please try to think of and list any possible long-term consequences for your 
friend that could ensue from the immediate consequences you listed above. 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
o 4 ________________________________________________ 




Finally, beside each consequence listed above, please rate the certainty of occurrence 
in percentage. 































Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible.  
Think about significant aspects of your life that you feel UNCERTAIN about. List 
the THREE (3) that you feel MOST UNCERTAIN about? 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 
o 3 ________________________________________________ 
 
Self-certainty manipulation 
Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. 
Think about significant aspects of your life that you feel CERTAIN about. List the 
THREE (3) that you feel MOST CERTAIN about? 
o 1. ________________________________________________ 
o 2. ________________________________________________ 











[Anchors: Very slightly or not at all (1),   A little (2), Moderately (3), Quite a bit 
























Below is a short cognitive task. Please complete the word by filling in the missing 
letters and write the word in the space next to the word.  If there is more than one 
possible word, just fill in the first one that comes to mind.     For instance, if you 
see  ' _ e _ r a'     You could write 'zebra'     Please work quickly and do not spend too 
much time on any one stem.  If you cannot think of a word, move on.   
CHA _ _  
DO _ _ _  
C _ NTR _ L  
PLA _ _  
_ _ OK  
CL _ _ K  
WAT _ _  
SH _ _ Y  
TAB _ _  
W _ _ DOW  
MU _ _  
_ _ NG  
TR _ _  
B _ T _ LE  
T _ _ N  
P _ P _ R  
V _ _ UE  
M_ J _ R  
P _ _ TURE  
_ O _ SE  
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FL _ W _ R  
_ NS _ RE  
R _ _ _ LESS  
POST _ _  
K _ _GS 
 
Felt General Uncertainty 
Indicate to what extent you feel in the ways described below right now, at the present 
moment. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Very much 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Mixed 1 2 3 4 5 
Uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 
Torn 1 2 3 4 5 
Bothered 1 2 3 4 5 
Preoccupied 1 2 3 4 5 
Confused 1 2 3 4 5 
Unsure of self or goals 1 2 3 4 5 
Contradictory 1 2 3 4 5 
Distractable 1 2 3 4 5 
Unclear 1 2 3 4 5 
Of two minds 1 2 3 4 5 
Muddled 1 2 3 4 5 
Restless 1 2 3 4 5 
Confused about identity 1 2 3 4 5 
Jumbled 1 2 3 4 5 
Uncomfortable 1 2 3 4 5 
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Conflicted 1 2 3 4 5 
Indecisive 1 2 3 4 5 
Chaotic 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Felt uncertainty about one’s self 
Anchors: Very uncertain (1) to Very certain (9) 
Overall, how uncertain/certain do you feel about yourself?    
    
Very uncertain       Very certain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Overall, how uncertain/certain do you feel about your future? 
Very uncertain       Very certain 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Identity motive satisfaction 
Using the scale, please indicate the extent to which each statement describes 
your feelings at the present moment. Right now, how much do you feel... 
Anchors: Not at all (1) to Entirely (5) 
… your past, present and future are connected  
… your life has no clear purpose  
… satisfied with yourself  
… included  
... unique  
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… that your life has a ‘story’  
… unsure about the meaning of your life  
… incompetent  
… left out  
… interchangeable with others  
… a sense of belonging  
… competent  
… a sense of continuity between past, present and future in your life  
… capable of coping with challenges  
… your life has a clear sense of purpose  
… excluded  
… your life is meaningful  
… anonymous  
… you have high self-esteem  
… comfortable with yourself  
… confused about the real meaning of your life  
… indistinguishable from others  
… close to who you were in the past and who you will be in the future  
… that you do not respect yourself  
... a sense of discontinuity between your past, present and future  
… you understand your life’s meaning  
… unable to deal with your challenges  
… it is unpleasant to think about yourself  
… you have a distinctive role in life  
… unable to fulfil your goals  
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… dissatisfied with yourself  
… that, in the course of your life, you have changed beyond recognition  
… close to others  
… confident to achieve your goals  
… insecure about your self-worth  
… that there is not much continuity in your life  
… your life is meaningless  
… incapable  
… accepted  
… too similar to others  
… you have the knowledge and skill you need  
… that your past, present and future are disconnected  
… rejected by others  
… you stand out from others  
… your role in life is meaningful  













Country of birth: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
For how many years have you lived in the UK? 
I have always lived in the UK.  
If you have not always lived in the UK, for how many years have you lived in the 
UK? (Please only report full years and write this in digits e.g. “7” rather than “seven 
years”.) ________________________________________________ 
 
What is your nationality? (if dual or mixed, please describe as accurately as possible) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What is your ethnic group? 
o White  
o Black-African  
o Black-Caribbean  
o Asian-Chinese  
o Asian-Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi  





Are you currently pursuing a University degree (Undergraduate, Masters, PhD etc.)? 
o Yes  
o No  





Do you belong to a religion? 
o No, I do not belong to any religion  
o Yes, Christian (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Jewish (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Muslim (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Hindu (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Buddhist (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 












Finally, we would just like you to answer a set of questions about the tasks you have 
just completed for us. 
 







Have you completed any of these tasks before today? 
o Yes  
o No  
 











Thank you for your time.   
The main aim of the study was to compare the effectiveness of two different types of 
self-uncertainty manipulation (i.e. tasks that are meant to engender some form of 
doubt with regards to the self and/or one’s worldviews). Firstly, hidden among a 
series of filler items regarding preferences and personality traits, we measured 
explicit self-esteem (“I have high self-esteem”) and implicit self-esteem (“How 
much do you like your name, in total?”). Then, in the direct uncertainty manipulation 
condition participants were asked to either list three important aspects of their life 
that make them feel uncertain (or certain, in the control condition). In the indirect 
uncertainty manipulation condition they were asked to think and write about an 
unresolved personal dilemma (or a friend’s unresolved personal dilemma, in the 
control condition). A fifth condition was added (called the ‘baseline condition’) 
where participants were not given any of the above mentioned tasks. Afterwards, 
half of the participants across all conditions were asked to fill in a measure of affect 
(“Please rate to what extent you feel in each of the following ways at the present 
moment” - Interested, Distressed, Excited etc.). This was included as a delay after 
the manipulation and before the outcome variables. Evidence in the literature is 
mixed about whether people inhibit feelings of uncertainty in the first moments after 
encountering the uncertainty-inducing stimulus.      Outcome variables were meant to 
measure the effects of the self-uncertainty manipulations. They included a word 
completion task that measured how often the word stems would be completed with 
uncertainty-related words (e.g. “do _ _ _” can be completed using either “doubt” or 
“doors”). This indicated how accessible uncertainty-related words were to 
participants. Next, participants were asked to rate how much they felt that a series of 
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uncertainty-related words described them (e.g. mixed, uneasy, torn). Finally, 
participants expressed agreement or disagreement with a number of statements 
which helped identify the exact nature of the threat experienced (e.g. self-esteem 
threat:  “…dissatisfied with yourself”, meaning threat: “… your life has no clear 
sense of purpose”).      Demographic data was also collected and participants were 
asked to speculate on the purpose of the study to see to what extent they were aware 
of the concepts measured.     PLEASE REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSING THESE 
DETAILS WITH FELLOW STUDENTS WHILE DATA COLLECTION IS 
STILL TAKING PLACE. If you have any concerns or questions related to this 



















Paper 2 (preliminary questionnaire materials) 
Introduction and consent 
Welcome to the preliminary part of our study on personal experience. This is a very 
short questionnaire (less than 5 minutes) that will ask you to reflect on your life as a 
whole and express agreement or disagreement on a number of statements about how 
you see your life. There are no right or wrong answers; we would simply like to 
know what you think. Also, don't spend too long on any one item; usually, the 
first answer that comes to mind is the best.      Your participation is voluntary and 
you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving an explanation. 
All data we collect from you will be treated as confidential and will only be accessed 
by the research team. You can withdraw your data from the study at any point before 
data analysis has commenced (to do so, you will need to quote your Unique ID, 
generated on the next page).  At the end of the study, you will be debriefed and the 
aims and purposes of our research will be fully explained.       The results of the 
study will be written up for my PhD thesis and for academic papers that may be 
submitted for publication. No identifiable information will be used in the write-
up.     This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools 
Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference 
number is ER/VC69/5. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its 
legal liabilities in respect of this study.     By ticking the box below and clicking 
next, you acknowledge that you are over 16, have read and understood the 
information above, and consent to take part. 






Book a time for main study 
Please book a time when you can come to the Pevensey 1 experimental cubicles 
(map included in the link below)  for the main part of our study. This must be 
scheduled at least 7 days from now.  
Book using the link below. This will open in a new page. After booking a time, 
please return to this page to continue filling in this questionnaire.   
vladcostin-study.youcanbook.me   
 
Unique ID 
Please complete the information below which we need to be able to match your 
responses to the first and the second part of the study while protecting your 
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anonymity (in case you do not know one of those information, please put 
ZERO). Please enter all the letters in CAPITALS. 
 
The third letter of your first name  
________________________________________________ 
The day in the month which you were born (e.g. 21) 
________________________________________________ 
The first letter of your mother’s first name 
________________________________________________ 
The day in the month which your mother was born (e.g. 15) 
________________________________________________ 
The first letter of your father’s first name 
________________________________________________ 
 
Meaning in life 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Fully disagree (1) to Fully agree (5)] 
My life is meaningful.  
My life as a whole has meaning.  
My entire existence is full of meaning.  
My life is meaningless.  
My existence is empty of meaning.  




Purpose in life 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Fully disagree (1) to Fully agree (5)] 
 
I have a good sense of what I am trying to accomplish in life.   
I have a sense of direction and purpose in life.  
I always have a series of goals to pursue.  
I often feel like I am following a path in life.  
Setting goals seems like a waste of time.   
I often feel like I am wandering aimlessly through life.  
My life has no purpose.  




o Male  
o Female  





Your relationship status:  
o not in a relationship  
o married  
o separated  
o in a committed relationship  
o divorced  
o widowed  
o other (please specify) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Country of birth 
▼ Afghanistan ... Zimbabwe 
 
Country of residence 
▼ Afghanistan ... Zimbabwe 
 





What is your highest educational qualification? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Are you currently pursuing a University degree (Undergraduate, Masters, PhD etc.)? 
o Yes  
o No  
 
If you have answered 'Yes' to the previous question, please specify your course: 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Your employment status: 
▼ Full-time employee ... Not applicable 
 
Your current or former occupation: 
▼ Professional or managerial (e.g., lawyer, university teacher, company manager) ... 
Student 
 
Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in Britain. At the top of the 
ladder are people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most 
education, and best jobs. At the bottom are those who have the least money, least 
education, and worst jobs or no job. 
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 Please select the number of the rung that best represents where you think you 
stand on the ladder.  
▼ 10 ... 1 
 
Compared to other people in this country, how would you describe your (or your 
family’s) level of financial wealth? If you are in full-time education, please indicate 
your parent’s or legal guardian’s level of financial wealth. 
o Very poor  
o Moderately poor  
o Below average wealth  
o Average wealth  
o Above average wealth  
o Moderately rich  




Which one of the following best describes the place where you are currently living?  
o City/large town  
o Smaller/average town  
o Village/rural  
 
Which one of the following best describes the place where you grew up? 
o City/large town  
o Smaller/average town  




Do you belong to a religion? 
o No, I do not belong to any religion  
o Yes, Christian (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Jewish (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Muslim (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Hindu (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Buddhist (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, other (please specify) 
________________________________________________ 
 
End of preliminary study 
Thank you very much for responding to our initial measures. Please turn up to your 
chosen time to the Pevensey 1 experimental cubicles.  
 




Study 2 (main questionnaire materials) 
Introduction and consent 
Welcome to our main study on personal experiences. The first part of the study is 
qualitative (involves collecting rich textual data) and is looking at how people think 
about specific past events in their lives. It will consist of two brief reflection tasks 
that will take around 12-15 minutes. The second part of the study will ask you to 
reflect on your life as a whole and express agreement or disagreement on a number 
of statements about how you see your life. This part will take around 5 minutes. The 
whole questionnaire should last about 20 minutes. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we would simply like to know what you think.  
  Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving an explanation. All data we collect from you will be treated as 
confidential and will only be accessed by the research team. You can withdraw your 
data from the study at any point before data analysis has commenced (to do so, you 
will need to quote your Unique ID, generated on the next page).  At the end of the 
study, you will be debriefed and the aims and purposes of our research will be fully 
explained. The results of the study will be written up for my PhD thesis and for 
academic papers that may be submitted for publication. No identifiable information 
will be used in the write-up. This study has been approved by the Sciences & 
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). 
The project reference number is ER/VC69/5. The University of Sussex has insurance 
in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. By ticking the box below 
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and clicking next, you acknowledge that you are over 16, have read and understood 
the information above, and consent to take part.   
▢  I agree  
 
Unique ID 
Please complete the information below which we need to be able to match your 
responses to the first and the second part of the study while protecting your 
anonymity (in case you do not know one of those information, please put 
ZERO). Please enter all the letters in CAPITALS. 
The third letter of your first name 
________________________________________________ 
The day in the month which you were born (e.g. 21) 
________________________________________________ 
The first letter of your mother’s first name 
________________________________________________ 
The day in the month which your mother was born (e.g. 15) 
________________________________________________ 
The first letter of your father’s first name 
________________________________________________ 
 
Low belongingness induction 
Please recall a particular incident in which you have felt intensely rejected in some 
way, times that you felt as if you did not belong. These can be experiences of 
rejection from another person (e.g. a time when someone no longer wanted to be 
your friend) or they can be experiences of rejection from a group (e.g., a time when 
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you were excluded from a group of people). Please describe the situation in which 







High belongingness induction 
Please recall a particular incident in which you have felt accepted in some way, 
times that you felt as if you belonged. These can be experiences of acceptance from 
another person (e.g. a time when someone wanted to be your friend) or they can be 
experiences of acceptance from a group (e.g., a time when you were included in a 
group of people). Please describe the situation in which you felt you belonged– what 













Low control induction 
Please recall a particular incident in which you did not have any control over the 
situation. Please describe the situation in which you felt a complete lack of control – 







High control induction 
Please recall a particular incident in which you were in complete control of the 
situation. Please describe the situation in which you felt in complete control– what 








Please rate to what extent you feel in each of the following ways at the present 
moment: 
























Meaning in life (same as in the preliminary study) 







Thank you very much for your valuable responses! 




Paper 3, Study 1 questionnaire 
 
Introduction and consent 
Welcome to our study on the experience of meaning in life. We want to see how 
people experience their lives as having or not having meaning. You will be shown 
several sets of statements about how you feel at the present moment. You will have 
to specify to what extent you agree or disagree with them. There are no right or 
wrong answers; we would simply like to know what you think. Also, don't spend 
too long on any one item; often, the first answer that comes to mind is the best.    
Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving an explanation. All data we collect from you will be treated as 
confidential and will only be accessed by the research team. You can withdraw your 
data from the study at any point before data analysis has commenced.  At the end of 
the study, you will be debriefed and the aims and purposes of our research will be 
fully explained. The results of the study will be written up for my PhD thesis and for 
academic papers that may be submitted for publication. No identifiable information 
will be used in the write-up. This study has been approved by the Sciences & 
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). 
The project reference number is ER/VC69/5. The University of Sussex has insurance 
in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. By ticking the box below 
and clicking next, you acknowledge that you are over 16, have read and understood 
the information above, and consent to take part.  






▼ Under 18 ... 99 
How would you describe your level of English? 
o Native  
o Fluent  
o Working proficiency  
o Basic proficiency  
 
Exclusion 
Unfortunately, you are not eligible to take part in this study. Thank you for your 
time! 
If you have any further questions or concerns about the study, please contact Vlad 













Please rate to what extent you feel in each of the following ways at the present 
moment: 

























Meaning in life 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
My life is meaningful.  
My life as a whole has meaning.  
My entire existence is full of meaning.  
My life is meaningless.  
My existence is empty of meaning.  
I feel that there is no meaning in my life. 
 
Purpose in life 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
I have a good sense of what I am trying to accomplish in life.  
I have a sense of direction and purpose in life.  
I always have a series of goals to pursue.  
I often feel like I am following a path in life.  
I have overarching goals that guide me in my life.  
I have aims in my life that are worth striving for.  
I have certain life goals that compel me to keep going.  
I have goals in life that are very important to me.  
My direction in life is motivating to me.  
I often feel like I am wandering aimlessly through life.  
My life has no purpose.  
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I don’t know what I am trying to accomplish in life.  
My goals don't seem connected to one another  
My current life course is not motivating  
I don’t have compelling life goals that keep me going. 
 
Sense of coherence 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
I feel that events in my life follow a certain order.  
I often feel that I can predict what is going to happen next.  
I can see a connection between past, present and future events in my life.  
My experiences tend to have common themes.  
I can see how my decisions are influenced by my previous experiences.  
My life makes sense.  
I know what my life is about.  
I can make sense of the things that happen in my life.  
I understand my life  
Looking at my life as a whole, things seem clear to me.  
I don’t understand what my life is about.  
I can’t make sense of events in my life.  
I often feel that my life is chaotic.  
My life feels like a sequence of unconnected events.  
I see past, present and future events in my life as disconnected.  
I struggle to find common themes that tie my experiences together.  




Sense of significance 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
My life is inherently valuable.  
Even a thousand years from now, it would still matter whether I existed or not.  
Whether my life ever existed matters even in the grand scheme of the universe.  
I am certain that my life is of importance.  
Even considering how big the universe is, I can say that my life matters.  
There is nothing special about my existence.  
My existence is not significant in the grand scheme of things.  
Given the vastness of the universe, my life does not matter.  
My life has no objective value. 
 
Sense of control 
Using the scale, please indicate your feelings at the present moment by selecting 
how much you agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
The events in my life are mainly determined by my own actions.  
I feel like I am free to make my choices.  
I feel that I have complete control over my life.  
I am not in control of most things that occur in my life  
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What I do has very little effect on what happens to me.  
I feel constrained by things outside of my control. 
 
Self-liking 
The statements below describe ways in which you might feel about yourself. Please 
indicate how you see yourself at the present moment by selecting how much you 
agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
I tend to devalue myself.  
I am very comfortable with myself.  
I am secure in my sense of self-worth.  
It is sometimes unpleasant for me to think about myself.  
I have a negative attitude towards myself.  
I feel great about who I am.  
I never doubt my personal self-worth.  
I do not have enough respect for myself. 
 
Sense of belongingness 
The statements below describe ways in which you might feel about yourself. Please 
indicate how you see yourself at the present moment by selecting how much you 
agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
I feel included.  
I feel that I fit in.  
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I feel accepted.  
I have many experiences in common with those around me.  
I feel a sense of togetherness with my peers.  
I feel rejected by others.  
I don’t feel that I participate with anyone or any group.  
I feel excluded.  
My experiences are very different from those who are usually around me.  
I feel like an outsider. 
 
Connectedness with others 
Below are seven diagrams that express varying degrees of relatedness or 
connectedness with some other people. For each of the people listed below, indicate 
which diagram best expresses your relationship with that person.  
 





The relationship between you and your close friends.  
 




The statements below describe ways in which you might feel about yourself. Please 
indicate how you see yourself at the present moment by selecting how much you 
agree with the following statements: 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
I am highly effective at the things I do.   
I am almost always able to accomplish what I try for.   
I perform very well at many things.   
I am very talented.   
At times, I find it difficult to achieve the things that are important to me.   
I sometimes deal poorly with challenges.   
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I sometimes fail to fulfil my goals.   
I wish I were more skillful in my activities. 
 
FAD-Plus 
For each statement below, indicate how much you agree or disagree. 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
People have complete control over the decisions they make.   
People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make.   
People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to.   
Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do.   
People have complete free will.   
People are always at fault for their bad behavior.   
Strength of mind can always overcome the body's desires.   
People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality.  
Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior.   
Your genes determine your future.   
Science has shown how your past environment created your current intelligence and 
personality.   
As with other animals, human behavior always follows the laws of nature.   
Parents' character will determine the character of their children.   
Childhood environment will determine your success as an adult.   
I believe that the future has already been determined by fate.   
No matter how hard you try, you can’t change your destiny.   
Fate already has a plan for everyone.   
Whether people like it or not, mysterious forces seem to move their lives.   
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Whatever will be, will be – there’s not much you can do about it  
Chance events seem to be the major cause of human history.  
No one can predict what will happen in this world.  
Life seems unpredictable - just like throwing dice or flipping a coin.  
People are unpredictable.  
Luck plays a big role in people’s lives.  
What happens to people is a matter of chance.  
Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random.  
People’s futures cannot be predicted. 
 
Government and control 
For each statement below, indicate how much   you agree or disagree. 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
In general, my country’s political system operates as it should  
Most policies serve the greater good  
In general, I’m satisfied with the way things are in my country. 
 
Religion and control; religious orientation 
Thinking about your religious and spiritual beliefs, as well as your conception of 
God, please use the following response scales to answer the questions below.  





To what extent do you think it is feasible   that God, or some type of nonhuman 
entity, is in control, at least in part,  of the events within our universe? 
 
To what extent do you think that the events   that occur in this world unfold 
according to God’s, or some type of nonhuman   entity’s, plan? 
 
How often do you attend religious services and activities? 
o never  
o 1-2 times a year  
o 2-6 times a year  
o 7-11 times a year  
o 1-3 times a month  




How often do you pray or meditate outside of religious   services? 
o never  
o 1-11 times a year  
o about once a month  
o about once a week  
o about once a day  
o several times daily  
 
In general, how religious do you consider   yourself? 
o not at all religious  
o slightly religious  
o moderately religious  
o very religious  





In general, how spiritual do you consider   yourself? 
o not at all spiritual  
o slightly spiritual  
o moderately spiritual  
o very spiritual  
o extremely spiritual  
 
How much does religion influence the way you act in everyday life? 
o Not at all  
o Slightly  
o Moderately  
o Very  












o Male  
o Female  
o Other (please specify) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Your relationship status:  
o not in a relationship  
o married  
o separated  
o in a committed relationship  
o divorced  
o widowed  







Country of birth 
▼ Afghanistan ... Zimbabwe 
 
 
Country of residence 
▼ Afghanistan ... Zimbabwe 
 








Are you currently pursuing a University degree (Undergraduate, Masters, PhD etc.)? 
o Yes  
o No  
 





Your employment status: 
▼ Full-time employee ... Retired 
 
Your current or former occupation: 




Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in your country. At the top of 
the ladder are people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most 
education, and best jobs. At the bottom are those who have the least money, least 
education, and worst jobs or no job. 
  
         
 Please select the number of the rung that best represents where you think you 
stand on the ladder.  





Compared to other people in your country, how would you describe your (or your 
family’s) level of financial wealth? If you are in full-time education, please indicate 
your parent’s or legal guardian’s level of financial wealth. 
o Very poor  
o Moderately poor  
o Below average wealth  
o Average wealth  
o Above average wealth  
o Moderately rich  
o Very rich  
 
 
Which one of the following best describes the place where you are currently living?  
o City/large town  
o Smaller/average town  





Which one of the following best describes the place where you grew up? 
o City/large town  
o Smaller/average town  




Do you belong to a religion? 
o No, I do not belong to any religion  
o Yes, Christian (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Jewish (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Muslim (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Hindu (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 
o Yes, Buddhist (Please specify the denomination in the box below) 
________________________________________________ 












Thank you for your valuable participation! We would like to collect some more data 
at three future time points: one month from now, two months from now and three 
months from now. These questionnaires will be significantly shorter than this one. It 
would be very useful for our research if we can collect these measures from you at 
these future time points.  
Please indicate whether we can contact you for future studies. 
o Yes, I am happy to be contacted  
o No  
 
Unique ID 
Please complete the information below. We need to be able to match your responses 
on the different parts of the study while protecting your anonymity.  
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In case you do not know one of those information, please put ZERO. Please enter all 
the letters in CAPITALS. 
o The third letter of your first name 
________________________________________________ 
o The day in the month which you were born (e.g. 21) 
________________________________________________ 
o The first letter of your mother’s first name 
________________________________________________ 
o The day in the month which your mother was born (e.g. 15) 
________________________________________________ 




      Please click here to provide your e-mail address in a separate survey. This will 
ensure that the data you just submitted cannot be linked to your personal email 









Thank you for your time! This study had several aims:  
a) To develop a measure of significance (i.e. the sense that one's life has value), 
coherence (i.e. sense that one's life is orderly and predictable) and purpose (i.e. a 
central life aim), and see whether they emerge as meaningful subcomponents of 
meaning. Also, we wanted to test whether they are related to self-reported meaning 
in life judgements.   
b) To see whether sense of control (the feeling that we control important outcomes), 
self-esteem (the perception that we are worthy and valuable) and sense of 
belongingness (the sense that we belong and are connected to others around us) all 
predict perceptions of meaning in life, and whether they differentially predict the 
three subcomponents.  
c) Because we ran the study at three different time points (each one about 2 weeks 
apart), we can trace different meaning trajectories and determine which of our 
predictors affect meaning scores across time.   
 
In the event that the study has raised any distressing issues, we encourage you to 
seek help from a friend, family member, doctor, counsellor, support group, or other 
source that you see as appropriate.  
If you have any further questions or concerns about the study, please contact Vlad 








Paper 4 questionnaire materials 
Intro and consent 
Belief systems study   
 People hold beliefs, attitudes, opinions and values through which they interpret the 
world around them. As such, we would like to find out your views on a number of 
topics ranging from political orientation and religion to more particular issues such 
as abortion and capital punishment. For each of these topics you will be shown a list 
of statements and you will have to choose the one that best describes your position 
with regards to that issue. Then you will be asked how much you agree or disagree 
with a series of statements related to each of your selected beliefs. The whole study 
is expected to take no longer than 30 minutes. There are no right or wrong 
answers; we would simply like to know what you think. Also, don't spend too 
long on any one item; often, the first answer that comes to mind is the best.  
 Giving consent 
 Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from the study without 
giving an explanation. All data we collect from you will be treated as confidential 
and will only be accessed by the research team. You can withdraw your data from 
the study at any point before MTurk payment has been processed.  At the end of the 
study, you will be debriefed and the aims and purposes of our research will be fully 
explained.      The results of the study will be written up for my PhD thesis and for 
academic papers that may be submitted for publication. No identifiable information 
will be used in the write-up.     This study has been approved by the Sciences & 
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). 
The project reference number is ER/VC69/5. The University of Sussex has insurance 
in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.     By clicking the box 
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below and clicking next, you acknowledge that you are over 18, have read and 
understood the information above, and consent to take part.    




o Male  
o Female  






Your sexual  orientation: 
o Heterosexual or straight  
o Gay or lesbian  
o Bisexual  





Your relationship status:  
o not in a relationship  
o married  
o separated  
o in a committed relationship  
o divorced  
o widowed  






What is your ethnic group? 
 
 
Are you currently pursuing a University degree (Undergraduate, Masters, PhD etc.)? 
If you have answered 'Yes', please specify your course: 
o Yes ________________________________________________ 








Your employment status: 
▼ Full-time employee ... Not employed / Student / Retired 
 
Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in your country. At the top of 
the ladder are people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most 
education, and best jobs. At the bottom are those who have the least money, least 
education, and worst jobs or no job. 
  
Please select the number of the rung that best represents where you think you 
stand on the ladder.  
▼ 10 ... 1 
 
Your religion: 
o Atheist  
o Agnostic  
o Christian  
o Jewish  
o Muslim  
o Hindu  
o Buddhist  












On each of the next few pages, there is a set of statements about a particular issue, or 
a set of values. On each page, you will be asked to choose an option that best reflects 
your system of beliefs, or set of values. 
 For some of these items you will have the option to type a statement of your own if 
you feel that the ones provided do not reflect your views; this can be anything that 
you see as related to the respective topic.  Where this option is not available, please 
choose the option from the ones provided that you find most appealing.  
 
Equality in society 
 
Equality in society 
 
Please choose one of the statements below. Or if none of these reflect what you 
believe, please select the ‘Other’ box and write a statement there. 
o It’s a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom  
o We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally  
o Success depends more on the circumstances into which one is born than hard 
work  
o By working hard one can overcome most obstacles that life presents and 
make his or her own way in the world  











Please choose one of the statements below. You might endorse more than one of the 
positions below, please chose just one statement that you feel most drawn to.  
o One should avoid causing physical or emotional harm to others  
o One should not treat some people differently than others; all people’s rights 
need to be respected and they should be treated fairly  
o One should be loyal and place the interests of the group above one’s own  
o One should fulfill his or her duties and show respect for legitimate authorities  
o Traditions should be upheld as they serve important roles within one's 
community  
o When one makes moral judgements, one must also consider whether things 





Please choose one of the statements below. Or if none of these reflect what you 
believe, please select the ‘Other’ box and write a statement there. 
o Abortion should be legal and readily accessible to people requesting it  
o To protect the rights of the unborn baby, legal abortion should never be 
available  
o Abortion should only be allowed only in case of rape, incest, or life-
threatening situations  









Please choose one of the statements below. Or if none of these reflect what you 
believe, please select the ‘Other’ box and write a statement there. 
o A murderer deserves to die  
o Capital punishment is absolutely never justified  
o Capital punishment is necessary for some crimes  




































Below are a set of values that people might see as guiding principles. Please choose 
the one that you find most appealing.  
o POWER (social power, authority, wealth)  
o ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition, influence on people and 
events)  
o HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence)  
o STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life)  
o SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing 
one's own goals)  
o UNIVERSALISM (broad-mindedness, beauty of nature and arts, social 
justice, a world at peace, equality, wisdom, unity with nature, environmental 
protection)  
o BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility)  
o TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in 
life, devotion, modesty)  
o CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline,  
politeness)  
o SECURITY (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness,  














Free will / determinism 
 
Free will / determinism 
Please choose one of the statements below. Or if none of these reflect what you 
believe, please select the ‘Other’ box and write a statement there. 
o One has complete control over the decisions one makes; one can overtake 
any obstacles if they truly want to  
o One could have free will even if scientists discovered all of the laws that 
govern all human behavior  
o Every event that has ever occurred, including human decisions and actions, 
was completely determined by prior events  
o Life is hard to predict because it is almost totally random; what happens to 
people is a matter of chance  
o Fate determines one’s successes and failures  






























Please choose one of the statements below. Or if none of these reflect what you 
believe, please select the ‘Other’ box and write a statement there. 
o Powerful people tend to exploit others  
o The only way to get ahead is to take advantage of others  
o People are inherently generous and kind-hearted  
o Most people mean well and can be trusted  
o Other ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Relationships to important others 
 
Please think of two people who are important to you and provide each of their names 
below. 
 . 
Name of person 1  (e.g. Jane)   





Relationships to important others 2 
 
Please complete the sentences below by specifying who you are in relation to each 
of the important people that you've named on the previous page. E.g. If Sam is 
your son the write "I am Sam's mother" 
 . 
I am [piped text]'s ________   



















Thank you for your answers so far. You are now halfway through the questionnaire.  
The next questions refer back to some of the answers you have just given. Use the 
scales provided to respond to each of the following statements. [I just included an 
example of each type of instruction used, i.e., value, belief, identity; the other ones 
are identical except for stating the corresponding meaning framework domain, e.g., 
morality, human nature] 
 
Sources - Equality 
 
Equality in society  
 
You said that [piped text] 
 
How important is this to you personally? 
[Anchors: Not at all important (1) to Extremely important (5))] 
 
Please use the scales below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
Believing that [piped text] makes me think that life is objectively meaningful 





Regardless of your belief that [piped text], please select strongly disagree from the 
options below: 
 
Believing that [piped text] makes me feel: 
A sense of purpose and direction in my life.  
A sense of order and coherence in my life.  
That my life matters in the grand scheme of things. 
 
Believing that [piped text] makes me feel: 
Positive about myself.  
Included with others.  
Competent.  
A sense of control.  
Distinctive.  





















From a list of values, you selected [piped text] 
 
How important is this to you personally? 
[Anchors: Not at all important (1) to Extremely important (5))] 
 
Please use the scales below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
 
Valuing [piped text] makes me think that life is objectively meaningful 
Valuing [piped text] makes me feel a sense of meaningfulness in my life. 
 
Regardless of your belief that [piped text], please select somewhat disagree from the 
options below: 
Valuing [piped text] makes me feel: 
A sense of purpose and direction in my life.  
A sense of order and coherence in my life.  
That my life matters in the grand scheme of things. 
 
Valuing [piped text] makes me feel: 
Positive about myself.  




A sense of control.  
Distinctive.  
Connected to my past and my future. 
 
Sources - Important others person 2 
 
Being [piped text] 's [piped text]  
 
How important is this to you personally? 
[Anchors: Not at all important (1) to Extremely important (5))] 
 
Please use the scales below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements. 
[Anchors: Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (7))] 
Being [piped text] 's [piped text] makes me think that life is objectively meaningful 
 
Being [piped text] 's [piped text] makes me feel a sense of meaningfulness in my 
life. 
 
Being [piped text] 's [piped text] makes me feel: 
 






Thanks you for participating! 
 
Your validation code is: 
${e://Field/mTurkCode} 
To receive payment for participating, enter this validation code in the Mechanical 
Turk window, then click “Submit”. 
  
What the study was about  
Meaning frameworks are complex webs of propositions that people hold about how 
things are (or should) be in the world. It has been speculated that meaning 
frameworks can create a sense of meaningfulness to the extent that they contribute to 
the three proposed dimensions of meaning in life: coherence, purpose and 
significance. We predict that a meaning framework that more strongly contributes to 
all three meaning dimensions will also be rated as most meaningful.  Additionally, 
we selected four other psychological constructs that have been identified in previous 
research as sources of meaning: control, belongingness, self-esteem and competence. 
We aim to assess whether people's experience of meaningfulness is contingent upon 
any of these four. In that case, that would suggest the need to consider additional 
dimensions of meaning.       
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please contact Vlad Costin 
at v.costin@sussex.ac.uk 
 
